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CHANGING APPRECIATION OF THE SOVIET PROBLEM*

By MARSHALL D. SHULMAN

WHETHER we articulate them or not, the assumptions that we make concerning the future development of the Soviet system are fundamental to our thinking about American foreign policy. The objectives toward which we can reasonably direct our efforts, the philosophy of our situation, are in a very large measure a function of the image we have in our minds of the changes we discern or anticipate in the character of the society and the government of the Russian people.

In recent years, we have come to learn a great deal about aspects of the Soviet Union, certainly much more than is reflected in public discussion. But of the actual distribution of power within the Soviet system, or of the laws governing the development of a modern totalitarian state, we still know very little. Necessarily, our thoughts regarding the changes which time can be expected to produce in this confrontation lead us into the realm of speculative projection from rather tenuous data.

The data at our disposal are, however, constantly increasing, and the assumptions on which we are operating require constant examination. It is evident that the present period is witnessing changes of a profound character in the Communist world, although it is certainly too soon to say with assurance what these changes signify, let alone to describe what they are. Even such fragments of information as are suggested by recent developments in the Soviet situation open up perspectives of the problem more profoundly challenging for American policy, both foreign and domestic, than have yet been faced in current discussion of these matters.

I

Whatever one might think of the Soviet regime, the Soviet achievements in World War II made it necessary to think about it in a somewhat longer-term perspective than many had been accustomed to before the war. As Stalin justifiably boasted in his electoral speech of 1946, the Soviet Union could no longer be regarded as a transient phenomenon.

For the most part, the prevailing conception which was brought to

* Acknowledgment is gratefully made to the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, under whose shelter this article was prepared.

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this longer perspective was of the Soviet Union as a variant of the Western pattern of political and economic development. Those who were sympathetically inclined continued to see the Soviet Union as an advance in Western social development, and analogized from Western revolutionary experience in deriving their expectations of its future course. Projecting a normative life cycle for revolutions, they anticipated that time could be expected to bring about a diminution of its harsher aspects, and that the social advance would remain in a domesticated form. To those who were more critically disposed, it was also possible to conceive of the Soviet order as an aberration from the normal, i.e., the Western, pattern of development, the degree of aberration representing the extent of the contradiction between reality and the Soviet path of development. In this view, it was anticipated that events would oblige the rulers of the Soviet Union to realize the error, if not the unfeasibility, of their ways, and in time to return to a more "normal" pattern of development and of relationship with other nations. If the Soviet leaders persisted in their error, it was felt, they would in time be replaced by another and more realistic regime.

In his remarkable article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," published eleven years ago, under the pseudonym "X,"[1] Mr. George Kennan proposed that the frustration of Russia's expansionist tendencies would be likely to lead either to the breakup or to the "gradual mellowing" of Soviet power. The argument was based upon the assumption that the Soviet Union was faced with powerful internal strains: economic weakness and imbalance, the exhaustion and disaffection of the population, the problem of succession, the difficulty of bringing the younger generation into the system of power, and other factors which added up to the strong possibility that the Soviet power bore within itself the seeds of its own decay in a less-than-ultimate sense. These strains would, if Soviet external pressures were met and blocked by counterforce, produce fundamental changes in the character of the regime, presumably moderating the features responsible for the situation of conflict with the rest of the world. Leaving aside the question of the validity of the general proposition, whose essential condition was only partly realized in the following period, the question involved here is what expectation was suggested by the concept of the "mellowing" of Soviet power. What Mr. Kennan himself had in mind was more fully set forth in another essay, "America and the Russian Future," which he published in 1951.[2] There are many aspects of this landmark essay deserving of

[1] *Foreign Affairs,* XXV, No. 4 (July 1947), pp. 566-82.
[2] *Ibid.*, XXIX, No. 3 (April 1951), pp. 351-70.

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attention, but our interest at the moment is in the nature of the image it projected of the possible forms of development of the Soviet system.

Recognizing that the primary responsibility for enduring change in the Soviet system would have to come from within, and that there were rather narrow limits to what could be achieved from abroad, Mr. Kennan set forth a course of action for the United States that he believed most likely to influence Soviet development in the desired direction. His emphasis was upon perfecting our own society, so that we might set an example of "spiritual distinction." He took for granted the mounting of military strength and cohesiveness in the Western world, the necessity for which had been generally accepted by this time, and said that the purpose of this policy should be "to convince the masters of the Kremlin that their grand design is a futile and unachievable one, persistence in which promises no solution of their own predicaments and dilemmas."[8]

Mr. Kennan believed it possible, but unlikely, that desired changes could come about by evolution, "by erosion from despotism rather than by the violent upthrust of liberty." Chiefly, this was because he felt that the modern police state, unlike the despotisms of the past, does not have behind it "a driving political will," does not concern itself with the well-being of the people over whom it rules, does not recognize an obligation to the future, relies chiefly upon terror and coercion to maintain its power. He saw not only a dichotomy but a smoldering hostility between the small ruling group and the Russian people, and expressed faith that any such system, "based on the evil and weakness in man's nature," could never achieve genuine stability.

It was no use, Mr. Kennan warned, expecting Russia to become capitalist and liberal-democratic, with institutions like our own. We had to anticipate a continuation of the collective tradition, although in agriculture, which he saw as the Achilles' heel of the Soviet system, one could anticipate voluntary co-operatives instead of forcible collectives. Three minimum changes were required, however, for Russia to become the kind of a country we could live with in peace: abolition of the iron curtain, elimination of imperialist expansion and oppression, and elimination of totalitarian controls over the Russian population. These apart, the Russian people should be allowed to work out their internal problems in their own manner.

Subsequent thinking on the possibilities for change in the Soviet system has been substantially influenced by two developments: first, the

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 370.

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death of Stalin and the transfer of power to his successors have been handled by the regime, not without incident, but so far at least without the upheaval that many had anticipated; and second, Soviet economic and technological progress has continued at an extraordinary rate, and has so far at least managed to surmount agricultural, transportation, and other vulnerabilities as problems rather than as crises.

Perhaps the highest degree of optimism in the period following the death of Stalin was to be found in the writings of Mr. Isaac Deutscher, who argued that economic progress and the spread of literacy in the Soviet Union made possible—indeed, had already begun to produce—a transmutation of the Soviet system to a form of social democracy.[4] Although few other writers went as far, many began to explore the implications of the impact of industrialization upon Soviet society, and speculated on the ultimate effects of the emergence of a middle class, of a class of bureaucrats and technicians, with varying expectations.[5]

Even before the appearance of the Soviet earth satellite brought this point home forcibly and perhaps traumatically to the American public, it had become evident to students of Soviet affairs that the remarkable Soviet economic and technological progress made obligatory a revision of any expectations of a collapse of the regime resulting from the unsoundness of its economic base.

In 1956, for example, Mr. Henry Roberts, in his excellent summation of the Soviet problem, based upon a two-year study by a group of prominent Americans, indicated the impact of these developments on our thinking. "There is no question," he wrote, "but that the Soviet regime has made some remarkable achievements, and has been able to exploit the potentialities of twentieth-century technology and organization to a degree greater than we might have thought its cumbersome and doctrinaire outlook would permit."[6]

And when, in 1957, Mr. Kennan returned to the subject in his Reith lectures over the BBC, now published in the United States as *Russia, the Atom, and the West*, he began his series by acknowledging freely that Soviet economic progress had surpassed anything he had thought possible at the time of the "X" article ten years before.

However, he is concerned lest we exaggerate the significance of this

[4] *Russia—What Next?* Oxford, 1953.

[5] E. H. Carr, "The Structure of Soviet Society," *The Listener*, LIV, No. 1379 (August 4, 1955), pp. 167-68, and a letter by Hugh Seton-Watson to the editor of *The Listener* on the above article, *ibid.*, No. 1380 (August 11, 1955), pp. 222-23; Barrington Moore, Jr., *Terror and Progress—USSR*, Cambridge, Mass., 1954; Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Totalitarianism*, Cambridge, Mass., 1954.

[6] *Russia and America: Dangers and Prospects*, New York, 1956, p. 20.

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fact. In a part of his analysis which has received less public attention than other sections of the series,[7] Mr. Kennan endeavors to strike a new balance of the strengths and vulnerabilities of the Soviet system, and its prospects for change. He points to the imbalance of the Soviet economy, particularly in agriculture, and cites the familiar assurance that the Soviet rate of growth is likely to slow down as it runs out of the advantages of backwardness and begins to experience the problems common to other advanced industrial societies. In any case, material progress is not everything. The Russians, he finds, are inclined to be "Babbitts" about their economic growth just as we were some years ago, and they will become more mature about it in time. Despite Mr. Khrushchev's challenge, we are not in a contest between the two economies; rather we should welcome each advance of the Soviet economy. As to its effects upon the Soviet power position, Mr. Kennan is inclined to deprecate this concern, since "the danger is already so great that variations in degree do not have much meaning."

Mr. Kennan's equanimity about Soviet economic progress is strengthened by his estimate of the deepening crisis of Soviet political life. He holds that the Communist Party is in an unstable situation because of the existence outside of the Party of groups and interests that do not find, under the present system, representation in the political process. Another source of instability lies in the pressure of Soviet intellectuals, artists, and students for "complete intellectual and cultural freedom," which the Communist leaders cannot grant without undermining their own rule.

Mr. Kennan suggests, although he does not explicitly say so, that his expectations of an evolutionary pattern of development in the Soviet system are somewhat greater than they were at the time of his earlier writings, and he expresses the wish that "Russia's progress toward more mature political institutions might proceed with as little violence and trouble as possible."[8] In the meantime, as he has urged before, the chief means of countering the Soviet threat will be found in remedying our own failings: the racial problem, urban development, education, and so forth.

The impression this suggests is that, in his anxiety to counteract errors of emphasis in the public mind, Mr. Kennan has unbalanced his argument in the other direction. He is out to dispel the overmilitarized and frenetic cold warrior in us, and to induce instead a state of dignified composure and moral perfectibility. The posture he evokes is ap-

[7] *Russia, the Atom, and the West*, New York, 1958, pp. 2-31.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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pealing, but the question is whether it represents an appropriate or an adequate response to the problem in its present form.

II

What we know about the events of the past few years in the Soviet Union, fragmentary and inconclusive as the evidence may be, is suggestive of a much more complex and disturbing image of the pattern of development of the Soviet system than we have yet acknowledged. Although not necessarily contradictory of all that Mr. Kennan and others have been anticipating, the changes which seem to be in process lack some of the benignity and promise connoted by the term "mellowing" and, instead of bringing us closer to a "normalization" of our relations, seem more likely to effect our defeat.

Whereas ten years ago our policy proceeded on the confident assumption that "time is on our side," it is now the case that, unless we respond more adequately than we are doing to the situation created by Soviet internal and external developments, the reverse assumption appears the more probable.

Indeed, many things have happened in the Soviet Union in recent years which may in time turn out to have been part of a "progress toward more mature political institutions." But if the changes that have taken place turn out to be more than the cyclical alternations which have characterized Soviet policy from the beginning, the "maturity" they adumbrate represents a greater rather than a lesser challenge, different in character perhaps from the one we are accustomed to, but more profoundly threatening over the course of time.

Ferment has been reported among Soviet students, artists, and intellectuals, and the intermittent widening and narrowing of the latitudes of discussion and of creative activities which have been permitted by the regime suggest an experimental approach to the question of the limits to be accepted. While a lessening of the degree of Party control over the arts would constitute in that measure progress toward a less totalitarian society, it is not necessarily a question of absolute control or absolute freedom, as is suggested in Mr. Kennan's image of the pressure from these quarters for "complete intellectual and cultural freedom." Insofar as one can judge from the outside, the pressure of the intellectuals appears to be directed chiefly at a reduction in the interference by the Party in cultural matters, and does not imply a widespread political dissidence toward the regime, or an espousal of an alternative form of government.

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The administrative decentralization, apart from its other significance, may permit a degree of local initiative, although ample means for central control remain through Party and planning channels. The elimination of the Machine Tractor Stations not only may portend a change in the collective farm system, but even more importantly reflects a greater pragmatism in dealing with the organization of agriculture than would have been thought possible a few years ago. In responding to trouble in the satellites, the regime seems to be involved in a critical experiment as to the degree of variation in local patterns it can accept within its sphere, providing the adherence of the area to the Communist bloc is not in question. The somewhat greater emphasis on the production of consumer goods, the reported reduction in reliance upon military and administrative tribunals in the legal system, the less overt use of police surveillance, and the possibility of greater travel abroad and of more widespread cultural contacts with the non-Communist world—all these elements may portend a refinement and a modification in the nature of Soviet totalitarianism, although it would be disproportionate to regard these measures as "democratization" in any Western sense of the word.

While it is possible, as some writers maintain, to picture these measures as reluctant concessions by the leadership to threatening pressures from within, it is at least as plausible to suggest that the easing of controls in certain areas of administrative and cultural life is possible because the fundamental allegiance of the population can be taken for granted, and that the interests of efficiency are better served by reliance upon voluntary service to the interests of the state. Such samplings as exist of present or former Soviet citizens indicate substantial dissidence only among the peasantry,[9] whereas the predominant view of the population as a whole appears to be one of acceptance of the regime because it "works," because it provides opportunity for individual advancement, some improvement from year to year in living conditions, and has had external successes. If a smoldering hostility exists between the Russian people as a whole and the Soviet regime, it is not reflected in the evidence available abroad.

Further, the Communist Party has shown skill in identifying and absorbing potential interest groups outside itself, and thus in preventing the growth of independent power elements in the society. As the Roberts study pointed out to those who count upon the army or the managerial elite to threaten the position of the party, "while the Com-

[9] R. A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works*, Cambridge, Mass., 1956.

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munist regime has been bureaucratized, the bureaucracy (including the military) has been Communized."[10] In a recent study of the position of the Party, Professor Merle Fainsod comes to the conclusion that, at least to the present, the Party has shown a capacity for adaptation and growth, and that this has assisted it to maintain its primacy in Soviet society. "Better-educated than their Stalinist predecessors, more technically-oriented in their training and experience, the present-day party functionaries have had to learn to balance zealotry with the pragmatic skills required to manage a complex industrial society."[11]

Although he feels that the authority of the present ruling group in the Party rests upon a precarious equilibrium which will be tested by the next succession crisis, Professor Fainsod finds no evidence in recent Soviet experience to suggest that the interests of the men who run the factories cannot be accommodated within a framework of totalitarian party control without yielding them political power. "There is no iron law," he says, "which dictates incompatibility between one-party rule and a highly-developed industrial society."[12]

In considering the consequences of Soviet economic growth, while it might be unseemly, as Mr. Kennan instructs us, to groan each time the scoreboard shows a Soviet advance, it would be foolhardy to ignore the dangers for us in the relative statistics. At the very least, we cannot afford to ignore the dilemma that while Soviet economic progress may over the long run present the hypothetical advantage of having certain desired effects upon Soviet society, it results in the meantime in a threat which is not hypothetical of a significant improvement in the Soviet power position relative to our own.

It may very well be true that, to the extent the Soviet regime commits itself to the production of consumer goods, this may over the long period circumscribe the freedom of action of the Soviet leadership in disposing of the nation's resources. So far, however, it must be said that the Soviet leaders have been able to make enough of a concession in the direction of consumer goods to have a beneficial political effect, domestic and foreign, without significantly reducing their capabilities in heavy industry and defense.

It may also be true that there are factors in the Soviet situation which may lead to a slowing of the rate of industrial growth, and indeed this may already be the case, but the comfort this affords is small, consider-

[10] Roberts, *op.cit.*, p. 27.
[11] "The Party in the Post-Stalin Era," in *Problems of Communism*, VII, No. 1 (January-February 1958), p. 13.
[12] *Ibid.*

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ing that the rate of growth of gross national product still remains and seems likely to remain something on the order of double our own. It is a milestone of enormous portent that the steel production of the Sino-Soviet bloc for the first time surpassed that of the United States in the first quarter of this year, according to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.[13]

That this is not just a matter of being out-pointed at some game devised by Mr. Khrushchev is soberly documented in the account presented by Mr. Allen Dulles of the ways in which the advances in the Soviet economic and technological capabilities are leading to a strengthening of the relative power position of the Soviet Union in the world.

What is involved is not simply the production of a larger quantity of weapons, which Mr. Kennan perhaps rightly feels would not alter the situation a great deal, but a number of other uses of Soviet economic power which would indeed alter the situation qualitatively and for us disastrously. Apart from the possibility of a technical breakthrough in weapons development—which becomes ever more possible, given the increased Soviet capabilities in this direction—the more direct and immediate danger is the use by the Soviet Union of economic means to affect the political orientation of other countries. It is already the case that both advanced industrial areas and economically underdeveloped areas have shown susceptibility to the appeal of Soviet trade, credits, and other instruments of economic penetration. It does not require an exercise of the imagination to anticipate the possibility of a number of areas of strategic importance becoming, not necessarily Communized, but oriented toward Soviet policies and away from our own, as a result of the increased capabilities of the Soviet Union in the economic realm. The influence of the Soviet system as a model of rapid industrialization is reported as a tangible political factor by all who visit Asia and Africa. Technical breakthroughs by Soviet science and technology in matters that bear upon the living conditions of these populations would further contribute to the expansion of Soviet influence and power.

There is another point which should be mentioned in this connection. In his lecture on "The Soviet Mind and World Realities,"[14] Mr. Kennan finds one of the sources of conflict in the persistent misunderstanding by the Soviet leadership of the motives of the West. Distorted by the Marxist-Leninist ideology, their perceptions of "the things that make our life tick as it does" mislead the Soviet leaders and tend to

[13] Allen W. Dulles, speech to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, *New York Times*, April 29, 1958, p. 8.

[14] Kennan, *Russia, The Atom, and the West*, *op.cit.*, pp. 21-24.

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perpetuate the situation of conflict. Presumably this error can be eradicated only by confronting the Soviet leadership over long periods of time with situations which will require them at last to make an adjustment in their mode of thought.

But what seems more to the point is not so much their understanding of our *motives*—a subjective factor which the Communists have been inclined to dismiss—as the extent to which their analysis of the dynamics of our political and economic system appears to them to have validity. And here it must be said that the events of recent years seem more likely to strengthen than to weaken the faith of the Soviet leadership in the validity of their conception of the dynamics of our society. Writing at this moment, under the impact of dramatic Soviet technological and economic achievements, contrasted with the current recession in the American economy, there may be a tendency to overemphasize this consideration, but even before sputnik and the recession, the contraction of American power and influence cannot have appeared to the Soviet leaders to have contradicted their expectations. Soviet ideology has shown resilience in many respects, particularly in the realm of the tactics of transition to communism, and Soviet ideologists did experience some difficulty in explaining the high rate of industrial output in the United States, but the central element of the ideology, which rests upon a Marxist interpretation of the dynamics of our economic system, has for the most part survived the four decades of Soviet experience intact. What is most difficult for us to face is this: that events do not appear to have contradicted the conviction of the Soviet leaders that their directed economy has competitive advantages over the free market economy of the West in an age of advanced industrialism. Nor, barring fortuitous developments in our behalf or a substantial change in our policies, do they appear likely to do so in the future.

What this brief reference to current trends in the Soviet system suggests is the possibility of a pattern of development toward a form for which we have neither the conceptual framework nor a nomenclature. Bearing in mind always that imponderable and fortuitous factors may influence the course of development of the Soviet system in ways that we cannot anticipate, we are obliged to face the hard implications of the direction pointed by present trends. There is at least the possibility that the Soviet system shows signs of development toward a more highly differentiated and stabilized state, perhaps less totalitarian in the degree of intervention of the Party in all aspects of the society, but still collectivized, authoritarian and heavily centralized under the direction of a single party, which encompasses within itself the pluralist interests

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of a complex industrial order. There does not appear to be reason to believe that this development will be accompanied by a process which can be described as the "normalization" of its external relations, in the sense that it involves a diminution of the Soviet commitment to the ultimate emergence of a Communist world system. On the contrary, it seems more probable that the Soviet system, evolving in its own terms, strengthening its military and economic capabilities, may represent an increasingly effective challenge for world influence with the passage of time.

Luck, of course, may be with us, and this picture may turn out to have been too dark. It is always possible, in a situation containing so many imponderable factors, that difficulties impossible to anticipate may rise up to alter the balance radically, but we cannot base our planning on a less sober estimate of the Soviet challenge than these indications present.

If this is the assumption on which we can reasonably base our thinking about the future, what follows from it? One thing certainly is that, separate from the plane of moral judgment, it is necessary for us to take the full measure of the Soviet system as an alternative form of the organization of society in the age of industrialism. That is to say that the pursuit of virtue in our democratic life, although by no means irrelevant, is not a substitute for the effective utilization by our society of its human and material resources. Questions of the ultimate values of our society are, of course, involved; the word "effective" immediately raises the question: "Toward what ends?" But the implication of this challenge is that the validation of our convictions regarding the values of a democratic society will depend on whether we are able to relate them to the conditions of a highly advanced industrialism.

Beyond the problem of maintaining some kind of military equilibrium with the Soviet bloc over a long period of time under conditions of a rapidly changing military technology, and of countering Soviet political and economic maneuvers, there is the more difficult and more fundamental question of whether over the years we shall be able to find ways of expressing a national sense of purpose in the utilization of our resources more effective than the centralized planning and direction of the Soviet system. It is likely that the measure of effectiveness in this confrontation will be taken in terms of national power in the broadest sense, military and non-military, tangible and moral, including the satisfaction of the needs of the respective populations.

The ultimate question, in short, is not merely the wisdom of our

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policies, but the adequacy of our institutions for the conduct of our affairs both at home and abroad.

III

In the mood of collective introspection which the Soviet earth satellite induced in the American people, many aspects of American life have been looked at as though they had never been seen before, from professors' salaries to automobile tail-fins. But even before the general public was aroused by this dramatic Soviet technical achievement, here and there isolated sectors of the discussion over foreign policy problems opened heretical chasms for examination.

In a study entitled *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process*, the British writer, Max Beloff, takes note of the "sustained and serious debate" going on in the United States, and observes that it is "bound to continue to probe until it calls into question the most fundamental of all American beliefs: that of the absolute validity of the American philosophy of government and of the institutions in which it has become embodied."[15] The question to which Mr. Beloff addresses himself is the adequacy of democratic processes for the conduct of foreign policy in the face of the Communist challenge, and in the light of the advantages possessed by a totalitarian society for concentration of effort, secrecy, and speed of action.

Another writer—also British, as it happens—Mr. G. L. Arnold, has invited our attention to the question "whether democratic politics can in time produce agreement on the degree of public planning necessary to preserve the social health of the non-Communist world." In a sketchy and neglected book entitled *The Pattern of World Conflict*, Mr. Arnold defines the cold war as "competitive attempts to alter the balance of power without overt resort to force,"[16] and urges upon us a planned international investment policy, providing for the interrelated needs of the advanced industrial and the economically underdeveloped areas of the non-Communist world.

Mr. Arnold is a member of what he describes as "the new hard-bitten generation of post-totalitarian liberals [which] is distinguished by a reluctant acceptance of the need for more centralized power."[17] In his analysis, totalitarianism is merely a perverted expression of the impulsion toward centralized state control provided by the industrial revolution. The answer to it is to be found in democratic planning—national and, for the non-Communist world, international. Mr. Arnold doubts

[15] Baltimore, Md., 1955, p. 12. [16] New York, 1955, pp. 228-35.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

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the capacity of private investment and the free play of market forces to offer much competition to communism's efforts to integrate itself with the nationalist movements in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

Doubtless the debate has only begun, and if the American economy and the Soviet leaders combine to administer further traumatic shocks to the American public, the national self-inquiry is likely to go forward with that zeal which characterizes all pursuits of American public opinion. The outcome of this period of inquiry involves as many imponderables as the question of the future of the Soviet system; indeed, some of them are the same.

Certain elements of the problem appear evident, although just to enumerate them plunges one immediately into a painful awareness of the conflicts they involve. Certainly some more effective form of expression of a sense of national purpose in the use of our resources will need to be found, as the anomalies and irrationalities resulting from leaving matters to the interplay of private interests are contemplated by the American public.

Just as certainly, it is not in the nature of our society to follow doctrinaire solutions, and what is most likely to occur is a period of pragmatic development and expansion of the many instrumentalities already available to us. This may lead us to direct our attention to the quality and effectiveness of the administrative agencies we have developed, a revision of procedures for the selection and responsibility of administrative personnel, review procedures, and measures to ensure a greater degree of political responsibility of these agencies. Perhaps at this conjuncture, the politics of administration becomes a critical sector in considering the adequacy of our institutions to meet the problems of an increasingly complex industrial society under competition from a centralized and controlled society.

This is of course the central dilemma: whether we can accept the need for a higher degree of centralization in certain areas of our national life to provide for a more rational and effective use of our resources, and at the same time vigilantly distinguish and preserve the pluralist values of our society in the cultural and spiritual realms. The full measure of political genius of the American people will be needed for the task.

We have enormous advantages in this competition. Our resources and our technology are a source of strength; even more so, the limitless potentialities of our free society. But the quality of our leadership may be the decisive factor, for this is less a matter of devising new and different institutions than of suffusing the ones we have with a sense of national purpose.

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THE INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF EXPECTING SURPRISE

By ARTHUR LEE BURNS

THE leading Powers are actively seeking novel weapon-systems to give themselves the advantages of surprise. Difficulties in the way of that search, and its effects upon the relationships between Powers, furnish the subjects of this article.* We shall confine ourselves to those surprises that consist in or are closely related to the invention of instruments of war. "Surprise" has many other connotations for military and international studies—e.g., surprise attack, surprising changes of alliance—but these shall not directly concern us.

Expectation of surprise, as a sub-problem within the general problem of uncertainty, has until now interested few besides economists.[1] Our approach is therefore nearer to the economic and political than to the psychological; but we shall not attempt to fit out our analysis, in the economists' style, with graphs and formulae that its very limited quantification does not deserve.

Certain postulates will not be argued for, but assumed: normal rationality in adapting means to ends; a background situation of deterrence,[2] in which the surprise-seeking Powers cannot for the moment attack each other with any hope of traditional "victory in the field"; and limitation—to a mere handful—of the number of Powers fitted, technologically and scientifically, to seek surprise.

I

Mr. Walter Lippmann, in August 1957, lent his authority as follows against both the likelihood and the significance of surprise:

> The overriding question is how the stalemate may come to an end. There are two main possibilities. One is by what is known as a technological breakthrough which would give one side or the other undoubted military superiority. The other is by that erosion and dissolution of alli-

* The author alone is responsible for the views expressed, but much critical help has been given by his colleagues, especially by Messrs. A. J. Catt, W. Hogan, M. Kelly, Professor P. M. A. Linebarger, and Messrs. J. A. Modelski and J. Rutherford.

[1] E.g., G. L. S. Shackle, "The Logic of Surprise," *Economica*, xx (May 1953), pp. 112-17; reprinted in his *Uncertainty in Economics*, Cambridge, Eng., 1955, pp. 56-62.

[2] I attempted an analysis of the deterrent situation in *From Balance to Deterrence*, Social Science Monograph No. 9, Australian National University, December 1956, pp. 16ff.; published in a revised form in *World Politics*, IX, No. 4 (July 1957), especially pp. 509-29.

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ances and allegiances which is going on within the two coalitions. There is erosion in Eastern Europe, which is obviously a great worry to the Kremlin. There is erosion in French North Africa, in the British Middle East, and in the American sphere of interest from Formosa and Okinawa to Japan.

On the whole, the probabilities seem to be that if the stalemate dissolves, it will be because of the great political changes that are taking place within the two coalitions. It is not, of course, for a layman to say that there will not be a decisive technological breakthrough that will radically alter the military balance of power. But a layman can say that foreign policy cannot be founded on the possibility that something, which is not happening, could conceivably happen some day nevertheless.

Moreover, the new invention would have to be a very big one—say, some easily produced device, unknown and unavailable to the other side, which would be an almost perfect defense against bombers and missiles. For the stalemate will almost certainly not be broken as long as both sides have the power to inflict terrible and crippling blows on each other.

The history of invention shows, it seems to me, that where there is such an intense competition as between the Soviet Union and ourselves, where the best brains from all over the world are mobilized on the problem, where such great resources are available, the chances are very small that there will be a new invention which, if it is decisive, is also unique.[3]

In taking his bearings from the history of invention, Lippmann seems to assume that that history always has been and always will be a single unbranching temporal sequence—for example and in particular, that there can be no more than just one "almost perfect defense against bombers and missiles"; and therefore that as (*pari passu* in Soviet and Western military establishments) the numbers, competence, and vigor of the researchers increase, so the chances decrease that either side will beat the other to near-perfect defense—if there is any such thing. But suppose both sides were to assume that *several* near-perfect defenses, each based upon a distinct weapon-system, might prove feasible, and furthermore that there could be no way of exhausting the logically alternative means to such an end: then, whether or no in the upshot one side did make the breakthrough, both sides' foreign policies (according to the argument of this essay) would be affected by, if not founded upon, "the possibility that something, which is not happening, could conceivably happen some day nevertheless." That kind of response, after all, would parallel in essentials the hedging and forestalling actions of a firm when it envisages the possibility of some discovery's making its product obsolete.

Given the nuclear Powers' present ability to wreak backbreaking

[3] Reprinted in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 16, 1957, p. 2 (*New York Herald Tribune* copyright).

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destruction within days or hours, Mr. Lippmann would certainly appreciate the gravity of expecting one-sided achievement of near-perfect defense. His discounting its possibility must therefore hang upon his implicit assumption that the process of militarily relevant innovation is always an *unbranching* sequence. Against that assumption, it will be maintained in this article (i) that in principle we cannot ever come to foreknow either the nature of discoveries yet to be made or the program of their subsequent development and application, but (ii) that as Max Born[4] and others have recently suggested, the incidence both of scientific discovery and of its technical adoption probably follows, as far as industrialized nations are concerned, a curve rising exponentially in some relationship with an increase of population, so that—to put the conclusion at its weakest—we have no evidence against the innovation rate's continuing to accelerate much as it has in the recent past. But should that be the case, it will be very surprising if military planners do not come to expect surprise innovations and to modify their plans accordingly. Can we therefore outline a picture incorporating the responses to and exhibiting the international effects of such expectation?

For brevity, we shall refer to surprise as either "technological" or "scientific" (the dichotomy is not exhaustive, but a more complete classification does not seem to be needed at this stage). *Technological* surprise connotes the effect of a novel armament built up from elements none of which is unknown scientifically to the surprised Power. *Scientific* surprise connotes the effect of an armament built up from elements of which at least some are technological applications of a "fundamental scientific" novelty the surprised Power has not yet conceived of. We shall also keep in mind that a surprise for someone at some moment need not be a surprise for anyone else, or for the same person later on. Therefore it should be noticed that we shall be thinking primarily of military planners and makers of foreign policy as the characteristic persons to be expecting or to be producing the kind of surprise that concerns us here.

The central idea of this article arose during the revising of a monograph on deterrence. The points made then[5] may be paraphrased thus: Military planners for the deterrent Powers (such, i.e., as now rely upon their prospective enemies' being deterred from all-out attack by fear of thermonuclear retaliation) employ scientists and technologists in weapons-research teams. These not only work to improve existing

[4] In "Man and the Atom," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XIII, No. 6 (June 1957), pp. 186-87.

[5] "From Balance to Deterrence," *World Politics, op.cit.*, p. 521, n. 19.

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weapon-systems: at least some of them are set to think up new ones—which, if based upon previously unused or newly discovered scientific principles, will thus far be so much the better. Such speculators may even communicate to their employers the belief that fundamental research happens at the time to be foreshadowing, without exactly specifying, the possibility of indefinitely many new systems. This new conviction would transform the planners' perspective: had they rather been convinced that their enemy could not have conceived and adopted a weapon-system they had not yet conceived of, they might have been able to guess a consistent set of probabilities as to his taking up one or another of the systems they had already envisaged; but to the extent that they come to recognize the possibility of being surprised, by so much must they find their task as planners impeded—what varieties of enemy attack and defense ought they to prepare for?

In the deterrent situation as we are here presupposing it, fundamental military planning can go on for just so long as the planners can be sure that they will retain means of retaliation enough to hit back with unbearable effect. Such assurance will suffice though they be unable to plan even palliative measures of defense. But it ceases to be sufficient as soon as the planners suspect their opponent of having committed himself to weapon-systems they have not yet envisaged but which might afford him the breakthrough to a near-perfect defense against both aircraft and missiles, as alluded to above. When that suspicion crosses their minds, their estimate concerning the enemy's closeness to breakthrough will determine whether they are then merely provoked to greater efforts at making the breakthrough themselves or whether instead they take some quite irretrievable countermeasure or, at the extreme, whether they come to regard their task as impossible.

At the time of writing, when the West has been surprised, not indeed by the event itself but by the degree and scale of the Soviet achievements in long-distance rocketry, one cannot guess with any precision how far the Western Powers expect a Soviet breakthrough to another and far more critical objective—a near-perfect defense. We do know, however, that a year ago, if not before, at least one eminent Soviet scientist expected that some Power would make such a breakthrough, and that he nevertheless gave no indication of recommending an irretrievable act of aggression. Peter Kapitza, replying to Bertrand Russell in a Soviet-sponsored exchange of articles, wrote:

> In the struggle for the prevention of atomic war it is also necessary to consider the possibility of finding effective defense against nuclear weapons. If this is achieved by any aggressively minded country, one that is sure it is

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protected against the consequences of nuclear weapons, it may decide more easily on unleashing atomic war.

It is therefore very important to have scientists answer the question: is it possible to find an effective defense against nuclear weapons?

We know from history that every new weapon of attack has always led to the appearance of a corresponding new weapon of defense. It is difficult to believe that atomic weapons constitute an exception to this rule.

There can be no doubt that scientists and engineers in various countries are working strenuously on this problem. The results, of course, are not published, but one may nevertheless hazard an opinion as to the possible prospects.

It is generally believed that the only possible defense is to bar access to missiles carrying nuclear warheads. Can it be asserted that it is impossible to find a means of completely barring the access of nuclear missiles to a given territory? I think that, considering the present state of science, the possibility of such a means being found cannot be denied, although to find it is a very difficult scientific and technical problem, of which there does not yet appear to be a generally accepted solution. If such a solution is found, it will in all likelihood be based upon little studied or still unknown natural phenomena. It is undoubtable, furthermore, that this means of defense will involve powerful energy processes, in consequence of which its realization will necessitate substantial material resources. It will therefore be difficult to conceal work of this nature from the "watchful eye" of neighbors.

If countries which are disposed to conduct their foreign policy "from positions of strength" are the first to discover an effective means of defense against nuclear weapons, they may "forget" any pledges they may have given. They may either launch atomic war or, at any rate, utilize their advantages to impose their will upon other countries.

International conventions designed to prevent atomic war must therefore envisage the possibility of effective means of defense being invented. They must accordingly provide for obligatory exchange of information concerning experimental work on defense measures, however this may complicate mutual control and supervision.[6]

These dark hints may well be merely disingenuous. But if they are not, we may construe them as warning us against making a potential enemy expect so severe and so early a surprise as near-perfect defense would be. For in the deterrent situation—as Kapitza seems to realize—near-perfect defense means the end of deterrence itself. We shall later examine the great difficulties in the way of such a defense; but at this point we need only be considering whether expectation of the enemy's achieving a surprise that would afford him near-perfect defense is the kind of expectation one might reasonably entertain and, if so, whether by itself it would end the deterrent situation.

[6] *New Times* (Moscow), No. 39 (September 20, 1956), p. 10. This article and its implications were called to my attention by Dr. J. A. Modelski.

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The surprising, for our purposes, is not the unlikely or hardly expected—i.e., not the subject of a very long-odds bet; it is the totally *un*-expected—i.e., something you have not considered at all for any odds whatsoever, or, having considered, have ruled out as impossible. Thus recognition (i) of an enemy's technological and scientific parity with oneself, and (ii) of the innovation-producing propensities evinced by technological and scientific enterprise, should tend sooner or later to cause you to *expect surprise*: to expect not something of a kind you can specify but something that until it actually occurs will have had no place at all in your scheme of considerations—it may not have entered your head. But if you confidently expect surprise, and if the grounds of your expectation have more than a little explanatory and predictive power, then at that stage where you expect the surprise to impinge, your sequence of alternative pictures of the future must dissolve.

Technological and scientific surprise would seem to differ in this: that you could put some sort of value upon your expectation of technological surprise, at least before it becomes a really confident expectation; and for so long as you could, your pictures of non-surprising alternative expectations need not lose their clarity. But scientific surprise you must either discount in its entirety or allow to dissolve your whole conspectus: it permits no threshold or interval during which most of your pictured alternatives remain clear enough and only a few show the blank that expectation of surprise produces.

Surprise in itself is no newcomer to international or military affairs. Scientific surprise, of one civilized Power by another, certainly is (but cf. the Australian aborigine, who suffered "scientific" as well as "technological" surprise from European firearms). The distinctive and novel feature of present developments lies in the sheer dimension of weapon-system surprise, technological or scientific. This article does not concern itself with marginal surprises—e.g., the French anti-tank rocket—but only with the scale of surprise that would require complete replanning by a Power that detected and understood another's build-up toward surprise. We must now mark out some of the relations between expectation and planning.

Any plan may be considered as comprising or including an array of expectations—that is, as a "book" specifying or at least suggesting odds for (and therefore also against) a variety of contingencies envisaged for some future occasion. This "book" will be internally consistent only if the array of odds, when they are expressed as fractions, sums to unity.[7]

[7] See Abner Shimony, "Coherence and the Axiom of Confirmation," *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, xx, No. 1 (March 1955), pp. 1-28; R. Sherman Lehman, "On Con-

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It will be prudent only insofar as the proportions among the various quotations of odds have been fixed so as to accord with the widest and most varied experience or evidence, and with the best-criticized hypotheses and theories. Even so, there is a higher prudence: after your book has been proved consistent and judged prudent, you may wonder whether your fortunes had not better be hazarded upon some prospect or other in some quite different "book." For example, a book on the fall of a normal die will quote five to one against any of the six alternatives, and so far will be demonstrably self-consistent and prudent.[8] But so will be a book on the fall of a penny or on the draw of a card. Preferences between such books should be allocated according to the gambler's interest in long-, medium-, or short-odds betting. But one cannot by any such arithmetical principle arrange one's preferences between that sort of gambling and, say, the policy of keeping the stakes, or of buying something other than a risk with them. One may have to choose between those alternatives, or between any sub-set of them, as one would choose between gambling in accordance with quite unrelated books; and, though without the benefit of actuarial advice, one may have extraneous and particular reasons for preferring any of them. Similarly, it may not be intrinsically irrational to prefer thoroughgoing pacifism, with all its possible consequences, above the gamble of power-politics, however confident one may be of one's estimates. A fundamental change of policy along such lines would certainly alter and might well clarify the expectations of those who made it. The pacifists' resolution, "No matter what, we *will* not resist," though it does not entail "No matter what, we shall not resist," does give the speaker some ground for relying upon the latter.

It may be that, besides both thoroughgoing pacifism and thoroughgoing military preparedness, there are other policies as completely distinguished, each producing an independent and more or less coherent array of expectation. Perhaps one limit was set to the range of policies when it was said, "Take no thought for the morrow; sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." Or perhaps that precept may be taken as the very axiom of the higher prudence; whenever you needs must take thought for the morrow, planning makes up part of your evil for today.

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firmation and Rational Betting," *ibid.*, XX, No. 3 (September 1955), pp. 251-62; and John G. Kemeny, "Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities," *ibid.*, pp. 263-73.

[8] We follow here a common theoretical practice when we assume fair gambling to represent an activity indifferent as between rationality and irrationality, even though we realize the strength of the argument that fair gambling is itself irrational, given that all fortunes are limited and that money has diminishing utility for all.

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The military, presumably, will interpose that indeed it always does; and since they are amongst the great vested interests working under the expectation that armed force will continue as the *ultima ratio*, it probably will so continue. That would mean that questions of the higher prudence were ruled out, and that one end—the maintenance of national security—remained paramount. But if so, our soundest array of expectations will be that which mentions all possibilities; and amongst those possibilities, from our day and age onward, must be counted "surprise."

Unlike the racecourse bookmakers, the military planners cannot call all bets off when, in some particular shape or form, Surprise comes home. They must therefore in a sense "quote odds" for Surprise. Prudence suggests that they should the more shorten those odds the more advanced, technologically and scientifically, their potential enemy, the greater his resources, the more flexible his style of grand strategy, the less constricting the pressures already upon him, and so on. (Remember that we are concerned in this article only with expecting the scale and kind of surprise that could not be countered except by a total reallocation of resources for defense.) Let us consider first the case of mere technological surprise.

Suppose you have a plan for meeting by *some* defense all possible forms and permutations of attack from your potential enemy or enemies. This plan may be thought of as containing a "book" quoting odds for each of those forms, etc., of attack. If the book is consistent, and if you are dealing with a contemporary enemy, *some* odds—however long—must be quoted for his attack's being substantially in a novel or surprising form—a form you have not even conceived of and for which therefore you have no defense prepared. So long as you are content to quote very long odds against such surprise, it will be sensible enough not to consider replanning: but once the odds shorten beyond some specific point, replanning becomes more and more imperative—and with it, the development of countersurprise measures. (The latter are discussed below.) Now let us complicate the picture with the possibility of scientific surprise.

Suppose you know that your enemy invests quite as much money and brain-power as you do yourself in basic scientific research. Had he invested nothing, he would have *no* chance of achieving scientific surprise; if he were to increase his investment, he would presumably increase his chances. But there seems to be no *cardinal* number guessable in this case. What can one possibly say about the chance of twenty eminent scientists making in the next three years one fundamental

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theoretical innovation which might in its turn enable development of a weapon-system surprise—except that, whatever the chances are, they must be greater than those for one scientist's performance and less than those for a hundred? Scientific surprise can therefore have no cardinal place in your "book," for no definite odds can be quoted for it. Yet the grounds for expecting it are, as we have seen, orderable if not measurable. Suppose, then, a continued increase in your enemy's scientific and industrial potential: though at present you may be able to brush aside the possibility of his surprising you scientifically, you may not be able to do so indefinitely. And if, for whatever reason, you come to feel that you can no longer discount and must begin to expect such a prospect, there will be no point in quoting odds for any other alternative or supplementary forms of attack.

The capital and the intellectual effort in many a social science project have been invested on the strength of a certain article of philosophic faith—that scientific advances must increase predictability. Most schools of philosophy have assumed this and have confined their arguments to the possibility of or limitations upon continued scientific advance. We have just concluded that, beyond a certain stage of technological and scientific development, the opposite of that article of faith will be true. For how long men will be able to bear a condition where increase of information prevents foresight is also impossible to foretell. But we may perhaps expect more proposals to plan and to control scientific advance. Any attempts to do this are likely further to extend and to enforce the sway of governments.

II

In the foregoing section a case has been made for the possibility of military planners' being compelled so to expect surprise that their task becomes an impossible one. But what of the "deterrent situation"? Are we not assured that no matter what novelty, in weight or kind, an enemy's means of attack possesses, he would never dare to use them so long as our side could retaliate with nuclear weapons? If this counterclaim is valid, and if its antecedent concerning our retaliatory capabilities is underwritten for us, then the present generation, whose picture of the future seems bound to be unfocused and finally obliterated by the prospect of surprise, will have instead grounds for expecting an armed peace based upon the nuclear Powers' ability to retaliate. This suggests the need for a closer look at both surprise and deterrence.

We predict the one and explain the other in practical syllogisms—

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arguments that we put into the mouths of the relevant agents—sharing as their common major premise the general resolve that we attribute with some confidence to every Power: that it will use what devices it can to maintain its own security. To complete the explanation of deterrence we need refer to little more than the figures for energy released by fusion, and the general fact or quasi-platitude that less resources are required for transporting *some* nuclear objects into a city-sized area than for keeping *all* such objects out. Until now at least, the data concerning energy produced by fusion have proved either irrelevant or favorably relevant to our postulated difficulties of attaining perfect defense; but upon a certain condition, though upon that condition only, expectation of surprise would undermine the deterrent situation: if, that is, a likelihood were to be established that some innovation or another, conjoined with the facts about energy from fusion, might make those facts unfavorably relevant to our quasi-platitude—that it is always easier to send some projectiles into an area than it is to keep all projectiles out. For a typical example, consider the near-perfect anti-missile defense, as envisaged by Kapitza, which it will be remembered would require "extraordinarily large power resources." To generalize: only a most remarkable innovation or a remarkable coincidence of several of them can possibly give a reliable guarantee against retaliation. Suppose that by means of some contrivance, itself perhaps employing nuclear energy, you were able to deny your skies to an enemy's missiles and planes; even so, he might have in reserve or might discover other means of exploding H-bombs to destroy your cities and strategic sites. Enjoyment of near-perfect defense merely from the air could generate dangerous illusions, if no account were taken of the use that might be made of guided overland or underwater carriers, to say nothing of pre-placed explosives—dodges that need not, as things now stand, embody any surprise element at all. The continuance of the deterrent situation is grounded in part, as we have said, upon each nuclear Power's considering itself unlikely to have blocked every route of ingression—to think otherwise, the Power would need also to be able to disregard the possibility both of attacks employing some utterly novel weapon, and of its enemy's adopting surprise routes of attack. When a Power can thus disregard such a possibility, let us say that it is enjoying "supreme defense."[9]

We can say then that, apart from the chance of unrestricted H-war

[9] For a similar use of this phrase, see C. W. Sherwin, "Securing Peace Through Military Technology," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XII, No. 5 (May 1956), pp. 161-62.

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launched by a government as insane as Hitler's in his last days, the deterrent situation will end only if some Power either acquires supreme defense or is believed by other Powers to be moving in that direction at a rate that prevents their overtaking it. Given current speeds of attack, one need be guaranteed the solitary enjoyment of supreme defense for a few weeks only; but the temptation would then be very strong to employ one's temporary world-dominion in destroying so far as one could every rival's means of attack and defense. The possibility of a coincidence of breakthroughs, including near-perfect anti-missile defense and amounting to near-perfect defense all round, is at once terrifying and—we may so far agree with Lippmann—remote. Nothing short of it can give a rational basis for the collapse of deterrence.

Bounds are therefore set to the range of effects that can be put in train by technological and scientific surprise, or by its expectation. Either could upset our peculiar international order only upon terms such as those Kapitza was willing to consider: "If such a solution is found, it will in all likelihood be based upon little studied or still unknown natural phenomena. It is undoubtable, furthermore, that this means of defense will involve powerful energy processes, in consequence of which its realization will necessitate substantial material resources."

But this line of reasoning also suggests other and important, if less drastic, consequences: the Powers capable of producing such surprises as near-perfect or supreme defense must be greater in potential and therefore fewer in number than those capable of maintaining nuclear armaments; but Powers of such dimension usually have allies whose susceptibility to retaliatory attack might restrain the dominant Power from making full aggressive use of whatever surprises it might achieve, even though it had sheltered its own cities and means of attack under a supreme defense. Were the homeland of, for example, the United States thus protected, its government would probably not wish to jeopardize its scattered dependent allies who could not substantially protect themselves from retaliation by a desperate USSR. Even so, one would expect the United States to envisage some order of defense-worthiness amongst its allies and perhaps some counterbalancing of their several needs against the possible advantage to itself of achieving surprise. After all, we take it for granted that the USSR would not relinquish any considerable prospect of similar advantage for the good of its satellites; and most of us do in fact account its ruthlessness as a source of comparative power to the Soviet, though not an unalloyed and perhaps not a long-term one. However, no Power can rate all its dependents'

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interests at just zero, unless it is prepared to dispense with all but a naked military control over them.

Supposing then that consideration for allies restrains in some, though a varying, degree any Power's disposition to exploit surprise: the allies' geographic situation also must become a factor—if, in the thermonuclear age, a factor of decreasing relevance. A concentrated bloc may be easier to protect and to insure against the backlash of an exploited surprise than would be a dispersed one. By compounding all such factors—the number of a Power's allies, its concern for them, their accessibility to friend and to foe—one could perhaps construct an index of unwillingness to exploit surprise. But whether or no, the point may now have been sufficiently made that, as well as scientific technological and military conditions, an unusual kind of political and international situation would be required if the possessor of a supreme defense was to be able to press home his advantage. But we must not forget quite a different possibility: a fundamental innovation that would favor the attack by making it so swift or—more promisingly—so insidious that the victim has no opportunity to launch his retaliatory forces. Already our reaction to Soviet victory in the satellite race can be regarded as fear of a swifter attack. There must be, however, a limit to the speeding-up of delivery. A much graver prospect may be the invention of something disabling that does not blow back against its user.

To a lesser extent perhaps, yet significantly enough, every possibility of innovation, whether usable in attack or in defense, whether technological only or scientific as well, has a disposition to alter our perspective on foreign affairs when we contemplate it. But perspective is one of the determinants of policy. In the limiting case where all perspective disappears, where surprise is so firmly expected that all specific expectations evaporate, policy also by this reasoning should collapse for want of foundation. The practical question arises whether there is any prospect of reaching that limit. To get an answer, we must ask the prior questions: are there, or might there be in the practical future, grounds for expecting a perspective-dissolving surprise; and would the existence of such grounds be a novelty?

In its scale, present-day technological and scientific activity is unprecedented, judging by any of a number of distinct criteria, severally of doubtful worth but jointly considerable. The last two decades' increases in that scale seem attributable to (i) an increase in the number of persons trained for technological or scientific work, (ii) amalgamation of groups working on similar or mutually relevant problems, and (iii) a rising demand for innovation as such, initiated by defense prep-

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arations, but reinforced and prolonged by great increases of effective demand, within the militarily strong economies, for both consumer and capital goods by-produced from innovations first introduced for military purposes, e.g., in electronics. Of particular importance for scientific advance has been one aspect of technological growth, viz. (iv) the proliferation of theory-testing gadgetry (e.g., the tools of radio-astronomy) which is allowing more and more speculations to be tested as hypotheses. Of the four features just mentioned, only the last couple are without a limit soon to be arrived at. We shall therefore not expect the present *rate* of growth to rise indefinitely, though we have good reason to believe that growth as such will continue, short of general disaster or a universal change of values. This may seem to fix at least a few sharp features in our perspective, so that down the avenue in which these occur, the future may appear well enough defined. But the appearance is an illusion—we rather see the conditions of surprise accumulating until surprise itself supervenes. It is possible, however, to say somewhat more about the several dimensions of surprise and about their grounding in technological and scientific conditions.

Explanatory, explosive, and surprise-producing power often go together. Only from a physical theory like that developed by Rutherford, explaining general features of the behavior of sub-atomic particles, would a scientific culture hope to produce the technology for releasing such vast quantities of energy; and only (as Kapitza suggests) from vast resources of energy can the preconditions of surprise—high articulation, swift application, and widespread effect, all producible in marked secrecy—be conjured up. In the deterrent situation, therefore, the degree to which you ought to expect surprise from an enemy depends in part upon how extensive you estimate his technology and his basic scientific research to be. But it also depends inversely upon the number of your own alternative means of attack, i.e., upon how many independently functioning weapon-systems you can deploy. If those two are the only factors relevant to surprise, and if surprise can be a perspective-dissolving prospect, then your perspective will dissolve at a point where you no longer feel that the potentialities of your enemy's technology and research are counterbalanced by the variety of your own means of attack or reprisal. That you should believe yourself likely to be beaten does not follow; rather, you would have cause to know you were unable to arrive at a belief one way or the other.

To imagine the following schematized situation may help. You learn from your Intelligence that the potential enemy has been devoting certain resources to a project whose nature you are unable to decipher. You

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seek to counteract this threat of surprise by yourself devoting the same amount of resources to the development of a new weapon-system which will function independently of your present means of attack. This new system of yours may, but need not, be a surprise from your enemy's viewpoint; it may instead be a marginal system which your planners had earlier neglected in favor of a more promising one. But will it, whether surprising to your enemy or not, wholly offset in your mind the security-diminishing effects produced by the reports of his preparing a surprise? It would do so only if you could be sure that, whatever the nature of his project, your response would effectively deter him from attack. That, however, you could not often be sure of, since his project might well turn out to be something that would prevent your launching a counterattack either with your new or with your old weapon-system. If the latter is a possibility that must always be taken into consideration, we can state it as a general principle that *surprise is always cheaper than its antidote.* From there it is a short step to recognizing that *countersurprise is the best antidote.*

We have already noticed that potential for producing surprise varies immensely with one's own technological and scientific resources. Possession of these, one would think, is likely to be the prerogative of more or less advanced economies, which at present are few and all very large. This fact makes the perspective-dissolving sort of expectation of surprise more likely to be entertained than would a situation where the economies are many and therefore relatively smaller. The supreme defense or the overwhelming attack, for instance, is more accessible to our world of three nuclear Powers than to a score or so of countries like Brazil and Australia (cf. Mr. Lippmann's contrary view quoted above). More than academic interest, therefore, may attach to the question of possible responses to the experience of perspective-dissolving expectation.

In the economic field, Professor Shackle suggests[10] that a pervasive expectation of surprise sufficiently explains the onset of inactivity on the stock exchange—situations, for example, such as those before Budget Day, which look hopeful neither for bulls nor for bears nor for anyone else. The present writer has applied[11] the same conception to international relationships: when two or more mutually suspicious nuclear Powers come to expect radical surprises from each other, one possible response might be widespread recognition that the work of rational military planning had become impossible. Given that recognition, the

[10] *Op.cit.*, p. 62.
[11] "From Balance to Deterrence," *op.cit.* p. 521, n. 19.

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logical and consistent policy would be a greater willingness to seek inspectable disarmament and the sharing of all scientific and technical information. Just as we say that the hydrogen bomb has made it impossible to plan for victory in a major war, so we should conclude that either a certain order of expectation of surprise, or expectation of surprise of a certain order, would make it impossible to plan at all, in the sense of imagining the alternatives open to one's enemy, and in that light allocating one's own resources.

At this point the objection can be anticipated that a good strategist, when he can make no estimates concerning his enemy's behavior, will always try to seize the initiative himself. If the features of the situation are not discernible, he will try to impose features of his own choosing upon it. Now, admitting that many great and successful commanders have acted thus, we may reply that at this level of generality there seems to be no definite criterion for deciding among the maxims "When unable to estimate, seize the initiative," "When unable to estimate, build up your general reserves and make no commitment," and, thirdly—an alternative discussed above—"When unable to estimate, put your opponent in the same position by preparing a countersurprise."

Of these maxims, the second would be the soundest when you had convincing evidence that your opponent's surprise-projects were still far enough from maturity to allow you a chance of deciphering them and of improvising a relatively inexpensive antidote. This maxim represents the extreme of non-commitment. But its safety has limits, and they are roughly those of the deterrent situation: so long as you are trusting in deterrence, it is best to keep some of your resources liquid, whilst those committed to research and other countersurprise preparations are best distributed amongst many fields. On the other side of the medal, current speeds of attack and scales of destruction are so great that any policy which risks receiving the first blow is suitable only for a Power confident of its own decided predominance.

The third maxim has advantages and disadvantages already discussed. It avoids alike the irrevocability entailed by the first maxim, and the risk of vulnerability bound up with the second. But if surprise is always cheaper than its antidote, this policy must have a term: sooner or later, one side will be bound to have committed all its resources. Here again, only a Power sure of its predominance can persevere with these measures.

The first maxim represents the extreme of commitment. To follow it in the current situation, or even in one where the expectation of surprise was clearly supervening upon deterrence, would be to capitalize

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upon present speeds of attack and scales of destruction, but with every chance of incurring disastrous reprisals. So the possible consequences of seizing the initiative are not, as they once were, final victory or final defeat—they are broken-backed survival or annihilation. To choose the second pair of alternatives might in just one circumstance be rational: if you were certain that otherwise the enemy would launch a flat-out attack first. This is not to imply that non-rational motives will never trigger "preventive" nuclear war, though for the sake of the analysis we have been strictly adhering to the assumption of rationality mentioned at the beginning of this article. It is only to imply that nowadays not even the brilliant will seize the initiative, except in either minor and retrievable or hopeless situations.

Our next section develops questions concerned with comparison between the time it takes to get a surprise ready and the time it takes to decipher one. But first we must notice an important conclusion to be derived from the foregoing paragraphs. If you respond to perspective-dissolving surprise either by increasing your general reserve or by starting an antidote-project (these two being the responses that do not invite immediate reprisal), then your potential enemy in his turn would be given to that extent additional grounds for expecting surprise from you. This reciprocity is part of the ground for our theoretical prediction of a snowball effect in expectation of surprise—an effect which would entail, when rival blocs have something like equal potential, a corresponding diminution in the possibilities of rational military planning.

Several of the author's colleagues have dissented from the next stage of the argument, where he had maintained that the rational response of two or more blocs which found themselves unable to go on with military planning would be to seek instead some way of amalgamating or of gradually disbanding their armed forces. The objection has been that while this might or might not be the rational procedure, the likelier course would be merely a continuation of efforts to "resist." Though most agree that this resistance need not go as far as preventive but suicidal war, the tenor of the criticism has been to invoke some such psychological principle as "frustration provokes aggression."

This may well be the shrewdest prognosis; but we must be sure that it does in fact come to terms with the situation as imagined. "Resistance" by a power-bloc must take some overt form. Resources are there, and something has to be done with them: some particular deployment is called for. Short of the attempts at deliberate *rapprochement* already suggested, the most sensible course for a nuclear Power expecting both to surprise and to be surprised might consist in multiplying its inde-

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pendent methods of retaliation, at the same time allocating more and more to Intelligence and Counterintelligence. The aim would be to develop as many different systems of attack as could be thought of, and to defend each as well as possible, so as to circumvent any near-perfect defense and to ward off any crushing attack. But again, as we have seen, the effect of this would be to raise general expectations of surprise even further. Each new allocation for anti-surprise measures would achieve less than the previous one.

Might there be some collective, supranational method, not yet explored, for offsetting expectation of surprise? Before the time of writing, the West had already suggested, during the abortive disarmament negotiations of 1957, that "outer-space objects" be put under international control. This would fall short of the "amalgamation" put forward above, but might promise very well indeed. Satellites and kindred objects, developed a little further than at present, could give early warning of any large-scale rocket attack. Furthermore, they could become the launching-sites of the future, not only or mainly for the strategic rocket, but also for the "contra-missile." Western leaders would seem to have conjectured, with some acumen, that such a possibility could open up the prospect of rival space-navies' spiraling out in search of a dominant position—dominant, that is, over any other weapon-system comprising either ICBM or conventional aircraft. By contrast, a single space-fleet under the control of some genuinely international organization could forestall the kind of armaments race that such a prospect of dominance might start; it could reinforce the peace-preserving effect of the deterrent situation at its presently weakest point, where there is the remote possibility of a rocket Power's profiting by sneak attack; and it might well be designed to do all this while physically precluded both from interfering with the political or economic arrangements of any country, and from retailing more than an internationally determined amount of strategic information. (Because of the very short time-scales appropriate to the military use of rockets and space-vehicles, these weapons should make a far more practicable international police force than could conventional armaments. At the same time, they need never have an independent resource-base large enough to constitute a separate Power on its own account.) Each Power's ICBM and similar weapons could then be deemed to have a purely defensive role, while land and sea forces would not be interfered with.

The foregoing scheme[12] is mentioned here primarily as an illustra-

[12] The above account dates from early February 1958. At that time there seemed to be no technical reason why it should not be possible for the nations to prescribe, in

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tion of the very wide range of possibilities opened up by scientific innovation. We had previously been supposing that surprises necessarily work *for* some Powers and *against* others—an unspoken, often unacknowledged assumption that the existence of sovereign Powers is to be a permanent, unmitigated, and overriding feature of coming world history. That may not be so. Popular psychology, whatever its merits in the interpretation of past events, need not be an infallible guide for the future. In thinking about these prospects, our best procedure will be to imagine as many of the logical possibilities as we can, and be chary of taking our bearings upon any "truths," however broad, concerning an allegedly permanent human character.

The present section took its departure from the question whether any surprise or prospect of surprise could overthrow the deterrent situation. We saw that only the acquisition by one side of a supreme defense or of an annihilating attack, or perhaps the other side's expecting either or both, could do so; that the scientific and technological conditions for either would be difficult and expensive to produce; that they would have to comprise a coincidence of innovations; and that these would need to coincide further with a certain kind of political and international situation. On the other hand, it became clear that the surprise-engendering activities of scientists and technicians are cumulative and progressive; that one side's taking steps to counter or to offset surprise is itself apt to cause expectations of surprise on the other side; and that, apart from the basic strength of the deterrent situation as already mentioned, there are no non-psychological reasons for assuming that a growing expectation of scientific and technological surprise would tend to support any particular form of international or supernational system rather than another. And we saw reason to doubt whether alleged psychological factors could be extrapolated into a future that might be in other respects so different from the past. Given present levels of expectation of surprise, deterrence should maintain itself; but whether it would continue to do so at noticeably higher levels, we do not know.

III

In this third and last section, we shall deal with difficulties in the way of achieving scientific and technological surprise. Difficulties may be intrinsic: technical features of the would-be surprising project may be

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game-theory terms, a "dummy player" of the requisite type and dimensions to transform the bipolar and deterrent situation without evoking a potentially tyrannous world government.

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apt to reveal its nature, do what you will to conceal it. Or they may be extrinsic: a political and social order that favors a certain type of publicity, a foreign policy that deliberately goes about to minimize surprise in all camps, an unusually efficient enemy Intelligence, a psychological propensity to copy one's opponents' endeavors—these and other nontechnical factors may work against surprise. We may not be able to avoid repeating some detail discussed from other angles in previous sections; but otherwise the cases made above for the prospects both of surprise and of deterrence will be taken as read.

Any weapon-system may be thought of as the outcome of a more or less prolonged manipulation of materials by men. This manipulative process, throughout its duration, will have been producing unintended or at least incidental effects. Let us consider as so much "signal" that part of these effects which communicates itself to the intended victim of surprise, the enemy. If he is the "receiver," then the Power developing the weapon-system is the "transmitter" of the signal (and of a good deal more besides). Thus the intrinsic difficulty—see above—in the way of any would-be surprise may be regarded as in principle a quantity—as a minimum of information transmitted from the project to the enemy. It is evident that, in determining this minimum, we must consider many more factors than the mere quantity of signal given off by the project. But we shall begin by listing certain conditions and consequences *necessary* to any surprise-project.

Reading backward in time from the project's completion, we notice (i) the military or para-military personnel needed to deliver, service, and command the completed weapon, (ii) the weapon itself, and its vehicle and accessories, and (iii) the budgetary effect, or equivalent, of (i) and (ii). Since every scientific surprise is also technological, every surprise-project will also need (iv) managing, designing, fabricating, and testing personnel, and (v) a production kit of raw materials and fabricating implements. And these, too, will have affected the budget. Above the technological level, a scientific surprise-project will further require (vi) personnel for scientific research and organization, and (vii) theory-testing equipment. Again, these must appear in somebody's budget.

Now each of these five or seven factors constitutes some kind of signal transmitted for a certain time, somewhere in the interval between the first glimmerings of the idea and the final readying of the completed weapon-system. Aggregate all such items under the heading "matériel-personnel processes during the production-interval"; aggregate all resources whatsoever at the disposal of the producing Power during the

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same interval: then you can derive an index of the *quantity* of signal transmitted by the project, which would read "matériel-personnel processes during the production-interval divided by total disposable resources during the production-interval." (One cannot safely cancel out that common phrase about the interval, since both numerator and denominator are aggregates of overlapping processes.)

Such an index would indicate how much build-up was going on. But it would not by itself measure the would-be surprise's degree of "give-away." Give-away features, as such, must have quality as well as quantity: they must enable enemy Intelligence to begin deciphering the specific nature of the surprise—starting, for instance, from the specialities of the personnel and the uses of the implements. By itself, the index of build-up (or quantity of signal) can serve as measure for nothing more than the evincement of the surprise's dimensions. A really big and well-disguised project might have a very high build-up index and a very low degree of give-away—if, for example, the early calls on matériel and personnel were very low, and the later ones very high. An expensive security cover and an elaborate system of disguises would actually raise the build-up index, because of the resources they would employ.

We may therefore conclude that the size of the build-up is only one of several factors contributing to "give-away." Others are: the orderedness of the signal (a purely random process by definition has nothing to give away, and the more interesting—the more potentially surprising—the whole project, the less random its signal); the proportion of the signal actually picked up by the receiver; the amount of resources devoted by the receiver to decoding the signal; and—a practically important but unmeasurable consideration—his dispositions to credit such information and to construe it as evidence of something strategically relevant. As far as concerns merely technological surprise (for which, it will be remembered, we have been assuming that the two or more opponents involved command the same range of scientific concepts), we would need to say no more. The least self-defeating technological surprise would then be one that had had a build-up (a) comprised of as brief and quickly successive processes as possible, especially in the early and middle stages, and (b) generally as economic as possible, so as to allow for effective concealment and camouflage. (The restrictiveness and cost of the security cover needed for concealment suggest that camouflage may be the better line. An enterprise subdivided and scattered amongst peaceful industries and learned institutions might be less likely to give its purpose away than would the same enterprise hushed up in

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a special establishment.) Every project must give off some amount of translatable signal, and if it is merely technological, the amount it gives off must vary to some—though not perhaps to a very great—degree with the effectiveness and the novelty of the surprise-project. Thus far, this stage of our analysis counterindicates a snowballing of expectation of surprise.

The picture changes when we go on to consider scientific surprise. Here we no longer assume that each Power commands just those scientific concepts commanded by the other or others. Let us call the range of concepts known to the militarily relevant scientists of a given Power its "dictionary." Given only two Powers or blocs, there will be three possibilities: (1) the receiver has a larger dictionary than the transmitter—i.e., has the logical power to interpret correctly more than every signal put out by the transmitter—while the latter cannot reciprocate, though it might at any moment make for itself the theoretical scientific discoveries necessary for doing so; (2) vice versa, the transmitter has a larger dictionary than the receiver; (3) each dictionary contains some concepts not contained in the other.

If the first condition prevails, the transmitter cannot for logical reasons achieve scientific surprise, though he might manage a technological surprise. If the second, he might achieve both. The Power with the smaller dictionary could not know but might guess that it had the smaller. The Power with the larger could discover it had by completely successful deciphering and interpretation of every signal put out by the other. But either might instead suppose the other's signals to be accidental, or deliberate gibberish, or from one cause or another incomplete. Every Power has a motive for getting itself the larger dictionary. This is one aspect of the broader case for basic research as a defensive measure.

The interesting situation is that under (3): for logical reasons, neither side could ever be sure whether or not the surprises the other was preparing were scientific surprises; but each might well have strong reasons for guessing so. Moreover, advantage in any one branch of fundamental research need not by itself increase the probability of interpreting correctly the signs of advance by an enemy in any other distinct branch. As this assertion may appear contrary to the accepted philosophy of science, a paragraph in support of it may be justified.

Theoretical natural science differs in structure from enquiry into human history. We know that only a finite number of persons have lived on earth, and that, more and more as the centuries have passed, activities have interlaced all over the world, so that, in recent history at any

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rate, historical discovery in one field perhaps always produces evidence relevant to another field. The future of humanity may well reverse this trend, but that possibility does not concern the present-day historians. Natural scientists, such as Oppenheimer in his Reith Lectures, tell us on the other hand that their studies are moving rapidly away from the single world-picture we associate in a general way with Newtonian science. Furthermore, the suggestion is that they are not moving toward a new picture, but rather that each advance into a new field, while it tells the scientist something new about some other fields, may have no bearing at all upon others again. Combine this with the facts that the opening-up of new fields is one of the most notable features of current scientific advance, and that many of the new subjects are intrinsically more difficult to grasp than were older ones; then it will follow that, as we argued in the first section of this article, scientific advance is not at the moment and may never again be a single unbranching sequence. The schoolboy dream of a Captain Nemo who has discovered scientific principles unknown to certain Great Powers is much less implausible than it was. But for the same reasons, no two Captain Nemos need coincide in their discoveries. Such unity as natural science may now afford can be only that of a community of work, and attainable, even so, only by the most complete scientific publicity.

Let us suppose that world-wide scientific publicity is not achieved, and that the "cold war in basic science" is intensified. Presumably there is a bottom to any community's barrel of creative brain-power. Given such conditions, each polar bloc may come to have more and more reason for expecting scientific surprise from the other. In contrast to the case of technological surprise, this supports the snowballing tendency of expectation of surprise in general.

Two distinguishing characteristics of scientific surprise, however, make it harder to achieve than technological surprise. First, it necessarily takes longer. Amongst the personnel sooner or later required for the project, at least those working on basic theoretical aspects, and probably others as well, have to be made familiar with the new concept that by definition every scientific surprise involves. The appropriate techniques will have had to have been invented, and the skills required for them developed and taught. And by that time the scientific secret can hardly be kept any longer. The situation would then by definition revert to one of technological surprise—something, together with its political and military effects, that we have a fine, clear picture of at the time of writing.

Secondly, the decision between commitment of resources and main-

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taining of reserves is several times more difficult in scientific surprise because, as we have seen, it will typically require not one but several technological innovations. Suppose, for example, that weather control had its scientific supporters as a potential method of warfare. A decision for or a decision against devoting resources to it could be hardly more than a shot in the dark. Until some Power actually decided in favor, the data for a solution to the decision-maker's dilemma considered as a problem in theory of games are necessarily not procurable.

Here at last we may have to turn for help to the psychologist and sociologist. How do people cope with a crucial strategic choice when the important facts have never existed? There seems to be evidence that they seize upon any analogy, even that of their enemies' achievements. At the moment we are hearing of the need for the United States to catch up with the USSR in rocketry. This may well be the rational need; but only if, when confronted with rockets, rockets of one's own are the best answer. Perhaps the public demand is really for psychological and not for objective military security.

Extrinsic difficulties in the way of achieving either type of surprise do not form a system and cannot be analyzed in the terms of the foregoing discussion, though it has already touched on several of them. The gravest, as one may guess it to be, would take us quite outside the scope of this article: difficulties of administration and management must surely mount up in military-*cum*-scientific establishments beyond anything incurred in other industrial enterprises. Another and great question concerns the political systems and traditions most suitable to technological or to scientific advance. Nearer still to the specific subject-matter of international relations, we need to ask how an alliance of independent states, like NATO, compares in surprise-potential with a would-be monolithic "Commonwealth," like the Soviet bloc.

Lastly, we may notice again a source of extrinsic obstacles to achievement of surprise lying neither within the surprising nor within the surprised Power's orbit. It is just possible, as we have seen, that a coincidence of successful surprises, or even the expectation of it, could set off a total nuclear war. Since all men have a vital interest in avoiding that outcome, it may not be mere optimism to hope that pressure will be exerted to reduce possibilities of surprise by the one kind of antidote that should not in the long run heighten the fever—world-wide inspection and publicity. Perhaps the recently disclosed innovations of rocket and satellite and of the informative devices that can be employed in them could be made ingredients of such an antidote.

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IV

The third section of this study was concerned with the difficulties of achieving surprise. These difficulties, it appeared, are not enough to make surprise impossible, but our brief examination of them did suggest that, given a degree of parity of the order that seems to hold between the scientific and technological potentials of the Western and the Soviet blocs, completion in secret of any grand surprise project would be very unlikely indeed. It also emerged that while features of technological innovation may tend to act as a brake upon expectation of surprise, features of scientific innovation should further accelerate it.

In developing our argument for the latter contrast, we introduced the notion of a "dictionary" of scientific and other concepts—a notion that seemed to be involved in our initial definition of scientific surprise. A further way of looking at expectation of surprise now suggests itself: to expect scientific surprise is to expect some unforeseen addition to one's dictionary. The greater the ratio between the expected dimensions of the expected addition and the known dimensions of one's present dictionary, the greater the surprise to be expected. The greater one's estimate of the dimensions of an opponent's dictionary, and the greater one's estimate of the difference in dimension between his and one's own, the greater one's expectation of surprise. Both the foregoing relationships are predicated upon the assumption that all Powers will press ahead, for reasons of defense, with technological and basic scientific development. Moreover, we may now safely assume that *merely* technological development is to be regarded as a figment of our analysis, and that our distinction between scientific and technological surprise is a purely formal one, which would not be apparent in practice—forthcoming surprises are likely to be technological and scientific at once. Again, we have recognized throughout the study that the most important sub-set of limitations upon achievement of surprise are ordinary economic limitations, and that most problems concerned with the effects of innovation can be subsumed as problems in the theory of economic growth.

As we step back and review the general shape of this study, it becomes clear that we are dealing with a subject-matter requiring not only military and international-relations theory, but also economics and the theory of information. Together with the theoretical aspects of those four disciplines, a realistic approach also requires factual data of the sort characteristically annexed to each of them and to the basic natural sciences. The problem of expectation of surprise in a scientific age re-

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mains, nevertheless, one problem, in the sense that it could be analyzed by means of a single coherent model. Such a model ought to be constructed far more strictly and formally than has been possible in the present untechnical opening survey; and, though we are as yet a long way away from the measurability demanded by formal models of that kind, we can say that it should not be impossible in principle to find means of interpreting as quantities the purely technical evidence that bears upon expectation of surprise. (Even this would not give a completely realistic picture: for, within the boundaries fixed by technical conditions, the "human element" will always blur the outlines of our nicest calculations.) Indeed, quantification of the evidence would seem to be the main unsolved problem here: the predicting of unpredictability, despite its suggestion of paradox, is not precluded by logic.

May there not be place, then, for a new discipline, growing out of work already done by economists, information theorists, and military analysts, and concerning itself with the processes and effects of scientific and technological innovation that has already transformed economic and international affairs?[13] Though no one of the contributory disciplines could supply all that would be needed—not even economics, which first elaborated the crucial idea of "innovation"—yet several of them have advanced far enough to prefigure for us what a general theory of innovation and surprise would be like. The subject of this present study would then appear as one brief and closely circumscribed aspect of a general and increasing process of surprises.

[13] For a name, how about the decent, if Hellenistic, *Kainurgics*—the study of innovatory action?

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THE "NEW LEFT" IN FRANCE

By CHARLES A. MICAUD

THE term "New Left" designates a state of mind—the desire to do away with the division and impotence of the old Left—rather than a definite sector of the political spectrum. It has, in fact, been used in three different contexts. In its most specific sense, it has meant the *Nouvelle Gauche* behind Claude Bourdet and his neutralist weekly, *France-Observateur*. In its broadest sense, it includes all the rebels at the Left, from the reformist followers of Mendès-France to non-Communist revolutionary Marxists. Finally, the term can designate—and this is how it is used here—the groups that occupy the no-man's-land between the Socialists and the Communists. Besides Bourdet's *Nouvelle Gauche*, they include the Christian *Jeune République*, already active in the inter-war period, and the younger *Mouvement de Libération du Peuple* (MLP), the former closer to the outlook of the Socialists, the latter to that of the Communists.[1]

Recently a merger took place; in December 1957 a new party was created, the *Union de la Gauche socialiste*, combining the most important formations of the New Left: the *Mouvement de Libération du Peuple* and *Jeune République* with the *Nouvelle Gauche* and a few rebels of the Socialist Party (SFIO).[2] In *Express* (December 12, 1957), J. M. Domenach welcomed this synthesis of two old traditions of the French Left: that of French socialism from Proudhon to Jaurès and that of "Christian liberalism" from Lamenais to Marc Sangnier. He saw in the new fusion the addition of "richesses exceptionelles" and the possibility of its becoming rather soon the formation having the most militant members after the Communist Party. He also saw in it a healthy sign of political renovation: ". . . it is abnormal that the great parties of the Left stay in the hands of bureaucracies that are more or

[1] Besides these organizations, the *Union Progressiste* of Pierre Cot, the group that is most closely identified with the French Communist Party (PCF), the *Parti socialiste unitaire*, and several short-lived formations of Christian Progressists (behind the periodicals *Positions, Jeunesse de l'Eglise, Quinzaine*) should be mentioned. Together with the MLP, these represented the pro-Communist left wing of the "New Left." The *Jeune République* was its right wing; in the elections of 1956, most of its followers voted for the Socialist ticket when they did not have a list of their own, whereas the former voted mainly for the Communist Party.

[2] It is significant that only two-thirds of the membership of the *Jeune République* accepted this merger. Since the elections of 1956, the Algerian war has acted as a catalyst and brought about *rapprochements* that would not have been possible before the Socialists became identified with the policy of "pacification" in Algeria.

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less disapproved by both militants and voters." The new party may well start a larger regrouping of left-wing forces, without which a *socialisme populaire* cannot succeed.

The phenomenon of the New Left cannot be dismissed lightly. It is of greater significance than the 2 or 3 per cent of the popular vote that it occasionally obtains. For the clientele of the New Left is made up, to a large extent, of students and other young people who will be among the leaders of tomorrow and will influence the course of events. It is not exaggerating to say that in at least some universities most politically conscious students, if they are not Communists, are in sympathy with one or another of the New Left formations and are assiduous readers of its publications.[3] Their hesitations and confusions reflect the crisis of French democracy and reveal the general uneasiness and disaffection.

Young people in France are searching for a new morality fitting the needs of today and a new efficacy; for an up-to-date and coherent doctrine that can be translated into fact. To them, the present party system is both inefficient and incapable of furnishing adequate answers to the problems raised by modern technology, the cold war, and the revolt of colonial peoples. The Republican ideology of the prewar period is meaningless to them. The Socialist and Catholic parties have betrayed their principles. They see no way of making politics fit their ethics.

Dissatisfaction with the status quo, or the tension between ideal and reality, is a normal and healthy reaction. In most Western societies this rebellion can find political expression in the party of the loyal opposition, where the rebels find a constructive outlet for their ethical urge and fulfill a useful function by reminding the party of its ideals and of its obligation to translate them into practice. Not so in France, where the rebellion of youth can discover no effective channels of political expression. The Socialist Party is only sporadically a party of opposition and presents no effective reformist alternative to the shifting coalition of the Center. It appears opportunistic, weak, inconsequential. The Communist Party, as it is today, is not acceptable. Nor is a new party likely to succeed in replacing the classical parties of the Left. The followers of the New Left are searching for a way out of this predicament; so far they have found it in a mythical reconstruction of the unity of the Left.

[3] An inquiry made in Grenoble in the spring of 1956 confirmed the strength of the New Left among students. This was due, among other factors, to the influence of two brilliant and popular university professors. Professor Georges Lavau, who was the candidate of the *Jeune République*, obtained 2,445 votes in the city proper, or about 5 per cent of the expressed votes, compared with 4,059 for the Catholic *Mouvement*

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Several attempts to unite the small formations of the New Left have failed, owing as much to divergences of views as to the continued electoral attraction of the two giants on each side. In *Les Temps modernes* Gilles Martinet attributed, with some reason, the failure of Sartre's *Rassemblement démocratique révolutionaire* in 1948 to the fact that its revolutionary formulae did not correspond to the social-democratic tendencies of most of its followers. For the new *rassemblement* that Martinet envisaged, he suggested not a common doctrine, which would prove impossible, but a common program that would form the basis for an eventual Popular Front.[4]

For the common denominator of the New Left is the belief in a Popular Front as an essential condition for efficient reform, or revolution, or both. This involves a certain impatience with the Socialists for their stubborn refusal to accept this "mariage de raison," if not one based on mutual love. It involves also a continued faith in the ability of the Communist Party to transform itself into a genuine French democratic party, and various degrees of wishful thinking concerning the Communists' present intentions and future good behavior.

The New Left believes that its special mission is to achieve a *rapprochement* between the "Marxist" parties by forming a strong enough group between them to reassure each. Since this is not an immediate prospect, its present role is to preach the eventual necessity of the unity of the Left. Because the Communist Party is isolated, to treat it decently is seen as an imperative duty. Obstacles to the coming Popular Front are minimized and advantages stressed. This is generally overdone and falls upon deaf Socialist ears, to the consternation of the marriage brokers. No opportunity is missed to point out that the Communist threat is but a figment of the Socialist imagination or that there are definite indications of a change of heart within the Communist Party. The anti-Stalinist campaign of the new Soviet leadership was God-sent as a proof of the correctness of their position. Even the crushing of the Hungarian revolution, a hard blow, could not blot out an optimism constantly sustained by new hopes and new mirages.

In fact, French intellectuals—from Sartre down to the self-taught office worker—who form the bulk of the New Left, find it a heaven made to order. They are on the side of social justice and from the vantage point of a good conscience can criticize the anti-communism

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républicain populaire (MRP), 7,976 for the SFIO, and 14,070 for the *Parti communist français* (PCF). The JR did not fare as well in the working-class suburbs.

[4] *Les Temps modernes*, special number, "La Gauche," Nos. 112-113 (1955), "Possibilités et limites d'une 'Nouvelle Gauche,'" pp. 1922ff.

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of the SFIO and the United States as reactionary. Even their frequent torments of conscience give a certain zest to life and permit them to enjoy the role of sophisticated hero-victims in the great drama of the modern world.

Their inability to choose between socialism and communism, reformism and revolution, the West and the East, has developed in them the art of straddling two stools. Their dilemma was well expressed as early as 1946 by Emmanuel Mounier, the father of the personalist philosophy and one of the few *maîtres à penser* of the postwar generation. The Communist Party, he wrote in *Esprit*, represents the working class. It has "the confidence and support of the immense majority of the working class and especially of its most dynamic part. . . . As long as this fact exists, it is decisive. To speak of revolution in our industrial age and to think that this revolution can be achieved without the working class acting as its opening edge is childish. . . . Everyone must remember that any blow directed at the party hits at the core of the faith of the desperate ones."[5] The Socialist Party, he continued, is no longer a workers' party; it is characterized by "impotence, ideological vagrancy," opportunism, and a combination of "pedantic narrowness and sentimental naïveté." Hence the disaffection of the intellectuals, owing to the emptiness of Socialist thought in the last thirty years. As for the MRP, the good intentions of its left wing cannot compete with the conservatism of the voters and the confessional character of the party. Elsewhere a "diffuse idealism," a "travaillisme sans travailleurs," call for ridicule. By contrast, the Communist Party, with its "military toughness and comradery in struggle," exercises a powerful attraction. No wonder that the best of the young Frenchmen in the Resistance have come to a party in which they find "virile discipline, a meaning to history, grandeur and efficacy."

On the other hand, said Mounier, French intellectuals must face the problem of communism with a critical mind. If Marxism is an acute description of socio-economic development, it is a "clumsy philosophy" in other respects. Communists refuse to consider the problem of man in society. This, they think, can wait, and be solved after the revolution. But here is precisely the heart of the matter. "The liberation of man can only be a difficult and precarious conquest. . . . Any revolution may fail because of an initial error concerning man, just as it can fail because of an error in tactics." The revolution may lead to another alienation of man. Therefore the duty of the Christian is to be realistic

[5] *Esprit* (February 1946), "Débat à haute voix," pp. 166ff.

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and vigilant, not to forget about the essential problem of ends and means, even if he is convinced that violence is justified to bring about the revolution. He must not believe with the Communist that the revolution purifies all its actions, "or else the countermorality of the Communists will justify any abuse and any crime." He who knows the clericalism of the Church only too well must beware of the clericalism of the party.

Yet Mounier's conclusion hardly fits these forebodings. The duty of the Christian, he wrote, is to continue to help "any revolution that is authentically popular and efficient and to be on the side of those who prepare it. . . . One can be determined never to separate oneself, even under the most troubling pretexts, from the forces that have the confidence of the oppressed, and yet be all the more demanding toward those who hold such a weighty hope." In other words, the duty of the Christian is to help the Communists and, if necessary, to scold them hard.

Almost ten years later, J. M. Domenach, who has replaced Mounier as editor of *Esprit*, restated the dilemma in similar terms à propos of Dyonis Mascolo's book, *Le Communisme*.[6] He quoted the latter as saying: "It is no more possible for an intellectual to be Communist than to be non-Communist. . . . Intolerable situation." The predicament remains. "The intellectual feels obsessed by the state of misery in which the major portion of mankind lives. He must either keep quiet or fight. But there is only one universally organized fight against man's needs, and that is communism. How could he not participate in it? . . . One cannot be a revolutionist outside the alliance with the PC, an alliance that is impossible so long as the party is what it is. And not to be a revolutionist is in fact equivalent to delegating to technicians without political conscience the care of reforms that will strengthen capitalism more than change it."

The New Left has been unable to extricate itself from the dilemma of a necessary but impossible alliance with the PC. The only way out is to believe that the party will some day be an acceptable partner and in the meanwhile to minimize the dangers that it represents. This position is typical of the special issue on the French Left published by *Les Temps modernes*. Gilles Martinet stated the terms of the problem: "Can one renounce unity of action with the party and the masses it represents without being isolated and becoming the hostage of a predominantly bourgeois coalition? Can one, on the other hand, practice unity of action without being in turn a prisoner of the PC?"[7] He went on to affirm

[6] *Ibid.* (July 1955), pp. 1204ff. [7] *Les Temps modernes, op.cit.*, pp. 1930-31.

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that it is perfectly possible to avoid such a dilemma. It is enough to be aware of two equal dangers: naïve confidence in the party and anti-communism. He suggested a union of the various organizations of the New Left to lay the bases for a new Popular Front, but carefully avoided answering the question he raised about the Communist danger. One is led to assume that the danger is small, if it exists at all. The same conclusion applies to the preceding article in the same issue by Pierre Naville, who put the blame for the failure of the Socialist-Communist coalition on the bureaucracies of both parties and suggested the democratization of both by a free discussion *à la base* for the elaboration of a common program. With this assimilation of Communist and Socialist bureaucracies, the confusion and wishful thinking become complete. In fact, the "realistic" arguments for collaboration with the PC boil down to the hope that the party will transform itself and become democratic. The slightest indication that this lucky turn of events is about to happen is seized upon with fervor. Each consequent disappointment is bitter.

Hence Sartre's indignation after Budapest. "What the Hungarian people are teaching us with their blood is the complete failure of socialism as a merchandise imported from the USSR. . . . One cannot have any friendship for the leading faction of the Soviet bureaucracy; it is horror that dominates. . . . As for the men who at this time lead the French PC, it is not, it will never be, possible to re-establish relations. Every one of their statements, every one of their actions is the fulfillment of thirty years of lying and of sclerosis. Their reactions are completely irresponsible. . . . If the Communists are dishonored, the Socialists are plunged in mud. They agree to follow the policy of the Right. . . ."[8] Yet Sartre's optimism is still alive. "The real problem is that of the relations between Socialists and Communists. Will the Communists be able to overthrow their own dictatorship and will the minority of the Socialists be able to leave their party?" The Popular Front still looms on the horizon as the salvation of France, however unworthy the two partners may be. "If the Communists who oppose dictatorship had the strength to impose a change of policy and if the Socialist minority developed new principles by itself, one would find a Popular Front of a new type in which the mediating element would be the New Left."

Sartre's tempestuous relations with the Communists suggest a passionate love affair more than a detached evaluation of a potential business partner. The ideal image of the loved one keeps reasserting itself,

[8] *Express*, November 9, 1956.

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despite her unfaithfulness, violent temper, and the indignities freely and publicly administered on the slightest provocation.

But Sartre's Marxist faith largely explains his fidelity to the "party of the working class." It is more difficult to account for the wishful thinking of those reformists who believe that an alliance with the Communist Party is the answer to France's problem. The only tentative explanation we can advance here is the hypothesis that the concept of the unity of the Left is appealing in proportion as French politics have failed to offer an alternative to the shifting coalitions of Center parties that spell confusion, opportunism, irresponsibility, and *immobilisme*. The strongly felt need for such an alternative leads to a rationalization of the dangers involved in an alliance with the Communist Party, viewed in an exclusively French context. The PC appears as the party of French workers led by thousands of patriotic party members raised in the French revolutionary tradition. It is obviously anxious to end its long isolation and to give adequate guarantees of patriotism and moderation. Participation in the government can only strengthen the "reformist wing" of the party and help it to become a genuinely democratic and French party.

There is a curious inability among many moderate Leftists to comprehend the real character of the party, its role as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, and the fact that its tight structure and military discipline, which the revolutionary goal alone justifies, make it a perfect instrument in the hands of leaders who have proved their unconditional loyalty to the USSR. Why should they, or the thousands of paid functionaries under them, wish to commit political suicide by allowing the democratization of the party? And why should they seriously consider embarking upon a long-term reformist policy that can only strengthen a system they have consistently condemned and successfully weakened?

The revolutionary wing of the New Left itself belies this wishful thinking by making clear that reformism is both undesirable and impossible. This revolutionary wing can be divided somewhat arbitrarily into two groups: non-Communist Marxists (one can no longer say "anti-Stalinists") who believe that the Soviet leadership has abandoned Marx's and Lenin's principles but accept the philosophical foundation of dialectical materialism, and the non-Marxist but pro-Communist Christians who often outdo the Marxists in their revolutionary zeal.

Characteristic of the outlook of the first is the special issue of *Les Temps modernes* already mentioned. It is a conscious attempt to demonstrate that no genuine Left can exist that is not truly revolutionist in

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the Marxist sense and therefore fails to accept the leadership of the PC. According to this school of thought, only two classes face each other—bourgeoisie and proletariat—and only two possible attitudes toward social change are conceivable—reaction and revolution. Simone de Beauvoir set the tone for the first half of the issue: "The Left," she wrote, "is not a state of mind, an ideological tendency. . . . It is very precisely defined by its will to abolish the exploitation of man by man."[9] Other contributors made clear that this exploitation is absolute, unmitigated, "integral," and demands total liberation. No sentimental humanitarianism will help. "It is not a question," wrote Claude Lanzman, "of remedying the distresses brought about by capitalism, but of suppressing capitalism. . . . It follows that a Left that does not recognize the PC as its central pivot is but a camouflaged Right."[10] The offensive is launched against the twin Sirens of idealism—the illusion of spiritual possessions and eternal values—and reformism. Modern history has proved that the latter is a myth, since "the theory of progress is at the mercy of the first sizable stumbling block. The reformist is in fact a conservative who strengthens the system he claims to transform. He is a counterrevolutionist. The only acceptable reformism is the one that opens up at each step the possibility of revolution."[11] The true Left, therefore, by contrast with the pseudo-Left, is the one that accepts the leadership of the PC, concluded the Communist Claude Desanti.[12]

Anticipating this conclusion, Simone de Beauvoir asked herself a pertinent question: "Why should Western intellectuals insist on defending a doomed civilization which has lost faith in itself? . . . It would seem natural that intellectuals, as such attracted by universalism, should side with humanity in general. . . . Why should they insist on identifying man and bourgeois?" The truth is, she answered, that they have created for themselves an ideological capital of "eternal truths" that they seek passionately to preserve. They are terrified of being "ideologically liquidated" by the revolution, without realizing that they are defending the privileges of the bourgeoisie in the name of a mystique.[13]

In *L'Opium des Intellectuels*, Raymond Aron asked himself an even more pertinent question and, speaking of the "dissidence" of French intellectuals, wondered: "Why should so many intellectuals detest a society that has granted them an honorable living standard . . . and proclaimed that the products of the mind represent the supreme val-

[9] *Op.cit.*, "La pensée de Droite, aujourd'hui," p. 1539.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 1645.
[11] *Ibid.*, Jean Pouillon, "Le Gauche et l'histoire," pp. 1659ff.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 1698ff. [13] *Ibid.*, pp. 1546ff.

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ue?"[14] His book caused a sincere indignation among the followers of the New Left.

The Christian revolutionary group of the New Left is the most interesting and deserves special attention. It is made up essentially of the *Mouvement de Libération du Peuple*, the strongest, best-organized, and most dynamic formation of the New Left, and the only one that is relatively strong among the workers in some industrial areas. In Grenoble, for instance, one-third of the militants of the *Confédération générale du Travail* (CGT) in the metal industry are members of the MLP. So is the secretary of the shop committee of the second largest plant. The MLP is proud of its "popular" character and of "representing with its militants, its action and accomplishments the greatest enterprise for the emancipation of the people after the PC."[15]

Interviews with some fifteen of its militants in Grenoble showed that they are a group of idealistic and dedicated people with full confidence in their mission. They are highly skilled workers, white-collar workers, or technicians, better educated and politically more sophisticated than the average Communist militant. In fact, the MLP forms a bridge between intellectuals and workers.[16] Its self-taught members are in close contact with teachers, priests, and engineers and proud of the fact despite a frequently aggressive *ouvrièrisme*. They even behave more like intellectuals than like workers. Representatives of management speak of their "split personality" and describe them as erratic, touchy, unpredictable, tense, and complain about the greater difficulty in dealing with them than with the more "direct" Communist militants in the CGT.

The MLP has succeeded in increasing its membership and maintaining its autonomy despite a prolonged and heavy flirtation with the PC. This is partly due to its type of organization and particularly to the activities of its sections in the plant and neighborhood. Unity of doctrine and tactics is maintained by a weekly, *Monde ouvrier*, and a monthly, *Perspectives socialistes* (formerly *Perspectives ouvrières*), as

[14] *L'Opium des Intellectuels*, Paris, 1955, p. 230.

[15] "Options fondamentales du MLP," 18th National Congress, November 11-16, 1954, published by *Mouvement de Libération du Peuple*, 54 Blvd. Garibaldi, Paris.

[16] The delegates at the 1957 Congress may give an approximate image of the social composition of the MLP membership: workers formed 28 per cent of the total; white-collar workers, 26 per cent; technicians and engineers, 9 per cent; intellectuals and liberal professions, 20 per cent; others, 17 per cent. Of those present, 56 per cent were members of the CGT, 17 per cent of the *Confédération française des Travailleurs chrétiens* (CFTC). See *Perspectives socialistes*, "Trauvaux 1957," supplement to No. 94 (November 1956), p. 100.

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well as by departmental federations, a national congress, and a national committee.

Solicited to join forces with the other groups of the New Left, the MLP has insisted that it should furnish the leadership, structure, and doctrine for a new revolutionary Socialist Party that would profit by its long experience and militant work *à la base*. It has no intention of taking the place of the SFIO, "hopelessly reformist for the last thirty years," or of giving it new vigor, as the *Jeune République* group would have liked to do. Nor does it intend to help transform the PC into a genuine democratic party, as some leaders of the New Left contemplate. Its goal is to build from the bottom up a revolutionary party that will offer an alternative to the PC and thus lay the foundation for the pluralistic socialist society of tomorrow. The Congress of Lyons in 1957 criticized the PC for its insistence on believing in the magic formula of an alliance with the Socialists, an alliance that is constantly turned down, and for neglecting the vigorous and authentically revolutionary forces of the New Left. According to the resolution of the Congress, it is up to the latter to form a new party in the French revolutionary tradition of Jaurès and Guesde that will not sacrifice democracy to revolution and vice versa. Nenni in Italy and Bevan in Great Britain are showing the way. The events of Eastern Europe point out the need for the democratization of socialism and its independence from the Russian pattern. The time has come for the "opening up" of socialism in France.

The doctrine of the MLP was outlined in a booklet entitled "Options fondamentales du MLP,"[17] approved by the Congress of 1954. It emphasized that unity of the working class is essential to its liberation. Capitalism, it stated, is outdated and cannot but continue to sacrifice the needs of the people to the privileges of a few. By contrast, socialism is dynamic and creative; it permits full employment and maximum production along the lines of the best interests of the collectivity. It rests on rational and scientific bases, on objective facts submitted to "the laws of material and social evolution." It is "a scientific and not a philosophical doctrine" that corresponds to the laws of progress and the needs of man. It is a "fact of historical evolution" and therefore "must spread progressively to all countries." But a fundamental distinction must be made between the "scientific doctrine" of socialism and the philosophical currents that interpret it and suggest various approaches. The latter must be respected; for their competition is the indispensable motor of

[17] *Op.cit.*

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progress and freedom and the only guarantee against totalitarianism.

The MLP, concluded the booklet, is open to all, but especially to that part of the working class that is not organized politically—that is, "the people who do not approve some methods of the PC or its ideology or do not understand the need for a common front of the popular forces." The MLP wants to organize them, while "rejecting any form of anti-communism . . . knowing that one acts as an anti-Communist when one abstains systematically from acting with the Communists because they are Communists." Priority must be given to education for greater political consciousness and not to electoral action, except at the local level. Priority must also be given to the workers; let other organizations concentrate on the bourgeoisie.

At the end of 1956 another booklet, "Pour un Renouveau du Socialisme," restated the objectives of the MLP with greater precision. This interesting document was carefully prepared. A first draft was circulated among the federations and was substantially revised (for instance, a lengthy criticism of American capitalism was omitted from the final version). It represents a distillation of the thoughts of many intelligent people as well as a common denominator of agreement. It is now the catechism of many thousands, and its main themes find wide currency among other thousands outside the ranks of the MLP. The mental processes involved are therefore worthy of close examination.

The booklet stresses the impossibility of serious reforms in the capitalistic context and the need for a new Socialist Party as the axis of another Popular Front. It is an appeal to other formations of the New Left to unite and, more specifically, to intellectuals to join the MLP.

The first part is a somewhat lengthy criticism of French capitalism. Its balance sheet shows that high wages are the exception and that technical progress is not reflected in an increase in wages. But such an increase is not essential. "It is not against low wages that we fight, it is against the institution of salariat as such. We want to abolish the proletarian condition, not only because it forces people to live in misery, but above all because it prevents self-fulfillment in freedom. . . . Our goal is not the *embourgeoisement* but the liberation of the people. . . ." The iron law of capitalism is growing inequality, a concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a small minority with a vested interest in pursuing a Malthusian policy; for that purpose it allows the anachronistic survival of many small enterprises. This oligarchy is corrupted by the easy privilege of colonialism and is ready to make room for fascism. "Democracy is in great danger when the ruling class prefers anything, even Nazism, to the Popular Front."

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Neo-capitalism, it continues, is no solution. Some enterprises, such as Renault, have attempted to give higher wages and to make of an elite of skilled workers a new *petite bourgeoisie* preoccupied only with its immediate problems and indifferent to the fate of other workers. "This is a grave betrayal of French trade unionism. . . . For what is the problem? To strengthen capitalism through its concentration." Experience has proved that capitalism cannot reform itself. A planned economy can be effective only if the economy itself is socialized, if banking and industrial production become public services, and if investment is directed wherever it is needed even though no profit is involved. "This preliminary reform of the state we call revolutionary, and we denounce in the name of reformism the equivocation that consists in doing away with this precondition. . . . Without the revolution, the necessary reforms will not come about." This is why the Monnet Plan and partial nationalizations have failed. "Nationalizations have a meaning only if they are steps on the road that leads to the overthrow of capitalist power. If one stops halfway, capitalism does not wait long to reconquer the ground it was forced to yield at one point."

The advantages of economic planning are found to be obvious and the example of the People's Democracies shows the superiority of the system in both its technical and its psychological results. It is a mistake to believe that planning would lead fatally to the "dictatorship of the managers." Only two conditions are needed to avoid the excesses committed in Russia and in Eastern Europe: the trade unions must keep to their true function—that is, to protect the workers—and decentralization for all decisions and controls must be made effective. "The people of France are too mature to need, after the tutelage of the capitalists, that of the bureaucrats." Many Frenchmen still wrongly believe that socialism will lead to totalitarian rule. "Nothing, absolutely nothing, fatally binds socialization and planning of the economy to totalitarianism. . . . In a socialist economy the citizens are much more interested in, and associated with, the direction of the economy, and hence of politics, than in the regime they have just been liberated from. Freedom does not result from constitutions, but from the public spirit, from the desire to keep informed and the will to express one's opinion—above all, from the presence of courageous militants."

Yet the next chapter starts with the unpleasant admission that the direction of the new economy must be rigorous. "The MLP would be illogical and would lie to the people if it did not affirm the temporary necessity of a dictatorship of the proletariat—that is, the form of government that gives wide responsibilities and power to the representatives

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of the large majority of the people against a minority of impenitent exploiters." It does not follow that the passage to socialism will resemble that of Russia, China, and Eastern Europe. "We desire with all our strength that terror be not needed and that tyranny be made impossible." By contrast with Russia, "the situation in France is exceptionally favorable for a passage to socialism in freedom." For France has a long democratic tradition, an advanced economy, the necessary technicians and, above all, will not have to go through a catastrophic situation such as a foreign or civil war to bring about the revolution.

Then comes the crucial passage. "Yet the MLP admits that wherever the Communist parties have been alone in leading the way to socialism, democracy has not been respected with enough scruples (*sic*). The dictatorship of the proletariat in fact has always degenerated into the dictatorship of the party and finally into that of the party's apparatus. . . . All this, we believe, was in germ from the moment one party pretended to have the right to direct, inspire, and animate the country and to reduce non-Communists to a kind of civic inequality. This is so repugnant to the majority of Frenchmen that it is practically unrealizable. And we repeat what we have always said: the building-up of socialism in France must be directed by several parties in agreement on the main lines of a program of planning and real democracy and in free competition concerning the means to employ. Socialist democracy must have several parties. It will be pluralistic, or it will not be."

The MLP criticizes the PC, the pamphlet goes on, for pretending to have a monopoly of truth in dialectical materialism. It refuses to attach to socialism any exclusive and total ideology, since this is at the basis of the monolithic organization of the party and of its "mystique de l'orthodoxie." The MLP is as opposed to totalitarianism as it is to capitalism and has proved it in its daily struggle. It has refused to tie its organization to any ideology and is opposed to Rousseau's concept of unanimity. "Socialism must absolutely not be the monopoly of a single organization. . . . Equal collaboration of diverse organizations is the only road that can satisfy the French people. . . . The diverse currents of philosophical or religious opinion must in socialism accept loyally the obligations of common action by being assured of the respect of their rights."

The booklet ends by urging the creation of a new Socialist Party, since the old one has discredited social democracy and is prisoner of its fear of communism. The new party must have a solid popular basis; it must be built from the bottom up and not vice versa. This does not mean that the MLP will not welcome intellectuals, and particularly teachers, who seek fraternal collaboration with the workers. Time, pa-

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tience, and hard work will be needed to build up the new party. But it is the only condition for bringing the two large parties of the Left together into a new Popular Front.

This curious document reflects prevailing attitudes among the New Left. In fact, it throws much more light on the psychology of the Leftist intellectual than on that of the average worker. Interviews with one hundred metal workers in Grenoble confirmed their pragmatic turn of mind and an indifference to political abstractions and political problems in general that contrasts with the ideological outlook of the MLP militants in the same industry. Yet the fact that the latter have some influence on the former through their trade union activities indicates a characteristic relationship between the revolutionary outlook of a committed elite and the prevailing apathy of the rank-and-filers, perhaps a relationship of cause and effect. A similar relationship can be found between the acute sensitivity to wrongs on the part of a minority of intellectuals of bourgeois origin and the complacent indifference of the majority of the middle classes.

Let us examine briefly the mental processes involved in the three assumptions underlying the whole argumentation of the MLP: capitalism is evil, reformism is impossible, the revolution will necessarily bring about the good society. Once these assumptions are accepted, everything follows, including alliance with the Communist Party and acceptance of the risks involved.

Capitalism—with a capital C—becomes a reality *sui generis*, just as does socialism, its counterpart. There is no other category conceivable and no intermediate situation. Significantly, the Scandinavian and British experiments are not even mentioned. The criticism of capitalism rests exclusively on French experience, the assumed failure of which is a sufficient reason to condemn "capitalism" everywhere as the single source of evil. This is a typically French combination of provincialism and universalism; not only is the French experience the only valid one, but France has a universal mission to point the way toward the good society of tomorrow.

Contemporary history becomes the scene of a great drama played exclusively by big business and the working class. The salaried middle classes and the individual producers (40 per cent of the active population in France) are hardly mentioned and play no significant role, their fate being linked to that of the workers. The essential reality is the monopoly of economic and political power by big business. This is an article of faith, the frequent repetition of which takes the place of proof. It is assumed not only that big business has a vested interest in main-

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taining a Malthusian economy but that it is the sole instigator of fascism. Quotations are taken from organs of the authoritarian and traditionalist Right to prove the malevolent influence of big business, the common enemy of both Extreme Right and Extreme Left.

By definition, capitalism is total evil and socialism absolute good. Since reformism means the absence of socialism, it partakes of the evil of capitalism. It is nothing but an insurance premium against revolution. Not only is it bad by definition, but experience has proved that it is impossible, since the ruling oligarchy will never surrender its privileges.

The heart of the problem is the belief that capitalism cannot transform itself. This seems to conflict with recent developments in France, such as increased production and productivity, higher living standards, better working conditions, and improved industrial relations in many plants. Do the MLP leaders actually believe that neo-capitalism is incapable of creating conditions for a better society? In another booklet entitled "Neo-Capitalism or Socialism?"[18] a more direct attempt is made at demolishing the claims of neo-capitalism as advocated by Mendès-France. The gist of it is that neo-capitalism may succeed, although haphazardly and imperfectly, and that this is precisely the grave danger.

The crime of Mendès-France, it is explained, is the fact that he turns his back on the working class and the Popular Front that alone could launch genuine reforms and instead tries to gain the support of individual workers in the free unions and elsewhere by offering higher wages and encouraging trade union collaboration with management and the administration. "It is clear that any attempt at substituting workers' representation for the presence of the working class, of substituting the notion of the workers' interests for that of a class option, is a dupery. In a word, Mendèsism woos workers, looking for them everywhere, on the condition that they lose their identity as a class. . . . Socialism is, above all, and before any economic planning, the affirmation of the existence of the working class as such: it is, above all, its political unity, its political identity." The duty of the MLP militant is therefore to call the bluff of neo-capitalism and to work for a People's Front against capitalism.

Thus the crime of neo-capitalism is essentially that it might bring about a better society that would make the best possible society impossible. Its sinister role consists in attempting to create something short of the ideal of complete justice and order and to bring it about by unorthodox—i.e., non-socialist—means. The Nineteenth Congress of the

[18] Supplement to *Perspectives ouvrières*, No. 69 (October 1955).

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MLP in 1956 declared that the fight against neo-capitalism in its various aspects (productivity, human relations, wage agreements, etc.) had become the No. 1 objective for 1957, the other two being the struggle against the war in Algeria and the campaign for the democratization and laicization of the educational system. "We must not allow the working class of our country to bog down in the new form of reformism."[19]

The third assumption, concerning the necessity of the revolution, rests, like the second, concerning the impossibility of reformism, on faith in the ideal society that socialism will bring about. It is not based on a full acceptance of the Marxist interpretation of history, despite the homage paid to the scientific character of socialism. For the Christians do not hesitate to knock down the whole scientific apparatus of Marxism by denying the validity of dialectical materialism. In other words, they believe that the revolution is necessary not because it is inevitable, but because it is ethically superior and, one could almost say, because it is esthetically desirable. It will bring about not only justice, but order, not only equality and self-realization for all, but peace, harmony, the absence of struggle and of chaos.

The repugnance to thinking in realistic terms is characteristic. There is not the slightest attempt to think in terms of power relations and of the structures necessary to protect freedom in the new society. It will be enough for the PC to realize its error—its belief that it has a monopoly of truth. The Communists then cannot have any objection to a coexistence of ideologies and a free and loyal competition of political parties that would agree on the goals of socialism (as if the monopoly of truth were not precisely the only justification for a monopoly of power that the party leadership cannot afford to relinquish). There is no sense of relativity in judging the comparative advantages and disadvantages of "capitalism" and "socialism." The good society of free and equal men is bound to succeed, predicated as it is on the intrinsic superiority of the system and the virtue of the people. The myth of the people as the symbol of goodness assumes the greatest importance, since the case for democratic socialism rests on its innate wisdom and capacity to assume all responsibilities in the planned society, thus preventing an eventual dictatorship by the managers.

The romanticism of revolutionary action presenting itself in the guise of realism allows the Christian socialists to close their eyes to dangers ahead and to discard any doubts concerning the ultimate success of democracy. "The question 'What will the MLP be on the day of the revolu-

[19] *Perspectives socialistes*, "Travaux 1957," *op.cit.*, pp. 125ff.

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tion?' seems to us a false problem. There is a fact: the MLP is: it is necessary today and will probably be for a long time. . . . Further than that one can say only one thing: history evolves through the action of men and the very existence of the MLP today is a factor that modifies . . . this historical evolution. To ask 'What will we be in ten years?' is a question that stems from a frozen, hence reactionary, concept of history. Our own concept of history is dynamic and our answer is this: Let us enter now into the struggle of the workers for socialism, marching loyally shoulder to shoulder with all those who have the same will to break the oppression of today . . . in a competition free of all sectarianism: here is still the best way of forwarding socialism in our country."[20] Thus the irresponsible gamble of the romantics is garbed in a reassuring dynamic concept of history; the very existence of the MLP is proof enough of the possibility of future peaceful and equal coexistence with the PC.

This naïveté on the part of the good revolutionist, who trusts that the partner in revolution cannot be different from himself, is partly based on his long acquaintance with Communist militants, men who are not in fact very different from himself and have nothing Machiavellian about them. To him these people *are* the party: they guarantee its safe evolution. For the myth of the militant, loyal, brave, dedicated, complements the quasi-mystical faith in the people. The "party of the people" cannot but partake of the people's basic innocence. Incidentally, the party has been willing to pay the price for the loyal collaboration of Christian militants and has given them, along with flattery, the illusion of shared decisions that lends some credence to their belief in the possibility of future coexistence.

But the real explanation lies deeper and is to be found in the realm of faith. The vision of the good society to come overshadows everything else, establishes the perspectives from which reality is apprehended, and dictates strategy and tactics. We are faced here with what may be called the phenomenon of "intellectual and moral absolutism." It is characterized by an insistence on a clear-cut dichotomy: good and evil, truth and falsehood, a choice between black and white that eliminates shades of grey in political thinking. Universal symbols are substituted for concrete and diverse realities and transcend them. There is no need for an examination of economic and social evolution in France or abroad, for facts must fit the universal schema of class struggle or else be dismissed as temporary aberrations. Characteristic of this frame of mind is Simone de Beauvoir's introduction to her study of the French Right: "Truth is

[20] *Ibid.*, January 15, 1956.

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single, error multiple": it follows that pluralistic interpretations of history (and this is the bulk of her criticism) are necessarily false, mere bourgeois attempts at camouflaging a simple situation that Marx has comprehended and translated into a correct and scientific single explanation.[21]

When pressed about the problem of injustice in French society, many of the New Left would recognize that the situation was improving and that a larger number of workers now had a decent living standard. But they would insist that the problem remained integral so long as injustice was present anywhere in the world. To them the scandal of injustice is universal and the fault lies with existing institutions. It is not a question of patient efforts toward the bettering of conditions, but of the radical elimination of evil. The contrast between the miserable millions of Asia and the pleasure seekers of America and Western Europe is intolerable, the proof of the basic evil of Western capitalism and the sign of its doom.

Perhaps this intellectual and moral absolutism can be traced in part to the French educational system, which generates a love for abstract principles and deductive logic, matched only by ignorance of economic and social problems. Love for abstractions combined with lack of interest in concrete problems could explain the irresistible appeal of Marxism as a total system of explanation and the admiration bestowed on the modern *maîtres à penser* as against the dull and cautious experts. Love for abstract systems often leads the young student to the acquisition at an early age of a *Weltanschauung* that only remotely fits the facts and difficult choices of life.

Another set of explanations involves the peculiar concept that many intellectuals have of their mission as moral philosophers. Their role is to stress ideals and denounce the shortcomings of political compromises. Often enough, moral condemnation remains platonic: it is sufficient to state the problem and find its ideal solution, its translation into facts being incidental, almost irrelevant. Often, also, moral indignation ends in bitter impatience with the "system." Hostility to it leads either to cynical retrenchment or to the adoption of a revolutionary outlook, both attitudes having the advantage of keeping one's ideals unpolluted by the sordid realities of politics.

Reformism in France is looked upon in the context of this divorce of ideals and reality. It is essentially a betrayal of principles; for it contents itself with cautious and prosaic goals, teaches the acceptance of limits, feeds on its own passion for moderate results, and ends in the

[21] *Les Temps modernes*, *op.cit.*, p. 1539.

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death of the ideal. "Tout commence en mystique et tout finit en politique," said Péguy. Reformism in France connotes well-known betrayals: Millerand, Briand, Viviani, and others, in the name of reform, soon became traitors to the cause of socialism. To many, politics is the art of compromise at the expense of principles and reformism is only the most hypocritical form of politics. The dichotomy of ideals and sordid reality must be constantly reasserted and this reassertion is the main function of the left-wing intellectual.

There is an element of romanticism in this appeal of the ideal solution, with its scorn for anything short of perfection, as well as in the urge to destroy for the sake of reconstruction. Involved in it also is what has been called "Saint Exupérisme," the appetite for action, the duty to engage oneself. Someone said that Malraux converted more young French people to the cause than Marx ever did. Intellectuals who had retired to their ivory tower for so long and preferred the tribulations of introspection to those of the society around them were awakened by the shock of two world wars and reconsidered their duty with a vengeance. Their new passion for action was not without a trace of guilt.

French society, they believed, did not offer them the possibility of effective organized action for the satisfaction of their ethical urge. The dichotomy of interests and ideals was neatly translated into the field of political action: one could belong either to a pressure group defending ignoble interests, more or less camouflaged by ideologies, or to the small but inefficient chapels of the idealists that with their tempests in a teapot are only partly rewarding. The PC alone combined ideals and results; it made efficient agitators of its members and translated the interests of the workers into the noblest possible cause. It alone gave an answer to the dichotomy of ideals and reality; the temptation to become a dedicated and efficient revolutionist was hard to resist. Only the highest concept of man's dignity and fundamental freedom could make one prefer the small chapels to the strong party.

Perhaps also the search for absolutes is to be linked to the impact of religion. Not only good Catholics but anti-clericals as well have been raised in the concept that "truth is single, error multiple." The monopoly of truth can easily be transferred from the Catholic to the Communist Church and Mounier was probably right when he commented on the "clerical vice" that unites many members of both churches. Nor is truth alone involved. The concept of an immutable and perfect social order, attained even at the cost of revolution, is appealing to clerical minds that tend to equate freedom with chaos. Before the war many

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were attracted to fascism by its promise of order and closed their eyes to its totalitarian aspects. Now Marx has replaced Maurras as the prophet of the new order, which is somewhat of a step forward.

This is not to say that Leftist intellectuals are not moved by an intense hatred of injustice. The very intensity of their moral reprobation often stems from a sense of individual or collective guilt. To some, who had ignored injustice, its discovery is a shocking revelation. Others feel that their duty is to compensate for the indifference of society at large; social conscience demands that they enter the battle and help save mankind, if only by going to meetings and signing petitions. In other Western societies, a more diffuse but more effective sense of responsibility would seem to keep the guilt complex under control and to lead to concrete performances rather than to dreams of revolution.

Moral absolutism is characteristic of a religious temperament, of a thirst for an explanation of and purpose to life. Evil exists and must disappear. Thanks to Karl Marx, one knows the cause of evil and the road to salvation. Through a transference of dogmas from the sacred to the profane, Marxist eschatology satisfies the religious need for perfection and meaning in life. The proletariat is the new Messiah, chosen by God to be the collective saviour of mankind. Revolution is redemption, the supreme sacrifice that will bring about the Kingdom of God on earth. Thus the saved victim and saviour, the proletariat, must continue to exist, or salvation will never be. Neo-capitalism is the demonic tempter, offering high wages in place of paradise on earth. The temptation must be resisted, for the stakes are too high and transcend such prosaic aims as high living standards—the salvation of man is involved: his integrity and his destiny.

This thesis is developed by Max Lyon in his "Réflexions sur le Progressisme."[22] For him the main explanation of a pro-Communist stand on the part of Christian Progressists is the "need for totality" to be found among many religious minds, the mystical thirst for an ideal society from which all evil and suffering have been eliminated in accordance with the grand design of God. "Communism becomes a 'mystique de substitution' for those Christians who rightly despair of finding in their religion a doctrine of temporal action that can be opposed to Marxism. . . . They transfer to the political domain an absolute hope that has a meaning only at the level of [transcendental] faith." Hence

[22] *Cahiers des Groupes Reconstruction* (February 1954), pp. 4ff. This publication represents the views of the left-wing minority of the CFTC. Despite its aggressive trade unionism and its faith in democratic socialism, it adopts a realistic attitude toward the Communist Party.

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their need to accept a global system of interpretation, where "History (with a capital H) is erected as an absolute and becomes the mysterious mediator of the divine will . . . where the decisions of a temporal power come to answer the 'scheme of God' and manifest, however obscurely, the divine will on this earth." Politics are viewed as the field of "the metaphysical conflict between Evil and Justice." The new society will once and for all deliver man from sin through the disappearance of evil. It follows that "since the Marxists have understood and analyzed the social processes of alienation and have laid the bases for a realistic policy of liberation, we must trust them for the edification of the new society: they seem to have mysteriously received the unique privilege of carrying out this task successfully." From the conviction that the Communist society contains in itself the absolute solution to social contradictions, it follows that "to oppose the Communists in any way, to refuse for more or less valid reasons to help them in their fight, which is the only 'authentically revolutionary' one, to side in fact with oppression, is to place oneself tragically against the current of history."[23]

The Christian Progressist, Max Lyon explains, wants to save the Church despite itself and prove through his actions that religion is not the opium of the people. His faith in justice must not be less ardent than the faith of the Communist. "The spiritual future of the Church is envisaged in the sole perspective of its 'revolutionary' action or inaction. Men will take seriously the message of the Church . . . only if the Church intervenes in their struggle and takes sides. If not, the proof will exist of its collusion with the 'puissances d'argent' and of its contamination by the bourgeois spirit." Their anxiety to defend the future of the Church even leads some to accept the necessity of temporary religious persecution. "One may find in the Progressists' attitude an obscure desire to pay for the sins of capitalism by working for the triumph of justice through the sacrifice of the just . . . so that the new society will be built through purification and the elimination of the last vestiges of bourgeois religion."

This analysis throws some light on the predicament of the "worker priests," two-thirds of whom refused in 1954 to accept the decision of the Church to end the experiment, preferring to remain workers. The crux of the matter was concisely expressed by the Archbishop of Aix: "Some have thought that an apostolic mission among workers was inefficient as long as the capitalistic system was not overthrown. They thought that they must consecrate themselves to revolutionary action;

[23] Raymond Aron develops a similar thesis in *L'Opium des Intellectuels*, *op.cit.* See also Maurice Schumann, *Le Vrai Malaise des Intellectuels de Gauche*, Paris, 1957.

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evangelizing would come later."[24] The rebels justified their position in a book that is a fascinating human document. They explained how they became new beings, transformed by their mission. "It was simply due to our condition of work and existence, to the sharing of our whole life with conscious militants—in particular, those of the CGT and PC—and to the analysis of the conditions that the working class movement offered to us. . . . We learned that class struggle is not a moral concept that one may accept or refuse, but that it is a brutal fact, imposed on the working class. It is a struggle against the working class forced on them by the single party of the *possédants*, helped . . . by the Church."[25] In this book we can follow the process of identification with the working class, ending with the passionate desire to merge oneself in the newly discovered proletarian consciousness. Revolutionary action became the prerequisite of effective sacerdotal mission. Christian zeal led to proletarian zeal until finally the spiritual mission was relegated to second place. The mystical quality of identification is striking. The priests speak of *communion charnelle* with the working class. "We were in communion with all our body and soul with their friendship, their fraternity, the ardent liberating fire of their struggle. We shared their impatience at so much misery . . . their lucid charity led us to fight with them day and night, conscientiously, calmly, logically, in order to fight the roots of evil."[26] Their thirst for sacrifice finally led them to the ultimate sacrifice: leaving the Church to redeem the working class, the salvation of which demanded expiatory victims.

This religious interpretation would apply not only to Christians, but to all those who, unable to accept a transcendental faith, passionately seek some pattern of explanation in an apparently meaningless world, the promise of a better society, and the comfort of a cause. The intellectual and moral crisis of which existentialism is the most elaborate rationalization has created a vacuum that can be filled by the Marxist eschatology. Nor is the need for the reassurance of a secular faith surprising in a world at war, particularly in France, where profound ideological divisions have prevented both social cohesion and effective democratic leadership at a time when cohesion and leadership appear essential for survival.

The hypothesis can be advanced that revolution is appealing in proportion as the process of reformism has proved difficult, if not impossible, in the past. Many revolutionists are in fact frustrated reformists, idealists who have despaired of finding an effective political outlet for

[24] *Les Prêtres ouvriers*, Paris, 1954, p. 219.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 230.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 267.

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their ethical urge. The apparent inability of the Center coalitions to generate consistent and constructive action has led many to believe that the only choice is between reaction and revolution.

Revolution then becomes a realistic way out of an untenable situation, and an incentive to action. But such an incentive is limited to those who are not afraid of the demands made on revolutionary militants. In fact, the revolutionary outlook of an elite makes for the indifference and apathy of the masses, who see no tangible advantages in sight—a pattern established early by the revolutionary syndicalists who paved the way for the success of the Communists. But both the fanaticism of the few and the skepticism of the many tend further to delay the process of reformism. They feed the division and organizational weakness of the trade unions and the parties of the Left and discourage attitudes and techniques conducive to successful collective bargaining. Neither incentives nor adequate pressures exist to bring about actual improvements; and the proof is thus furnished that such improvements are impossible.

The *tour de force* of the Communist Party has consisted in recruiting enough frustrated reformists to form a solid phalanx of disciplined party members who are made into efficient instruments for an anti-reformist policy, while at the same time maintaining among the masses the illusion that only the "party of the working class" has a vital concern for that class's well-being. The workers have continued to trust the militants and to vote for the party that has a vested interest in preventing the reforms they are hoping for. The smoldering indignation against the "system" keeps bringing to the party both irate idealists and bewildered masses.

There is some consolation in the thought that the prospect of betterment offered to the workers cannot be consistently turned down. The leaders have to accept it, even if grudgingly and in protest, or else be cut off from their followers. The realism of the workers will continue to reassert itself and put the revolutionists in a quandary; this has been and will continue to be the dilemma of the CGT and the PC. How long can revolutionary dynamism accommodate itself to surreptitious reformism that saps its very foundations?*

* This mildly optimistic note needs to be somewhat modified in view of the recent advent to power of General de Gaulle. The fear of an authoritarian form of government could polarize social and political forces around the extreme Right and the extreme Left. For many Leftists, including the supporters of the "New Left," a Popular Front is the logical and inevitable answer to the threat of "fascism"; the dilemma of the Center Left has already led to a painful drama of conscience that has split the ranks of the Socialists and the Radicals. The issue of Republican defense may well give the Communist Party another chance.

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LA FIEVRE DE LA RAISON

Nationalism and the French Right

By EUGEN WEBER

AN epigram coined under the Third Republic presents the political Frenchman as torn between the claims of his heart on the Left and of his pocketbook on the Right. At a time when a nationalistic policy in Algeria draws heavily on all pocketbooks this idea seems out of date: today a good section of the French public is trying to reconcile accepted attitudes with a new policy, and the old phraseology of the Left conceals less and less successfully an ideology of the Right. The trend is strengthened by transfusions of new blood from a colonial domain lost or endangered in the last few years; that is, by the arrival in metropolitan France of tens of thousands of politically active and actively resentful citizens from Indo-China, Morocco, Tunisia, impenitently expressing their disrespect for democratic values, their wartime sympathies for Pétain and Vichy, and their contempt for the traditional language of political conformity. But these new recruits can do no more than reinforce a tendency already evident at the end of the 1940's and growing since—a drift to the Right, reflecting the widespread awareness of French decline as a power and dull resentment of apparently insoluble economic difficulties that are taken together as evidence of national decay, sinister foreign machinations, and the inability of the present political system and personnel to cope with either.*

Any study of opinion, especially public opinion, is a patrol into no-man's-land: the mission is seldom definite, nor are the results. Shadows may look portentous and the evidence collected, usually circumstantial, seldom points indisputably in only one direction. The investigator has to listen very carefully and think more carefully still in order to determine the point at which the confused stirring and muttering he is trying to interpret fall into a pattern that seems to make sense. Similarly, the student of opinion has to decide when and whether and which of the many voices around him becomes significant and ought to be

* This article was written before May 13, 1958, and its judgments refer to a regime that has recently put itself in suspended animation. There is, however, nothing to suggest that fresh faces or patterns of government have so far appeared which are succeeding in coping better than the old. Recent events merely emphasize the increasingly widespread acceptance, in resignation or relief, of authoritarian solutions to apparently insoluble difficulties and incoherences. But nothing has yet clarified the fortunes or position of the extreme Right that is my special concern. Nor was it ever my intention to prophesy; this is an attempt to analyze the past, not to predict the future.

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admitted as the voice of the public, or at least one of the voices to which the public will lend an ear.

Nor is the popularity of an idea a completely straightforward phenomenon: it may be merely the incidental reflection of a vaster mood. Thus, for instance, the sympathy for Israel in many circles of the Right that were only recently anti-Semitic does not indicate a new-found philosemitism so much as anti-Arabism. In the same way, the significance of the developments discussed below is not intrinsic but symptomatic. Though the intellectuals of the extreme Right have no wide support and little electoral success, the ideas which they express in their journals and their books have a widespread and interested readership reflecting an increasingly dominant mood of demoralization and despair.

The rise of this mood leads to defiant proclamations like "La France seule"—reminiscent of an earlier "Italia fara da se"; to compensating nationalist-chauvinist verbiage from which, as the 1957 Congress of the Socialist Party at Toulouse shows, not even the parties of the Left are immune;[1] and even to a certain revival of fascism.[2] It is reflected in the success of Pierre Poujade, temporary though this may be; in the successful pressure of Algeria's *Présence française*; in the bias which carries the Socialist Party "from Jaurès to Poujade," according to Maurice Duverger in *Le Monde*, or "from Mussolini to Max Lejeune," according to Pierre Dominque in *Rivarol* (July 17, 1957), in the footsteps of *les grands ainés*, Valois, Doriot, Bergery, Déat, Marquet, and Montagnon. It can be seen in the progressive rehabilitation of Pétain and his followers, clearly apparent since 1946, from the scandals and riots which attended the masses in memory of Philippe Henriot or of Pétain to the point, ten years later, where the public attending a mass in Notre-Dame to celebrate the centenary of Pétain's birth proved more numerous than the small crowd of counter-manifestants on the cathedral square. It appears also in the gradual resurgence of a group of men and a political attitude whose annihilation had seemed certain only twelve years ago: the nationalist Right.

[1] See the speeches of Robert Lacoste, Max Lejeune, and even Guy Mollet at the Toulouse Congress; and M. Duverger, "Neo-Socialisme, 1957," *Le Monde hebdomadaire*, Nos. 456 and 457 (July 1957).

[2] *Rivarol* (January 10, 1957) printed the letter of a French Algerian student, "Pourquoi je suis devenu un salaud de fasciste," ending: "En A.F.N. nous sommes nombreux qui ne demandons qu'a passer à l'action. Ce sera bientôt fait. Et avec vous je dis: Vive la France. Vive Pétain. Vive le Christ-Roi!" In *Aurore* (November 24, 1955) Jules Romains expressed premature regret at the disappearance of the right-wing Leagues he had opposed before the war; cf. also the sympathetic treatment that prewar Fascist activities receive in his *Fils de Jerphanion* (1956).

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In their analysis of the by-election that shook the First Sector of Paris in January 1957, Louis Bodin and Jean Touchard assert that, from Right to Left, the reference to the nation was the most striking feature of the election.[3] From the Communists, playing on labor's fear of foreign competition and stressing the theme of national independence, through the significantly labeled *Communisme national* of Pierre Hervé, to a Right divided against itself, the adjective "national" received pride of place in electoral literature. And this revived use of the nationalist vocabulary reflected the revival of a state of mind in the country as a whole—a state of mind not unfamiliar to students of the nationalist revival, so-called, which preceded the First World War. The new trend has not passed unnoticed, at least in France, but it has remained undefined except in analyses of the Poujadist movement,[4] and this is not surprising in view of its vagueness, of the difficulty of pinning it down, and of the protective coloring furnished by established prejudices which permit most observers to see only what they expect to see. Taught, as most of us have been, by Thibaudet and Siegfried, by Brogan and Thomson, overly persuaded by a reading of history which seems to forbid any enemies on the Left, we have failed to draw correct conclusions from a political scene in which the Left is gelded, where the old slogan might well be restated as "Pas d'ennemis à droite," and the new catchwords are not republican but nationalistic.

We know enough by now not to confuse nationalism, always self-assertive, with patriotism, which is more defensive in nature—a love of one's land and values implying no expansive ambitions. In this sense, nationalism might be seen as the political exploitation of patriotism, using patriotic feelings to forge unity, enforce discipline, or provide the energy and resources for the expression of its aggressive tendencies. We are familiar with the sort of nationalism that expresses national vitality and self-confidence in the pursuit of a manifest destiny to conquer or dominate new realms; and also with that which reflects a new self-consciousness in demands for unity or the redemption of fellow-nationals groaning under a foreign yoke. But there is a kind of self-assertion that amounts to whistling in the dark, and there is also a kind of nationalism that appears as a sign of weakness, whether conscious or not, and a symptom of decay. All three varieties can be found in the

[3] "L'Election partielle de la Première Circonscription de la Seine," *Revue française de science politique*, VII, No. 2 (1957), pp. 271-312.

[4] S. Hoffmann, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, Paris, 1956; J. Touchard, "Bibliographie et chronologie du Poujadisme," *Revue française de science politique*, VI, No. 1 (1956), pp. 18-43; E. Weber, "Poujade and the Sickness of France," *Dissent*, IV, No. 2 (1957), pp. 183-88.

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history of France: the first in the passionate faith that thrust French armies and administrators forward over Europe after 1792; the second in the irredentism, already tinged with weakness, that colored French politics between 1871 and 1914; the third in the confused defeatism of the 1930's and the confused resentments of today.

It is only the third variety which concerns us here, although it is seldom found unalloyed, being naturally affected by recollections of former attitudes, policies, and greatness. But it is this nationalism of an ill-defined new Right, far vaster than the small cliques of Abetz or Vichy, [5] which is closely connected with a general shift to the Right in the politics of a country where most politicians today use the vocabulary of the Left (when they use it) only to recommend conservative measures. Yet little is left even of the salutary hypocrisy of language which honors certain values in the breach if not in the observance; little survives of the republican radicalism which shaped the Third Republic: we watch the party of Jaurès and Blum move toward a national socialism, and note that the brilliant and forthright economist who followed Herriot in the presidency of a disintegrating Radical Party resembles Caillaux rather than Combes.[6] Everybody is conservative—from Mollet to Poujade—or, if they are not, at least they act as if they were.

"Etre à droite," wrote Jules Romains, "c'est avoir peur pour ce qui existe." And this well describes the common trait of the shifting coalitions which the Chamber thrusts up every now and then, like mud bubbles in the hot pools of Yellowstone Park, to burst like them with a sulphuric smell. Men of the Left in the ranks of various parties like to recall Alain's famous remark: "When I am asked whether the break between parties of the Left and Right, men of the Left and Right, has any meaning still, the first thought that comes to my mind is that who-

[5] This is where party labels and groupings (e.g., *Front Républicain, Gauche Républicaine*) are misleading, because they fail to show why an assembly where the representatives "of the Left" are in a majority should so consistently avoid the politics of the Left. We need a careful analysis of the parliamentary personnel, in terms of their voting and their tendencies, before we can discriminate among them. Such an analysis I cannot provide at this time or discover elsewhere.

[6] The resemblance between the two men goes beyond their high competence and their talent for making enemies to the confusion they create in some minds concerning their adherence to Left or Right. To this question concerning Mendès-France, the French Institute of Public Opinion received the following answers (*Sondages*, No. 1, 1955, p. 37):

	Sept. 1954 (%)	*Jan. 1955 (%)*
A man of the Right	16	25
A man of the Left	31	24
Other answers	17	22
No answer	36	29

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ever asks this is certainly not a man of the Left." But they forget that in Alain's day there really was a difference which the Right sought to minimize, whereas today few nuances remain for the Left to magnify. So, the Left is hard to identify once the Communists have been excluded, and this in turn makes it more difficult to tell the various Rights apart. But even if we fall back on rough definitions and investigate only those men, publications, and groups that clearly declare themselves as belonging to the extreme Right—if we exclude, therefore, the Laniels and the Pinays, the Cotys and the Mayers—we are still impressed by the proliferation of groups, cliques and, especially, reviews "of the Right."

A study of these last, even at the most superficial level, provides material for a reappraisal of French political reality. In a quick tour of the newsstands we find *Aspects de la France*, edited by the ex-*Commissaire-Général aux Questions Juives*, Xavier Vallat—"hebdomadaire de l'Action française royaliste"; *Rivarol*, "hebdomadaire de l'opposition française"; *Fidélité*, representing the *Phalange française; Faisceaux*, carrying on the tradition of Georges Valois, "pour l'indépendance nationale et européenne"; *L'Heure française*, connected with Pétain's faithful defender, Jacques Isorni, "hebdomadaire militant des Jeunes Forces Françaises"; and *Libertés françaises*, of Robert Havard de la Montagne. *Ecrits de Paris*, the most important of the new nationalist monthlies, numbers among its contributors Maurras' faithful disciple and biographer, Henri Massis; Admiral Auphan, contumaciously condemned to death by the High Court in 1946; François Cathala, heir of Pierre Cathala, Vichy Secretary of State in various economic departments; Jacques Benoist-Mechin, historian of the German army, ex-member of the *Parti populaire français*, ex-*jeune cycliste* on the team of Marion and Pierre Pucheu, ex-Vichy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Simon Arbellot, high in Vichy's Ministry of Information; Alfred Fabre-Luce, memorialist of Vichy; and, again, Xavier Vallat. *La France Catholique* unites a number of the right-wing Catholics who wrote for *Demain* and the *Revue du Siècle* under Vichy: Jean de Fabregues, Gustave Thibon—who since 1955 has collaborated with Pierre Boutang in running *La Nation française*—and Jean Guitton, author of a study of Pétain's national revolution published under Vichy. *Défense de l'Occident* is published by the executed Brasillach's bitter brother-in-law, Maurice Bardèche. *Fédération*, "revue de l'ordre vivant," groups a less dedicated but very brilliant band—Daniel Halévy, Robert Aron, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Gabriel Marcel, Thierry Maulnier, Paul Sérant, and the corporatist Louis Salleron. This list leaves aside pe-

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riodicals which, like Poujade's *Fraternité française*, take their stand less clearly on the Right or which, like *Présence française*, the influential mouthpiece of die-hard Algerian colonists, appear only as the organ of a pressure group.

Though widely diversified, the groups behind these publications together form what is often called "the new Right"—a species whose advent began to be noticed seriously in the middle 1950's. In an article published in *Arts* (January 1955), Jacques Laurent[7] described this new Right as inspired by Maurras, Massis, Pierre Boutang, and Paul Sérant. The former pair have their established place in the literature of prewar nationalism and the latter belong to a younger generation, but all four men supported Pétain and share a common reverence for him. Boutang, veteran of the *Action française*, is the author of *Amis du Maréchal*, a plea for support of Pétain's authority published in 1944. He started to write in *Aspects de la France* as soon as it managed to appear in 1946, having bought the title of an innocuous and moribund review to secure its allocation of paper, and only left it for Gustave Thibon's *Nation française* in October 1955. Sérant, whose home ground seems to be *La Parisienne*, a more pretentious and less distinctly Right review, has published a sympathetic study of the tribulations of *miliciens* after 1944 —*Les Inciviques* (1955).

Writing in the *Gazette littéraire* (February 1955), Jean Paulhan recognized the importance of Pierre Boutang, but adjoined to him two other "young doctrinaires": Maurice Bardèche in the *Défense de l'Occident* and Alfred Fabre-Luce, who finds his platform in *Rivarol*. To this intellectual Roll of Honor we might add the brilliant royalist historian, Pierre Gaxotte, prewar founder of *Je Suis Partout*, who contributes to *La Vie française* and in whom *Rivarol* (March 17, 1955) saluted the tradition of Bainville and Maurras; Thierry Maulnier who, though somewhat settled now, still shows traces of the days in 1930 when, together with his fellow-*normaliens* Bardèche and Brasillach, he joined the staff of the *Action française*; Philippe Ariès, a historian who, under the occupation, contributed to the *Cahiers de la Restauration française*; and yet another historian, Jean Guitton, whose appointment in 1955 to the Chair of History of Philosophy at the Sorbonne led to student demonstrations both for and against him and his associations.

It is difficult to tell what the influence of these men really amounts to. *Rivarol* (May 5, 1955) printed the letter of a schoolboy who ex-

[7] Author of the sad story of a young militiaman's fate after the Liberation, *Le Petit Canard*, Paris, 1955.

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plained that he attended one of the most "progressivist" *lycées* of Paris, where Communist propaganda was extremely active: "Il y a deux ans, j'étais le seul de ma classe à lire *Rivarol* et professer mes idées ressemblait à un sport fort difficile. Maintenant, plusieurs de mes camarades achètent régulièrement votre hebdomadaire, le lisent et le font lire autour d'eux . . . . nous discutons avec ardeur . . . . nos idées trouvent maintenant leur expression et gagnent en force." Two years before this, *L'Express* had quoted prefectorial reports which indicated that opinion in the country was turning against the regime: Strasbourg: "coupure entre parlement et opinion publique"; in the Jura: "accentuation du courant anti-parlementaire"; Lyons: "l'anti-parlementarisme se manifeste avec vigueur."[8]

Such developments might be interpreted as bringing grist to the mill of the anti-parliamentary Right, but no confirmation for this view can be found in the electoral results of January 1956. It is true that the Jura shifted to the Right, but Socialist gains at Lyons equaled those of the Independents, whilst in the Bas-Rhin the reigning *Mouvement républicain populaire* (MRP) actually strengthened its position. Indeed, both in January 1956 and in the by-election of January 1957, what we might call the unabashed, or Fascist, Right was left standing at the post. On the other hand, sales of nationalist publications seem to be increasing: in January 1956 *Rivarol* printed 53,000 copies; *La France Catholique*, 50,000; *Aspects de la France*, 28,000. We cannot, of course, tell the relationship between *tirage* and actual sales, but the figures compare favorably with the 50,000 of *France-Observateur*, or the 25,000 of the MRP's *Forces nouvelles* . . . and *Rivarol*, which on February 7, 1957, claimed sales of from 60,000 to 70,000, seems to stand second in weekly sales only to *L'Express*.

The strange inverse relationship between the apparent popularity of nationalistic periodicals and the electoral failure of Nationalist candidates suggests that, while their ideas find favor, the direct reminder of Vichy does not, and that therefore we may discover the same ideas in other quarters, echoed by personalities less compromised and hence more available. This is exactly what we do find in the rise to power of the conservative Independents, welcomed by *Rivarol* and *Ecrits de Paris*, which particularly cherish Pinay for his Pétainist associations, and in the fortunes of Pierre Poujade, who also benefited from their sympathy. The sympathy went not so much to the man, generally treated with some skepticism, but to a career interpreted from the first as a reflection of the country's growing disgust with parliamentary

[8] *Express*, June 20, 1953.

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democracy, and implying a shift toward the Right. Though the conclusion could be debated, the trend could not: it was already there in 1949, reflected in the pages of the hyper-bourgeois *Aurore*; it had been brought to the Cabinet's attention by Vincent Auriol in April 1949, and to that of the Chamber by Paul Reynaud in February 1950;[9] but it took some time for the turn of the tide to be more widely marked. By January 6, 1955, *Rivarol*, celebrating its fourth anniversary, could write: "Nous savons maintenant que nos positions sont celles sur lesquelles se rejoignent et se regroupent tous les français qui ont dit 'non' au communisme sovietique." Some months later (July 28) it noted with pleasure that the intelligentsia was turning toward the Right as faith in political parties and interest in democracy declined. On September 30, a grand meeting in the Salle Wagram cheered Lyautey, Weygand, Juin, and Noguès, and booed de Gaulle, Catroux, and Faure, thus reflecting (as *Rivarol* said on October 6) "une vague de fond antiparlementaire." The Poujadist victories of January 1956 made this abundantly clear and 1956 was a year of heart-searching and lamentations in the most eminent quarters. Thus Guy Mollet, speaking at Arras on May 6, declared that "l'autorité de l'Etat s'effrite lentement." President Coty was quoted by *Paris-Match* as telling young deputies that he saw the regime "dégringoler à une allure qui l'épouvante." In *Carrefour* (December 19), Senator Debré, of Indre-et-Loire, feared that "l'illégitimité qui marque peu à peu les gouvernements impuissants condamne la République." And the soldiers grumbled, too—Grandval, Navarre, Boyer de Latour—until there was no ignoring at any level the utter lack of confidence in, or respect for, the regime.[10] Such a mood, not lacking Fascist undertones, has nothing in common with the nationalism of a Poincaré or even a Millerand, strong men but confident in the Republic and the republican system. It recalls rather the atmosphere of 1939 and 1940, years in which a regime of order, national discipline, and regeneration replaced the *grande pagaïe* of the Third Republic. And we sense an awareness of this when *Le Monde*, in connection with the riots of April 1957, refers to the renaissance of the extreme Right.

"Des parlementaires et même des ministres," wrote Jacques Fauvet,[11] "s'inquiètent depuis quelque temps de la montée du fascisme." The Fascist danger, however, does not come from the bands whose acts of violence get in the news with paragraphs and photographs of rioting

[9] *Aurore*, May 6, 1949, on the Cabinet meeting of April 14; *Journal Officiel, Débats, Chambre*, February 7, 1950.
[10] *Ecrits de Paris*, September 1957; *Le Monde*, January 18, 1957, "L'Armée s'inquiète."
[11] *Le Monde hebdomadaire*, April 3-10, 1957.

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round the Etoile, the Sorbonne, or at the Cité Universitaire.[12] There is no evidence of any increasing popularity for them. If we may judge by the vote in the First Sector of Paris, in which the *Parti du Drapeau* got 2,006 out of a total 319,081 votes cast in the second ballot—less than 0.5 per cent of the total vote—the threat to the regime from that quarter is slight and in no way comparable to 1934. The real danger to republican institutions comes rather from the respectable, non-violent, conservatives who have adopted a Nationalist vocabulary which does not emphasize anti-parliamentarism but expresses a highly ambiguous attitude toward parliamentary democracy and constitutional liberties. In this sense, the three Nationalist deputies of Tixier-Vignancour's *Rassemblement national* elected in 1956 count far less than Independents like Frédéric-Dupont or Julien Tardieu,[13] because the latter are the solid citizens who succeed in representing a tendency of the majority. That they succeeded by insisting on local issues is nothing new in France: as the parishioners of St. Sévérin, St. Sulpice, and St. Thomas d'Aquin know, *la politique de clocher* is no more out of place in Paris than in the provinces. But that they found it useful to join the Nationalist vocabulary to their own conservative one is highly significant and probably unheard-of since the early 1920's.

The new development is generally attributed to the Algerian crisis and it is to this that Jacques Fauvet, in the article mentioned above, ascribed the new confidence of the extreme Right. But, while true in part, this explanation loses sight of the fact that the Algerian tangle is itself due to the government's inability to govern, to the weakness and lack of continuity of governmental authority mentioned by René Coty in a speech at Strasbourg on July 6, 1957, to the instability and debility of the state which, in a speech at Verdun in June 1956, he held responsible for the country's troubles.

However, in its turn, all this must be attributed to the impossibility of running a parliamentary regime in which between 20 and 25 per cent of the voters are disfranchised. Since 1947, the ostracism of Communists from the parliamentary game has left politics lopsided, excluding the possibility of a left-wing majority being ever realized. Worse, it has corrupted political attitudes and encouraged people to believe that things are as they are not. Unable to write a constitution that would

[12] Thus, on June 21, 1956, the press reported a fight between Communists and Nationalists at the Cité Universitaire as a result of which one Nationalist was gravely injured and one student expelled.

[13] And even their unsuccessful opponent, Dr. Soubiran, author of a best-selling novel, *Les Hommes en Blanc*, and candidate of the *Centre-Républicain* as Tardieu was of the *Centre national des Indépendants*—with little to choose between them.

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proscribe Communists, incapable of interpreting the existing one so as to exclude them altogether, yet unwilling to allow them to work within the limits of the constitution or to allow anybody else to work with them, the non-Communist parties have in effect conspired to nullify their votes. In doing so, they have left themselves hardly any room for political maneuvers and have retained for the country only the semblance of a representative government. What began as an expedient has, over the years, become an established fact: successive governments are no more than the combinations and permutations of a divided majority; the country is aware of it, and it feels no more confidence in them than they do in themselves. The result is a series of governments without authority, *tournant à vide*, pulled this way and that by the currents, pressures, and necessities of the moment and hence unable to find or impose solutions for a score of pressing internal problems—let alone for the Algerian impasse, which would tax the wisdom of a Solomon, let alone of the Mollets, the Maunourys, the Pinays, and the Gaillards, who cannot even begin to rule.

But the exclusion of the Communists and the divisions of the other parties, in turn, reflect the apparent inability of Frenchmen to decide on fundamental identities or conflicts of interest, and hence to tell where they stand. The middle class is doubly divided by memories of religious struggle and by hostility between members of the Resistance and collaborators. The workers have not yet recovered from the bitter failure of the Popular Front, and are themselves divided on the Communist issue: we find them massively with the Communists, but voting also for Socialists, Catholics, and even the extreme Right. So there is neither a real middle-class party nor a real working-class one (apart from the Communists) that might furnish the nucleus of a Republican majority, be it conservative or left-wing. The result of all this, taken in conjunction with the parliamentary humbug, is that middle class and workers both come to feel powerless to affect the country's policy, short of a revolution which they lack the means or the guts to attempt. They have a confused apprehension of their troubles, a dull sense of injury, but no understanding of the causes, and so they relapse into a sort of general skepticism reflected in a cynical view of the government, of its policy, and of any alternative government or policy. Against such a background, any search for a political remedy is fruitless before it starts, all remedies proposed are met with the same discouraged skepticism, and people go around muttering that this will have to end some time, but that only a *coup d'état* and a strong hand at the helm might set things straight . . . yet doubting even that.

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It is not surprising that such a mood should see the revival of the anti-parliamentary Right. But when Fauvet attributes this revival to the Algerian conflict, he is right only insofar as the issue and the governmental inability to cope with it have generalized awareness of a pre-existing reality—the farce of an unrepresentative assembly coupled with an impotent executive—and have thus enabled the spawn of Vichy to cry, "I told you so!"

Indeed, "I told you so" has become almost a leitmotif of the unrepentant Vichyites, for whom the political developments of the last few years appear as a justification of their past. First and foremost, of course, is anti-communism. The Communist danger is something which the extreme Right can claim to have perceived years before most other Frenchmen, and to have opposed more steadfastly than any. A little sense and France would not have found herself in her present plight: Hitler was an original-minded statesman, aware of a European unity others ignored and of the Eastern peril they underrated; Mussolini was an Italian patriot, of course, but one who loved France: "Peut-être ne lui a-t-il manqué pour donner à l'histoire de l'Europe le sens qu'il voulait lui donner, que d'avoir trouvé à Paris un Mussolini français . . .?" All the trouble started with Roosevelt: "Le vrai 'Munich' c'est Yalta!"[14]

At any rate, the only thing to do now is to mark the enemy well—the principal enemy, for enemies are many: there are the Jews, though they furnish a subject better avoided, barring an occasional crack in *Aspects de la France* or *Rivarol*. There are the English, who for Pierre Dominique sometimes recall the good old days of *Je Suis Partout*, against whom can be waved the bloody rag of Mers-el-Kêbir, and on whom it is convenient to lay the blame for the bloody and ill-fated Suez adventure: "un vieux cadavre fait surface—la communauté Franco-Britannique." "Les colonies pour les Anglais commencent à Calais."[15] There are the Americans, toward whom the Right has nursed ambivalent feelings, half cowering, half resentful, as toward the Germans at an earlier date, but becoming increasingly friendly after the inauguration of President Eisenhower, until *Ecrits de Paris* (January 1956) published an article by Senator William Knowland—"La Paix dans l'Honneur."

To begin with, however, Americans seemed little better than Russians. *Fidélité*, organ of the *Phalange française*, visualized a "révolution socialiste-nationale . . . pour sauver la France des mâcheurs de chewing-

[14] P. C. Berger, "Hitler, cet inconnu," *Ecrits de Paris*, March 1955; P. Dominique, "Mussolini et la France," *ibid.*, July 1955; A. Fabre-Luce, "Munich et la Corée," *ibid.*, September 1950; P.-A. Cousteau, *Rivarol*, December 1, 1955.

[15] *Rivarol*, April 18, 1957.

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gum ou des brutes asiatiques." René Johannet reported that French officers in Germany liked the Germans better than the Americans: "Les Allemands, c'est des gens comme nous. Les Américains, c'est comme les Russes, on n'arrive pas à se les expliquer. Avec eux on ne peut rien prévoir."[16] The public had to be reminded that de Gaulle was restored by American arms and was, therefore, as much a tool of the foreigner as the men of Vichy. It was known that when French journalists who accompanied de Gaulle to America in 1945 were presented to Mr. Truman, the President apostrophized them sharply: "I hope you will in future be more loyal to the United States."[17] For those who had been accused of bootlicking and collaboration, the opportunity to present France under the rule of their accusers as a foreign satellite was too good to miss. Thereafter, the new regime was tagged "le régime de l'étranger" and an article of *Ecrits de Paris* (January 1952) presented the situation as unchanged: there had been Russian domination before 1914, British domination before 1939, American domination since 1944. "The American yoke is light compared to what the Russian might be," wrote Michel Dacier, "but it is there and it would be childish to deny it." As the same magazine repeated a year later: "S'il est vrai que des français ont pu, par dégout de la démocratie, désirer avant la guerre une entente avec les 'dictateurs,' et souhaiter, après notre défaite, la victoire des Allemands sur l'U.R.S.S., il est vrai aussi que, par passion républicaine, d'autres français ont mis notre pays dans la dépendance des 'démocraties' anglaise et américaine."[18] Conclusion: between the two there was little to choose; and so Alfred Fabre-Luce in his *Histoire de la Révolution Européenne* (1954) entitled one chapter "Two Resistances"—that of Pétain and that of de Gaulle.

There is no doubt that the nationalist sallies reflect a widespread resentment of American domination which has led to several anti-American outbursts—as in 1953 in connection with the Rosenberg case (still liable to be brought up against any criticism of French excesses in Algeria), and again at the time of the Suez crisis, when *Le Figaro* (January 9, 1957) printed Thierry Maulnier's letter to his "Dear American Friends," warning that anti-American feeling was growing in France and would be rendered acute by American policies in Egypt and Algeria. "Perhaps," suggested Maulnier, "you would be wrong to trust too much in our need for you," thus hinting that agonizing reappraisals may not be the exclusive preserve of American Secretaries of State. But while Maulnier's letter sounded an ominous note and one quite

[16] *Ecrits de Paris*, January 1950.
[17] *Combat*, August 24, 1945.
[18] *Ecrits de Paris*, July 1953.

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representative of such opinions as this writer was able to canvass at the time through the political spectrum to the right of the Communist Party, it is interesting to see that by this date *Rivarol* and *Ecrits de Paris* had come to accept the necessity of an American alliance. This appeared when the same Michel Dacier whom we met above commented on the period, after Nasser's taking over the Suez Canal, when Britain and France looked like using force against him: "Ils eurent heureusement la bonne fortune d'avoir à leurs cotés M. Foster Dulles qui les empêcha de commettre d'irréparables erreurs" (*Ecrits*, October 1956). At the same time, *Rivarol* warned against any sabotage of the American alliance and against nefarious press campaigns which blamed the United States for the mistakes of the French government, and aimed to remove France from the American camp. And when Britain and France attacked Egypt, *Rivarol* headlined: "They are mad! . . . Only the United States can still save world peace." Bitter attacks followed against "les Bonapartes de chef-lieu-de-canton" who, first in the Suez adventure, then in their attempts to "free France from the American protectorate," threatened the nation's security and well-being. Only American support could protect France against Russia and communism, therefore American support must not be imperiled.[19]

Thus, the Vichy Right has undergone the same evolution as between the wars, from *la France seule* to a realism which counsels alliance with the least evil against the greatest. Maulnier's article in *Le Figaro* indicates that anti-Americanism had, with Suez, passed into the hands of the Independents, who know what the public wants; and we find M. Frédéric-Dupont, speaking in the First Sector of Paris, being met with applause when he declared in January 1957: "Les Américains nous ont trahis. . . . Ils arrivent toujours trop tard, en 1944 comme en 1917. . . ."[20] In 1955 and 1956 Poujade had been applauded for saying the same things, but saying them less bitterly;[21] in 1957 there had been the Suez fiasco, and France had been "let down once more" by her unreliable but overweening ally. The feeling of frustration at differences ill-understood and apparently insoluble was easily translated into resentment against Americans whose policy seemed designed to filch from France the remains of her African Empire. But, for once, in a part that seemed cut out for it, the Vichy Right demurred: logic and anti-communism

[19] *Ibid.*, October 1956 and January 1957; *Rivarol*, October 11 and November 1, 1956.
[20] Bodin and Touchard, *op.cit.*, p. 281.
[21] *Fraternité française*, July 20, 1956: Poujade rejected "l'affreux capitalisme anglo-américain et l'infâme dictature russe. . . ."

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have been the twin bases of its policy, and these run counter to the desperate anti-Americanism of the general public.

Another facet of American policy which many on the new Right can accept is pro-Germanism. Here again is the opportunity to say, "I told you so." When de Gaulle, speaking at Bordeaux on September 25, 1949, declared his belief that Europe will exist or not according to the possibility of an accord between Germans and Gauls, *Ecrits de Paris* (October 1949) asked whether this was not as true in 1939 as in 1949: was this not exactly the language of Pétain and Laval? And who was responsible for bringing Russia out of her Eastern plains right into the heart of Europe? Certainly not the Germans or their French friends. So, in May 1950, the leading article of the same review urged neutrality between Russia and the United States—a European neutrality, based on a Franco-German alliance. We have seen that this view has changed, but the pro-German sentiment has not. In the spring of 1955, P.-A. Cousteau declared in reply to an inquiry of *Fédération* (May-June 1955): "Before the war we were a British satellite. During the war we were a German satellite. It so happened that the Germans, whilst extirpating democracy, imposed upon us the regime that suited us best. The Allied victory brought us . . . the pox. And now we are an American satellite. . . ." And in *Rivarol* (March 28, 1957) Pierre Dominique asserted, as he had under another regime: "L'alliance franco-allemande est la clef de voûte de l'Europe de demain."[22] It remains to be seen whether the motives which led these men to show more sympathy to a United States under Eisenhower than to the same country under Truman will not operate in reverse if Germany is ruled by Ollenhauer instead of Adenauer.

The question remains why, when their ideas appear to have gained so much ground and the atmosphere seems so propitious, the men of the new Right have failed to make more of an electoral mark. One obvious answer is that most of them are convinced anti-parliamentarians, and that some are still ineligible as a result of their wartime activities. Another, that their best minds are "brains," not politicians, as can be seen by one glance at the rosters of Vichy—theorists, intellectuals, administrators. But these are not sufficient explanations: Léon Daudet

[22] Another coincidence which sometimes perplexes the observer: the Nationalist Right are "good Europeans," supporting the Iron and Steel Pool, European Union (on their terms), German rearmament, etc., partly out of a desire to defend Europe against Asia and collectivism, partly out of nostalgia for the New Order they embraced under Pétain or Abetz, partly because they see the European community as dominated by conservative powers (Germany and, behind Germany, the United States) and run by enlightened technocrats.

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stood for election in 1919, and today Isorni and Tixier-Vignancour do not scorn to walk the degraded corridors of the Palais Bourbon. Candidates of the extreme Right appear at most elections and do rather badly. Some, of course, are crackpots (though this is not necessarily a reason for failure in politics) but even apart from such it is tempting to ask, for instance, why should a Poujade do better than they?

One paradoxical reason for their failure is that at a time of general disgust with political processes the representative figures of the extreme Right—Massis, Sérant, Boutang, Salleron, *et al.*—are politically minded and politically dedicated men: intellectual and systematic, they are the heirs of Maurras; dreaming high and ruthlessly pure dreams, they are the heirs of Drieu la Rochelle and Robert Brasillach. They attack democratic politics, parliamentary politics, but hardly politics as such: "Politique d'abord" was the slogan of Charles Maurras; "Nous vomissons la politique" is a favorite assurance of Pierre Poujade.

Again and again Poujade emphasizes his political ignorance and indifference—politically he presents himself as a babe in the woods, uncorrupted by the pressures and the influences that affect the politicians, seeing in politics mostly useless and mischievous nonsense: "Nous ne faisons pas de politique. . . . La politique qui nous a fait tant de mal. . . ." What could be more natural than to attribute the ills and difficulties of the moment to the unnecessary complications of a political machine which needs only to be scrapped along with the pests that follow in its train—bureaucrats, politicians, and tax collectors—for everything to improve, for France to recover her prosperity and power, for the Gaulish cock to crow *cocorico* once more, and no longer *cocacola*? In this sense, Poujadism is connected with a refusal to accept the economic evolution that drives the little man down, and out of business, or the international developments that demote France to the rank of a third-class power. This sort of Poujadism condemns big business, state interference or enterprise, and foreigners, and calls a plague on all their houses. It has no necessary connection with the personality of its leader, or with old-fashioned nationalism of the *Action française* variety: it can be tapped by appeals to patriotic and socio-economic resentments (*vide* Frédéric-Dupont or Max Lejeune) and this explains the joke which qualified the election of Julien Tardieu in the First Sector of Paris as a disaster for Poujade but a triumph for Poujadism.

But this sort of Poujadism is much too simple for men like Massis or Sérant—they are too intellectual, too systematic, too idealistic also, for such demagogy. Maurras has left them a difficult legacy, and one which does not lead to success though it may provide ideas for others less

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scrupulous and more flexible. This was the case after the Agadir crisis of 1911, when for a few years the much-touted *Poincarisme*—the nationalist revival centered upon the Lorrainer President of the Republic—was very largely the nationalism of Charles Maurras seasoned to suit respectable Republican palates. But even this is unlikely to happen today, since men like Sérant either have nothing to teach their contemporaries, or have nothing that their contemporaries wish to learn. They merely express in a more systematic way a mood much more generalized than the nationalism of the *Camelots du Roi* ever could be.

In a recent book—*Gardez-vous à Gauche!* (1954)—Paul Sérant declared that the young bourgeoisie has lost its prewar tendency to nationalism or fascism and now wallows in a feeling of absurdity, in a sense of uselessness, in the belief that the future belongs to the Left, and so adopts the habit of licking the Leftist hand that beats it and of using the vocabulary of the Left to blame the Right. As an observation, this summarizes the appearance of things. But, below the surface, things are rather different: the general sense of uselessness leads as often to a vote for Poujade or Mendès (in 1952 for the Gaullist *Rassemblement du Peuple français*—RPF) as for the "Left" . . . in any case, does Sèrant mean the disfranchised Communist Left, or the disintegrated and increasingly "national" Republican Left? As for the vocabulary of the Left, it has long since been adapted to conceal the policies of the Right and many professors have used the odd results to illustrate the ambiguities of political language. Of late, however, a glimpse of the political reality beneath the meaningless terminology reveals a policy that is more than merely conservative—perhaps not Fascist, though recent measures have been so qualified, but certainly nationalistic: as Bodin and Touchard conclude in their oft-cited article (p. 281), "Au nationalisme du sabre et de l'aventure, le corps électoral du premier secteur préféra un nationalisme municipal et conservateur."

To the extent that the results of the Paris by-election may be interpreted as having a wider applicability, the most interesting aspect of this particular feature is the narrow range of effective choice, limited to different varieties of nationalism and different groups more or less of the Right or, at least, on the Right. It is tempting to speculate whether this is not more than just a flash in the pan—whether it does not indicate a significant shift in French political tendencies.

After 1789 the history of France consisted of a long evolution toward the Left; within this situation the intellectuals of the Right proposed ideas and policies which were, by their very nature, reactionary and minoritarian. But, as the twentieth century advanced, the strength

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of the leftward trend declined. The fiasco of the Popular Front was decisive: there had been periods of crisis and incoherence before, but after 1937 the solution of current problems was sought more and more in policies of the Right. The trend persists today through a strange combination of factors: the economically backward sections of France move toward Poujadism, the economically advanced toward technocracy; the relative socio-economic immobility of the country and the inability of its elected representatives to act coherently or effectively suggest the uselessness of existing institutions; fear of the foreign enemy and resentment of the foreign ally tend to replace policy by a chauvinism born of inability to cope with either; colonial questions on which, once upon a time, the Left could usually take a clear stand now also lead to chauvinistic conclusions; even the core of the Left's positions—the franchise and constitutional liberties—is slowly being sacrificed to the fight against communism and colonial rebellion.

The domination of the Left has become as unreal as the wonderful clothes of the king in the fable: from being self-consciously and almost deliberately unpopular and anti-popular, the men and ideas of the nationalist Right have become increasingly representative; but everyone, themselves included, is so used to thinking of them in opposition that the new reality is hard to grasp and harder to accept. Even the champions of the Right tend to consider the trend to the Left as a law of history—if not a law of nature. They are so fascinated by the Communists that they do not stop to consider their actual lack of power: they cannot believe their eyes when they see that the king has no clothes on.

And so they fail to grasp the changed nature of their situation and to realize that, with the situation, their own position has changed, too. Clinging to their old roles as brave prophets of an unpopular faith, they continue to recite their old lines whilst around them the scene and the public are changing. Paradoxically enough, they remain as much out of step now as they were before the change took place. This may be because they recognize present developments as mere deviations from a vaster trend. It is more likely, however, that responsibility is not something the men of the nationalist Right are prepared to face: Lucien Rebatet in *Les Décombres* allows us to glimpse this important facet of their mentality when he describes the lack of enthusiasm shown by Maurras when, for a moment in February 1934, the opportunity to reach power seemed within his grasp.[23] "La jeunesse est une ivresse perpetu-

[23] *Les Décombres,* Paris, 1942, p. 30. Drieu la Rochelle was well aware of this. In *Drieu, Temoin et Visionnaire* (Paris, 1952, pp. 202-3), P. Andreu quotes an article

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elle," wrote la Rochefoucauld. "C'est la fièvre de la raison." In this sense, Maurras and his followers are the Peter Pans of politics, cherishing the fever that allows them to use their reason in the service of unreason, perpetual *anti's* even when they pretend otherwise. They are always proclaiming their preference for action; but the action they like is absurd—action for action's sake, not for a concrete political result. The right-wing critic, Ramon Fernandez, explained his prewar evolution from communism to fascism by saying, "Je n'aime que les trains qui partent." And Gilles, in Drieu la Rochelle's novel of that name, mirrors a similar attitude and a similar evolution.

But trains leave only in order to get somewhere, and arrival, with its concrete problems and its implications of definite aims, is not nearly as appealing. It may be because of this that Maurras and his followers persisted in a royalism they knew to be impossible, but which saved them from the risk of political responsibility, from ever really having to face facts (they preferred logic) until 1940, when their make-believe soon shattered under the pressure of reality. In the same way, today, the ideological Right keeps its distance from political reality and leaves its prizes and transgressions to opportunists who are no less to the Right for being less theoretically uncompromising. Between the idealistic nationalism of the extreme Right and the petty, down-to-earth nationalism of Poujadism—be it with or without Poujade—the electorate prefers the latter. And who is to tell whether the theoreticians of the extreme Right, when they advocate fascism or exalt the hierarchical and aristocratic conception of the world, are not making a choice, conscious or not, for purity—i.e., irresponsibility?

An article in *Ecrits de Paris* (February 1957) suggests that our time is ideal for fascism or communism—both of them anti-parliamentary, hard, and violent. But we should not confuse aparliamentarism with anti-parliamentarism, hostile indifference to politics with a politically active opposition to a certain kind of politics. The times may be difficult, but their hardness and violence are impersonal and far removed from our grasp. Rather than hard and violent, these are resigned and soggy times when hopelessness leads to indifference and indifference

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that Drieu published in the *N. R. F.* of December 1942: "Je ne suis pas au pouvoir, je ne suis jamais au pouvoir, je ne suis pas de ceux qui sont jamais au pouvoir. Je m'arrange toujours pour être assez mal avec ceux qui sont au pouvoir, même quand ils sont de mon bord." And his alter ego answered: "C'est bien ce que je te dis, tu n'es qu'un écrivain, tu n'es pas un homme sérieux, tu n'es pas un homme complet. Tu prends des responsabilités, mais tu ne les prends pas jusqu'au bout." Cf. also L. Dimier, *Vingt Ans d'Action Française*, Paris, 1926.

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to acquiescence and decay.[24] In these circumstances activists are out of place, at any rate when their activism is only a kind of sport. For those who agree with Jacques Chardonne who, in his *Lettres à Roger Nimier*, wrote, "Je regarde mes propres opinions et celles des autres comme des enfantillages," the proper, but electorally useless, conclusion is nihilism. For those who have always thought opinions of secondary importance but never doubted the importance of concrete interests, the answer presumably lies in the satisfaction of immediate needs and prejudices—*un nationalisme municipal et conservateur*. This, in itself, is nothing new. It is the platform of the nationalist Lacrisse, as Anatole France presented him in *M. Bergeret à Paris:* "Défendre l'armée nationale contre une bande de forcenés. Combattre le cosmopolitisme. . . . Conjurer le péril collectiviste. Relier par un tramway le quartier des Grandes-Ecuries à l'Exposition. Améliorer le service des eaux." And when Lacrisse is elected, his opponent explains the results in much the same terms as were used in 1956 to explain the Poujadist successes—the dissatisfaction of small shopkeepers crushed between the large stores and the co-operative societies. And he adds: "Ils seront bien attrapés." We can say as much. But we should remember that, at the turn of the century, the future still lay with M. Bergeret: one may doubt that it does today.

[24] In November 1955, during the electoral campaign, the French Institute of Public Opinion asked the following question: "Do you think that by voting in the coming elections the electors will have some influence on the country's policy?" Answers: great influence, 14 per cent; little influence, 26 per cent; no influence, 33 per cent; no opinion, 27 per cent; *un point, c'est tout.* (*Sondages*, No. 4, 1955, p. 11.)

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Review Articles

THE CRISIS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

By WILLIAM W. KAUFMANN

Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York, Harper & Brothers, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1957, 455 pp. $5.00.

IN the years since World War II, American statesmen have found themselves increasingly preoccupied with military problems in their efforts to maintain and advance the interests of the United States. Not only have they had to decide how to deal with the various military threats to these interests. They have also had to take strategic considerations and the risk of war into account in all their day-to-day dealings with the outside world. Their task would have proved difficult enough had they had to confront the hostility of the Soviet empire with the traditional means of warfare. It has become almost unimaginably complex as a result of growing Russian power and what appears to be a continuing revolution in the technology of military weaponry.[1]

This terrible revolution, and the constant effort somehow to come to terms with it, have left their mark on the student of international relations as well. He has seen a new problem area open up to challenge his skill and ingenuity. He has also discovered that his understanding of world politics would be something less than perfect without an appreciation of the impact of military considerations upon the course and conduct of foreign policy. His response, fortunately, has been to observe, to inquire, and to write. Gradually, and in increasing numbers, articles, pamphlets, and books have begun to appear on how we should resolve the great problems raised by the combustible mixture of a turbulent world, nuclear weapons of increasing power, and delivery systems of hypersonic speeds and intercontinental ranges.[2]

I

By far the most ambitious and provocative of the efforts to deal with this crisis in military affairs has been *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign*

[1] I am particularly indebted to Bernard Brodie, Malcolm Hoag, Victor Hunt, Andrew Marshall, Harry Rowen, and Albert Wohlstetter for giving me an appreciation of how complex the task really is.

[2] For a review of some of this literature, see Bernard Brodie, "More About Limited War," *World Politics*, x, No. 1 (October 1957), pp. 112-22.

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Policy, a publication of the Council on Foreign Relations, written by Henry A. Kissinger. It is a book of many merits, not the least of which is that it treats in far greater detail than any of its predecessors the subjects that are, or should be, of major concern to the makers of military policy. Its method of doing so is to review the attempts that have been made to devise a rational military posture, to describe and analyze what now constitute the principal problems in the field, and to strive for an informed judgment on what appear to be the alternative solutions to them. Despite its title, what Kissinger has really written is a book about military rather than foreign policy, although he may argue with considerable force that a more sensible military policy than the one we currently possess is an essential prerequisite to an effective foreign policy.

In general terms, Kissinger's conclusions are rather familiar and can be quite simply stated. The Soviet bloc represents a formidable, diversified, and growing threat. Even now, strategic airpower, although an important component of our strength, cannot be relied upon to counter more than one aspect of this threat. We ourselves must create a wide spectrum of capabilities, embark upon a program of civil defense, refurbish our overseas defense systems, reorganize our defense establishment, and, above all, develop a sounder doctrine than we currently possess for the employment of these forces. Only if we adopt such a program with respect to our military affairs can we hope to achieve the freedom in our foreign policy necessary to meet the challenges of the Soviet bloc and recover the ability to use force when the situation seems to require it.

Kissinger is at his best at this level of discourse, and his best is very good indeed. One may question the extent to which his condemnation of our postwar policy-makers is justified and still conclude that *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* represents the most persuasive critique available of the course that the United States has followed in its military affairs since World War II. In addition, its case for a reversal of that course—for a more highly diversified military establishment and a more sophisticated philosophy concerning its use—is by far the strongest to have appeared thus far. It will be a great tragedy if, in the admittedly crucial effort to counter the Soviet missile program, and in the scramble for outer space, the need to prepare for contingencies other than all-out war is lost sight of and all the problems associated with local conflicts are ignored. It will be in no small measure to the credit of *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* if a more balanced view of present and future requirements evolves.

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Had Kissinger been content to provide a general analysis of postwar military policy and a broad prescription for future action, this in itself would have constituted a most helpful contribution to our understanding of the major dilemmas and choices with which Soviet animosity and changing weapons technology confront the United States. But fortunately he has not been satisfied to stop there. He has also ventured into a fairly detailed series of proposals on the kinds of forces that we and our allies should deploy and the types of strategies that we should develop for their use. In doing so he has passed judgment upon such complicated issues as the vulnerability of the Strategic Air Command now and in the future, the virtues of nuclear as against conventional weapons in local wars, the utility of disarmament negotiations, the desirability of sharing nuclear weapons systems with our allies in Europe, and the efficiency of the defense establishment as it is presently organized.

Whether or not Kissinger has dealt satisfactorily with these issues is perhaps less important than that he has raised them, and, in doing so, has demonstrated that a great deal can be said about them despite the veils of secrecy and confusion that shroud so much of the data that are pertinent to a determination of military policy. For students in search of guidance and encouragement to research in this area, there can be no better point of departure than *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*.

II

That his book should be regarded as a point of departure rather than a set of definitive answers to these difficult questions Kissinger no doubt would be the first to admit. As he himself has put it, "Contemporaries are in a peculiarly difficult position to assess the nature of revolutions through which they are living. All previous experience will tempt them to integrate the new into what has come to seem familiar. They will have difficulty understanding that what is most taken for granted may be most misleading because a new order of experience requires new ways of thinking about it" (p. xi). For this and for many other reasons, Kissinger's specific conclusions should be treated with respect—and with a great deal of caution.

Several of the reasons for caution have as much to do with the techniques by which these conclusions were reached as they do with their substance. Kissinger necessarily had to be selective in his choice of material for presentation to the reader, but it is impossible not to be curious about his criteria of inclusion and exclusion. In his chapter on

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"The Fires of Prometheus," for example, he presumably wants to inform us on the effects of nuclear weapons and show how greatly they contrast with the power of the explosives that were available during most of World War II. Yet he makes only the most fleeting references to weapons in the kiloton range. He concentrates our attention on megaton weapons and thereby leaves the unfortunate impression that they, and only they, represent the significant revolution in firepower. Since in his chapters on limited warfare he advocates the use of standard 500-kiloton weapons (and apparently allows them to be surface-burst in the bargain), it would have seemed both logical and desirable to have given some notion of the damage caused by nuclear devices in this and the lower ranges. But for this information the inquiring reader must turn to *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons*[3] rather than to *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*.

To a political scientist, another omission will be particularly striking. Kissinger admits at one point that we must counter Soviet propaganda against nuclear weapons and gain acceptance both of their conventionality and of our ability to use them with discrimination. But nowhere does he take stock of domestic and foreign attitudes toward these weapons in order to determine to what extent they are politically manageable. We are left to suppose that the controversies over fallout, weapons testing, and the use of nuclear bombs in warfare do not reflect the existence of important political forces at work, and that by the simple expedient of a firm stand in favor of nuclear armaments, the United States can overcome the doubts and fears that have become associated with them.

Nowhere is this failure to take the political environment into account more disturbing than in Kissinger's discussion of limited nuclear war. His concept of how such a war might be fought is sufficiently interesting to warrant separate analysis. What requires comment here is that he has omitted to consider the precedent-setting effects of initiating the use of atomic weapons and has also overlooked the impact upon allied and neutral nations of our having taken this fateful step. Presumably any war that is limited in scope is bound to have a great many interested onlookers. Hence, if we should again become involved in such a war, we will probably be calculating not only how to keep the conflict limited, achieve a set of local objectives, and maintain or enhance American military prestige. We will also be striving to determine how we can do all these things without suffering unacceptable political

[3] Samuel Glasstone, ed., *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957.

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losses outside the theater of war. In short, our conduct in the combat zone will probably be influenced by our desire to create favorable attitudes and expectations among neutrals as well as participants in the war. How we could do so, and fight in the manner prescribed by Kissinger, is a problem which, regrettably, he ignores.

Although he says a great deal about the types of capabilities we should acquire, Kissinger says very little about how they would perform, how much of the various types we should have, or what they would cost. In addition, he has neglected to consider the size of the total budget that should be assigned to military purposes, or how it should be divided among the many claimants. In short, he has not really faced up to the allocative problems, or to the possibilities of trade-offs and substitutions, which are so crucial to the making of military policy. One wonders, for example, what he would do with a $60 billion military budget. Roughly how much would he spend on aircraft and missiles, on the various forms of active and passive defense, on civilian shelters, on capabilities for limited war? And what criteria would he employ to determine his allocations?

To the extent that a study is essentially exploratory and impressionistic in character, these are unfair questions to ask of it. But to the extent that it pretends to be specific and detailed in recommending military policy, to the extent that it does more than suggest alternative ways of looking at the problems of American security, it must face the task of distributing our limited military resources in such a way as to achieve the optimum ability to cope with a very uncertain future. Obviously we cannot have everything in this realm, rich as we are. We must pick and choose, not only among different objectives, but also among different ways of reaching the same goal. In this kind of calculation, the cost of particular measures becomes crucial both as a determinant of whether or not we can afford them at all and as a criterion of their worth compared with some alternative method of achieving the same effects.

It is all well and good to say that we need a program of civil defense, and that the country is in a position to double its military budget. But it can also be argued very cogently that we need a lot of other capabilities as well. Although the principle of civil defense makes eminent good sense, its practical utility will depend crucially on how much of what kind is purchased and how many resources are thereby taken away from some other objective. Conceivably the cost of an effective civil defense may be so great as to be unacceptable, given our other goals. Conceivably, too, the amount favored by Kissinger will prove so ineffective

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that the resources had much better be invested in some other activity. We simply cannot say, because he has omitted to furnish us with any data regarding amounts, costs, and expected effects.

Similarly, we may need a new military doctrine very badly; we may even want to adopt the one that Kissinger has described. But before subscribing to its details we should remember that doctrine is not something that is conjured up out of the void. Its development is vitally influenced by a number of factors: what the prospective enemy is doing; what weapons are feasible within the current state of the technological art; what effects we wish to obtain with them; and what resources are made available to the military establishment. The preferred systems of action—the composition and size of the forces we purchase, as well as the methods of their employment—are the outcome of elaborate and simultaneous calculations about a host of such factors. To ignore these calculations, to attempt the imposition of a doctrine which is not the product of careful studies guided by the criteria of costs and effects, is as dangerous in its way as to proliferate weapons without regard to the problems of their use. Because he has omitted considerations such as these, the most that can be said of Kissinger's arguments is that he has sketched out one of the major courses of military policy that we might follow. By no means has he demonstrated that it is preferable to the others.

Perhaps more disturbing than these omissions is the frequency with which Kissinger muddles his facts in arguing his case. Admittedly this is a difficult field in which to be certain about anything. Leaks to newspapers, reports by newspaper correspondents, discussions with informed individuals, Congressional hearings: these are all valuable sources of information. But the data thus obtained need to be checked, and used with caution. Unfortunately, Kissinger has not exercised the necessary circumspection. As Paul Nitze has pointed out, he states the cube root law in such a way as to underestimate drastically the effects of nuclear weapons.[4] He also appears to use nautical miles interchangeably with statute miles in discussing the ranges of Soviet and American bombers and, worse still, to confuse range with operational radius. And, oddly enough, he tends to describe future possibilities, however remote, as though they were current realities. For example, he announces on page 181 that "The Army has already made a start of reorganizing some of its divisions, each into five self-contained combat teams. It

[4] Paul H. Nitze, "Limited War or Massive Retaliation?" *The Reporter*, September 5, 1957, pp. 40-42. Mr. Kissinger informs me that this error was corrected after the first printing of the book.

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stresses the development of troop-carrying helicopters, and even the individual soldier in some units has been given a rudimentary ability to transport himself through the air by means of the 'flying platform.'" Yet according to the testimony of General Gavin, as reported in *U.S. News and World Report* (August 2, 1957), "Here you see the Hiller flying platform, of which we have a dozen in procurement. It is really a research vehicle, but yet it is tremendously significant to us, because we see all the possibilities now of . . . innovation in land mobility." It will take some time, in other words, before the Army can become an Air Force.

In this same general realm, a reasonable familiarity with military technology would suggest that the vertical-takeoff-and-landing aircraft is unlikely to become an operationally useful weapon before the mid-1960's, that we are nowhere near a substitute for the internal combustion engine, that nuclear trucks do not look like very promising vehicles for the next decade or so, and that the Army has not yet come close to freeing itself from logistic bases and lines of communication. Yet to read Kissinger's chapters on limited warfare is to believe that the military equivalent of the stringless yo-yo is at hand. Much as he, and we, might wish it were so, the facts do not bear him out.

Still another reason for having reservations about Kissinger's results is that he has been extremely inconsistent in the argument of his case. Nowhere is it really possible to be sure what he believes, because the premises he uses to reach one conclusion seem unrelated to the assumptions he makes in some other context. The medley of contradictions that accompanies this process may be illustrated under several general headings.

Kissinger is much concerned with the strategic implications of technological change. On page 119, he tells us: "It is likely that the future impact of technology on strategy will approximate the traditional pattern rather than the dramatic discovery of nuclear weapons." This is reassuring if true. But in another connection, on page 204, he states a different premise: "Were weapons technology stable, the fear of war might be counted on to counterbalance the antagonisms of a revolutionary period. But weapons systems are changing at an ever accelerating rate, and every major power is aware that its survival is at the mercy of a technological breakthrough by its opponent."

In his discussion of limited war, Kissinger asks why certain earlier conflicts did not expand. One answer, given on page 138, is that "they remained limited less by conscious choice than by considerations of domestic policy. In the seventeenth century Louis XIV employed al-

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most his entire army for a period of close to twenty years. . . . His military establishment was . . . limited by the availability of resources and so were the wars he fought." Three pages later, however, there is another answer: "In the great periods of European cabinet diplomacy, between the Treaty of Westphalia and the French Revolution and between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of the first World War, wars were limited because there existed a political framework which led to a general acceptance of a policy of limited risks."

It is especially bewildering to follow the development of Kissinger's thought on how the belligerents might respond to various limited war situations. On page 16 he says that the Soviet Union "can engage in military actions ranging from the employment of conventional forces to the use of 'tactical' nuclear weapons of a size which will raise serious doubts as to whether they 'warrant' the resort to all-out war." In other words, there is some correlation between the yield of the nuclear weapons used and the attitude of the belligerents toward all-out war. But apparently this is no longer true on page 133: "The most agonizing decision a statesman can face is whether or not to unleash all-out war; all pressures will make for hesitation, short of a direct attack threatening the national existence. In any other situation he will be inhibited by the incommensurability between the cost of war and the objective in dispute. And he will be confirmed in his hesitations by the conviction that, so long as his retaliatory force remains intact, no shift in the territorial balance is of decisive significance." This interpretation of the belligerent's psychology is confirmed on page 144: "In reality both sides will probably grasp at every excuse, however illogical, to keep a thermonuclear holocaust from occurring."

Seventeen pages later, however, the belligerents have apparently lost their fears and scruples about all-out war. For it is "no longer possible to count on substantial mobilization of reserve forces to help redress the balance in case of local aggression as was still the case in the Korean War, because mobilization may well unleash a retaliatory blow." Great caution would seem to be the order of the day in limited wars, given this kind of sensitivity on the part of the antagonists. But on pages 184 and 185 we are told that "Mobile units may be able to attack selected targets at a considerable distance from the combat zone without unleashing all-out war, so long as their intentions are sufficiently clear. . . . After missiles exist in quantity, the possibilities for this kind of warfare will increase rather than diminish. Since strategic striking forces composed of missiles will be better dispersed and less vulnerable than those

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based on manned bombers, powers may become less sensitive to a penetration of their air space."

Tolerance of so much freedom of action may seem somewhat curious considering the earlier statement that a mobilization of reserve forces may set off a retaliatory blow. It is downright baffling in the light of what immediately follows. For on page 185 Kissinger tells us that "Unless some concept of limitation of warfare is established in advance, miscalculations and misinterpretation of the opponent's intentions may cause the war to become all-out even should both sides intend to limit it." He goes even further on page 194. Here the powers have again become willing to risk all-out war in response to a provocation that is far less than total. As Kissinger puts it, "even in a nuclear war it is possible to step up the commitment by resorting to higher-yield weapons. But, given the proper tactics, such a course may not drastically alter the outcome and, if carried beyond a certain point, it will unleash all-out war." On page 205 the antagonists have become even more willing to precipitate the holocaust: "The Soviet leaders may, for example, consider the use by us of nuclear weapons in a local engagement as the beginning of a strategic attack and react by launching a retaliatory blow." By the time we reach page 225 this bellicosity has increased by orders of magnitude. For it is "not only that limited war must find means to prevent the most extreme of violence; it must also seek to slow down the tempo of modern war lest the rapidity with which operations succeed each other prevent the establishment of a relation between political and military objectives. If this relationship is lost, any war is likely to grow by imperceptible stages into an all-out effort."

In short, Kissinger so frequently changes his assumptions about the psychology of the belligerents, and what affects their behavior, that the danger of an all-out war developing from a local conflict seems to depend rather critically on what point he is trying to prove. Such a method may be good polemics, but it does not contribute greatly to our understanding of the dynamics of warfare or of the problems that will confront the United States in situations of local violence.

Omissions, errors, and inconsistencies of this character naturally make it difficult to have confidence in the recommendations that Kissinger makes with respect to current and future military policy. In particular, a number of doubts and suspicions arise in connection with his analysis of, and proposals for, the Strategic Air Command, limited war forces and strategy, nuclear weapons sharing, and disarmament. Some of these doubts and questions may be worth expressing.

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III

Kissinger's account of the Strategic Air Command appears to be based largely on the hearings of the Symington subcommittee on airpower.[5] Consequently, the developments of the past two years have rendered it obsolete in many details. But quite apart from its relevance to the present state of affairs, Kissinger's whole approach to all-out war and the evolution of strategic airpower reflects certain states of mind which are sufficiently common and disturbing to require comment.

What Kissinger appears to be saying is that the contingency of a surprise attack on the United States by means of the Soviet strategic forces is the least likely but most catastrophic contingency that faces us. On the catastrophe that would result from such an attack we can all agree; about the likelihood of its occurrence we can be less than certain. Several factors contribute to this uncertainty. The Soviets, now that they have acquired a significant strategic capability of their own, are definitely able to launch a powerful attack upon the United States; and there is a variety of evidence to suggest that they are giving some thought to ways of going about it.[6] As Kissinger points out, in such a war the attacker can start with a great many advantages, including the potentiality of surprise against a system which presumably will not previously have been tested in battle. At what point, if any, the Soviets might decide to undertake such an operation is impossible to predict. But two considerations ought surely to dominate our preparations for all-out war. The first is that a goal which to the Soviets might previously have seemed desirable but unattainable—namely, the destruction of the United States—may now seem feasible and hence worth contemplating and planning for in the most serious possible way. The second consideration is that designing and maintaining a deterrent to such an attack is a terribly complex and demanding task which cannot be lightly treated or worked at only spasmodically. For, under current and future conditions, to permit serious vulnerabilities to exist in our strategic posture may well be to invite attack. Indeed, failure to ensure the ability of our forces to survive a first blow and strike back with great power at the enemy—whether at his military capabilities or at his cities—would constitute a degree of folly almost without parallel in history.

[5] See *Study of Airpower*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956.

[6] See Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVI, No. 2 (January 1958), pp. 241-52.

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In principle, Kissinger grants all this despite his tendency to minimize the probability of all-out war. Although he paints a heart-warming picture of SAC's power, he accepts the view that the deterrent must undergo continual modernization, and lists what have become the conventional means to that end: the dispersal of SAC to some undetermined number of bases, a program of civil defense, and improved antisubmarine defenses. But there is no evidence that he has taken a critical look at the problems confronting SAC before proceeding to these suggestions. Rather he appears to have fallen into one of the classical errors of peacetime military planning; he has made assumptions about both the Soviet Long Range Air Force and the Strategic Air Command which are extraordinarily favorable to the United States. Russian equipment and training, he suggests, are such as to permit the Soviet commanders very few options in their attack strategies. Moreover, these commanders are stupid. They lead to SAC's greatest strengths; they do nothing to exploit whatever weaknesses our defenses may have. Consequently the chances of their achieving an effective surprise attack are too small to be taken seriously.

Perhaps it could be argued that at the time Kissinger wrote his chapter on all-out war he was entitled to believe, from all the available information, that the Long Range Air Force was limited severely in range, that it either could not do aerial refueling or would have to do it over hostile territory, and that it would be obliged to plunge headlong over the Dew Line in a brute force attack upon SAC's bases. It might also be argued that in 1956 the evidence suggested a first-class ability on the part of SAC and the overseas air forces to deal with this kind of attack. But whatever the facts, to advance these contentions is really to miss the point. Intelligence about a prospective enemy, especially one as secretive as the Soviet Union, is almost always imperfect. It may help to narrow the uncertainty about his capabilities, but—as we may be learning from the sputniks—intelligence cannot replace uncertainty with certainty. In the circumstances, the responsible analyst must allow the enemy a great deal of ingenuity, a somewhat variable capability, and a range of strategic choices. He must then consider the difficult eventualities as the basis for his countermeasures, on the reasonable assumption that if he can deal with these he can also manage the enemy's less efficient strategies. But apparently Kissinger regarded this kind of caution as excessive. At any rate, he did not examine his assumptions about SAC or the Long Range Air Force to see whether relatively small variations in their capabilities might not lead to a radically different set of conclusions. He belabors our military and civilian leadership for being

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obsessed with the memory of Pearl Harbor; but his analysis here is the stuff of which Pearl Harbors are made.

A similar lack of curiosity characterizes Kissinger's discussion of the measures for reducing the vulnerability of SAC. He appears to assume that for every problem in this realm there is but one solution, and he is content to articulate it without much regard to its worth. In fact, however, there are a number of ways to go about the protection of our strategic forces, and not all of them promise equal effectiveness at a given cost. For example, the dispersal of SAC to a somewhat greater number of bases than it currently frequents is an expensive measure, and one that cannot be pushed very far without affecting the efficiency of the force in other important respects. Moreover, it is a measure which the enemy can effectively counter by rather small and inexpensive additions to his inventory of bombs and delivery systems. Hence, while dispersal undoubtedly has a role to play in reducing the vulnerability of our strategic forces, it by no means represents a sufficient solution either for the present or for the short-run future. Other measures of a more imaginative character, especially hardened base installations designed to exploit the relatively low accuracies of the first generation of ballistic missiles, no doubt will be required to give SAC the ability to retaliate effectively in the aftermath of a surprise attack. Unfortunately, however, Kissinger does not indicate what these measures might be or how to make a selection from among them.

Of no small moment, he has also ignored, except by implication, one of the most difficult problems facing the architects of SAC: how to ensure the survival of the force without at the same time sacrificing its responsiveness to the judgment and will of the Executive. Naturally it would be the wish of the President to send SAC off and winging at the earliest possible moment. But in considering when to take this fateful step a number of considerations must affect him. He will be aware that if he gives the order in the face of warnings that turn out to be false he will have the problem of recalling the force. He will also be aware that a response to false alarms could trigger off countermeasures on the part of the enemy and thereby set in motion a series of actions and self-confirming hypotheses which could lead to an unintended war. Finally, he will be sensitive to the fact that to flush manned aircraft very frequently will be to incur a great expense and that missiles, once dispatched, are not subject to recall. In short, the President will almost surely want very substantial evidence that an attack is under way before launching the force, especially if it is composed of missiles. Everything will work toward making him extremely conservative with

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respect to this decision, especially if early warning systems are somewhat unreliable. Yet he will want equally to avoid having SAC destroyed on the ground. The dilemma is not entirely unfamiliar. The soldiers and statesmen of 1914 faced it in a somewhat different form; and we know what were the consequences then of making military effectiveness seemingly depend so critically upon maintaining a rate of mobilization equal to that of prospective enemies. But Kissinger appears to be oblivious to this problem, so much so in fact that, as he depicts SAC, it must depend for its survival on early and unambiguous warning followed by what apparently is the automatic launching of a thermonuclear raid. However, if warning is ambiguous, what he is really offering the Executive is the choice between a dangerously hair-triggered force and one that may not survive a skillfully executed surprise attack. Surely so crucial an issue deserves more sophisticated, imaginative, and subtle treatment than that, especially as the ballistic missiles take over the functions of the manned bomber and flight times become measured in minutes rather than hours. In these circumstances, protection of a very special order for the strategic forces would seem to be required.

When Kissinger comes to the point of assessing the impact of future weapons systems upon the strategic balance, he again takes too much for granted. One of his assumptions, to the effect that the United States and the Soviet Union will proceed more or less in pair in their development of these new systems, has already been shaken by the Soviet ICBM announcement and the orbiting of the sputniks. Another assumption—namely, that acquisition of the ICBM, or the nuclear-powered aircraft (about which Kissinger expresses quite unwarranted optimism), automatically guarantees the stalemate—is, if anything, even more dangerous. Actually, our experience with manned aircraft, the advantages that tend to accompany the offense, and the particular dangers inherent in a surprise attack all entitle us to believe that the problem of securing our retaliatory forces will remain as difficult and complex as it is proving to be now, and that we can take virtually nothing for granted in our efforts to achieve this objective.We would be most unwise, in this connection, to suppose that major technological developments, however defined, are the only changes that can significantly influence the character and outcome of this deadly competition. So difficult does it appear to achieve a balance in the realm of strategic warfare, and so delicate is that balance once achieved, that factors other than entirely new weapons systems can throw it out of equilibrium, especially in directions favoring the attacker. Despite the promise of

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the ICBM, Polaris, and the other weapons that are on the horizon, we should not fool ourselves by thinking that the task of maintaining the strategic deterrent will suddenly become easy and automatic. There is too much ingenuity in the world for that.

The whole evolution of strategic warfare suggests, in sum, not only that a Soviet surprise attack is an eventuality that we must take with the utmost seriousness. It is also a contingency whose deterrence will require imaginative, complicated, and expensive efforts, especially given the necessary assumption that we may strike second in such a war. To suggest in the circumstances, as Kissinger does, that American political and military leaders have become obsessed with the contingency is to do them a grave injustice. To imply, as most of his chapter on all-out war does, both that the situation is well in hand and that the task of keeping it in hand for the future is relatively simple is to encourage a complacency that could lead us to disaster.

IV

To be more concerned than Kissinger about the risks and problems of all-out war is not to be any less concerned than he is about the threat of local wars. This is an area to which the national leadership has given far too little serious attention; it is also an area which has become critical for precisely the reasons that Kissinger, following closely in the footsteps of pioneers such as Bernard Brodie, has so lucidly given. Here, too, we face the difficult and challenging task of developing forces and strategies to cope with novel and diverse contingencies. And in doing so, we have to grapple with the puzzling question of how we can keep local outbreaks of violence contained—how we can fight effectively and yet avoid the onset of all-out thermonuclear war.

On this and other questions Kissinger has much to say that is pertinent and instructive. He also reaches a number of conclusions which are, to say the least, highly controversial. Nowhere is this more the case than in his discussion of limited nuclear war. For here he takes the position that the use of nuclear weapons "represents our most effective strategy against nuclear powers or against a major power which is capable of substituting manpower for technology" (p. 199). This declaration, which occurs in Chapter 6, comes as rather a surprise after the arguments of Chapter 5, but Kissinger advances a number of reasons for making it. In his judgment, an atomic war can be fought with no greater damage to the combat zone than would result from a more conventional conflict. And initiating the use of these weapons involves perhaps even less risk of the war expanding than if we start with con-

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ventional means. Doing so will also give us a military advantage that we lack in conventional wars. Besides which, against a nuclear enemy, we dare not risk the possibility that he may suddenly convert a conventional war into an atomic conflict and wipe out our forces in the process. Indeed, so lyrical does Kissinger become over the prospects of limited nuclear war that he appears to regard it as an instrument for taking the initiative against the Soviet bloc and rolling back its frontiers.

Before considering this complex of arguments, let it be admitted that the United States no longer is the sole master of decisions about the employment of nuclear weapons. Both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom are in a position to initiate their use, and within a decade other countries may obtain this freedom as well. It follows, therefore, that the United States, so long as it honors its overseas commitments, must be prepared to fight and try to limit nuclear wars. But whether or not it is to the interest of the United States to *initiate* a nuclear war under the conditions prescribed by Kissinger, and design its force structure on this premise, is quite another matter.

The argument that an atomic conflict can be "cleaner" than a war fought with high explosives is difficult to deal with in default of specific examples of the two types and some basis for comparing them. But before it can be said that Kissinger has proved his point, what appear to be significant defects in his case must be mentioned. The first of these is what can only be described as a total failure to acknowledge the effects of nuclear weapons. Kissinger describes the 500-kiloton bomb as the largest that can be used without danger of significant fallout, and therefore the maximum size that should be permitted in a limited war. Leaving aside the problem of how this ceiling would be imposed and enforced, one wonders where he obtained the notion that such a bomb, even if used in rather small numbers, would not create significant amounts of radioactivity. One also wonders how he can talk about using such weapons in a discriminating fashion when a free air-burst 500-kiloton bomb will cause serious blast damage to objects such as reinforced concrete buildings over an area of about fifteen square miles, and produce very severe thermal effects over an even larger area. To say that Kissinger does not contemplate having the belligerents make frequent use of such high-yield weapons, and that his concept of limited nuclear war envisages that they will rely mainly upon bombs in the lower ranges, offers little consolation even if true. A one-kiloton device produces significant blast damage over an area of approximately a quarter of a square mile, as well as fallout and thermal effects. Moreover, in the kind of warfare that he describes, bombs—whether of the higher or

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lower yields—will presumably be used over considerable territorial expanses and in quantities that could be quite impressive. In the circumstances, the zone of combat might well be visited very rapidly with destruction of the most severe proportions. That this indeed would be the outcome seems highly probable in view of the fact that Kissinger apparently allows the opposing air forces more or less free play over the theater of war. What they might do with this freedom or what might be the nature, reliability, or accuracy of their delivery systems is difficult to deduce from his account. But apparently, in his version of warfare, airmen do not get panicky and jettison their bombs, or hit the wrong targets, missiles do not go astray, and heavily populated areas —whether rural or urban—do not suffer thereby. Surely this is wishful thinking.

There is, in addition, a great deal of wishful thinking in Kissinger's image of how a limited nuclear war would be fought. According to his view, the advent of the new weapons and tactics which he prescribes will enable land warfare to resemble naval conflict in that ground units will achieve the compactness, self-sufficiency, and mobility of naval vessels. Since military targets of this character will prove extremely hard to find and hit, and since no other target system will be worth attacking, there is every probability that the levels of damage in such a war will be low. Unfortunately, however, he does not indicate when we are likely to obtain this capability. We can only assume, therefore, that for a decade or more we will be deploying forces with all the traditional problems of lines of communication, logistics, and limited mobility; that important targets other than the military forces themselves will continue to exist; and that a determined enemy will be tempted to attack them. In other words, for the foreseeable future, we must anticipate that the damage from nuclear weapons will be superimposed upon the havoc caused by the more conventional explosives, and that the results will be commensurately worse for the areas in which the conflict takes place. We must also anticipate that rather few countries will volunteer to be defended by these means. For the more distant future, our acquisition of increasingly mobile and self-sufficient systems of defense may simply drive the enemy to use more and bigger bombs to destroy them, with correspondingly worse damage to the landscape and its inhabitants.

We may nevertheless want to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a local conflict, provided that in doing so we do not increase the risk that the war will thereby expand significantly in scope. Kissinger assures us that the dangers are no greater than if we start by using high explosives.

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In fact, he goes further and claims that the risks are lower. Perhaps this is so, but there do not appear to be very solid grounds for his confidence.

No doubt almost everyone will agree that it is to our interest to keep a local conflict from expanding into a thermonuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. We shall probably want to avoid expansions of a lesser scope as well. But precisely how we should go about preventing these outcomes is not at all clear. The dynamics by which an essentially local dispute might grow into a major contest between the great powers, or into the ultimate catastrophe of the thermonuclear debacle, are not well understood; nor are the means by which they might be controlled. About all we can say at this juncture is that history, logic, and intuition tell us to treat the danger of this spiraling effect as a serious problem.

Kissinger gives the impression that the spiraling effect can be controlled by the formulation and announcement of limited objectives. Limited war, as he puts it on page 140, "is fought for specific political objectives which, by their very existence, tend to establish a relationship between the force employed and the goal to be attained." Or, "The more moderate the objective, the less violent the war is likely to be" (p. 145). Perhaps the problem and its solution are as simple as that, but there are grounds for skepticism. The interests that become jeopardized once a war starts among the major powers are numerous and complex, and their protection or enhancement may seem worth very considerable sacrifices. Moreover, the size and character of the forces invested in a conflict by the United States will be determined by the kind of resistance that is to be overcome as well as by the goals we are attempting to reach. This in fact quickly became evident during the Korean War, where the investment grew to considerable proportions as the antagonists engaged in the competition for limited objectives. Briefly, then, the possibility always exists that with or without moderate objectives, a terrible cycle of competition and expansion can develop with results perhaps even more disastrous than those of World War I.[7]

In the circumstances we should not deceive ourselves: even with the threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe overhanging us, any war involving the major powers is bound to be a highly volatile process. Given the very real dilemmas faced by the belligerents—given the clash between the desire for limitations and the effort to protect and advance a

[7] For a stimulating discussion of this problem in another context, see Thomas C. Schelling, "An Essay on Bargaining," *American Economic Review*, XLVI, No. 3 (June 1956), pp. 281-306.

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whole host of interests, including the intangible of prestige—the danger of the conflict expanding into an apocalyptic exchange must be regarded as very real indeed.

Whether or not nuclear weapons would make such conflicts any more volatile is terribly difficult to say. The fact that airpower armed with nuclear weapons can now travel such great distances and have such an enormous impact upon the battlefield introduces a dimension and a problem of control which are not present in a war fought with conventional means. The concept of sanctuaries has been developed in the effort to overcome this problem, but it must be a matter of speculation whether the bases from which atomic sorties were being launched would long remain immune from attack. There is, in addition, the probability that a nuclear war will proceed at a vastly more rapid tempo than a high explosive conflict. Soldiers and statesmen will be forced to reach decisions quickly under the pressure of imperfect information and sudden crises; the problems with which they must deal will almost certainly contain elements of great novelty; and the consequences of particular decisions may prove most difficult to foresee. Under such conditions, a local nuclear war may indeed have a much greater potential for expansion than a conventional conflict. We simply cannot be sure, and it is important that we should admit our doubts.

Despite the probability that a nuclear war will be accompanied by high levels of damage, and the possibility that it will be more volatile than a conventional war, we may still want to use our "quality weapons" if, as Kissinger maintains, we can gain a military advantage over our antagonist by doing so. But is this contention any more justified than the others, or is it simply a notion left over from the days of our atomic monopoly? Unfortunately no one has made a systematic comparison of the two modes of warfare according to criteria which allow a firm judgment about their relative advantages and disadvantages from the standpoint of the United States. But such a comparison, if made, would surely involve many considerations which Kissinger has ignored.

Obviously in those situations where the United States could use nuclear weapons, but the opponent could not, to do so would confer a considerable military advantage on our forces—although the degree of the advantage would probably depend upon such factors as terrain, climate, logistics, the tactics of the opponent, and our own ruthlessness. But such cases are not the interesting ones. As Kissinger recognizes, the really challenging situations are those in which both belligerents have a significant nuclear capability at their command. Assuming that the

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American leaders could choose between a nuclear and a conventional conflict, and that they decided to base their choice on "strictly military" considerations, they would be entitled to ask a number of questions of their military advisers. How, for example, would the American forces get into the theater in a nuclear environment? By what methods, once there, would they be supplied and reinforced? How many bases would be available to the Air Force and where would they be located? What tactics would the forces in the field employ? What, meanwhile, would the enemy be doing and how would he be situated in all these respects?

The answers to these questions are difficult to give in default of specific examples. But if we exclude Kissinger's kind of war, as we must, on grounds of infeasibility, it becomes possible to imagine a great many cases in which the American forces would tend to be at least as vulnerable to nuclear weapons as the opponent. Kissinger seems to believe that nuclear weapons would confer an advantage on the defense; he also contends that, because of the character of the American social system, our forces will be superior to the enemy at the level of small-unit action in a nuclear environment. But nowhere does he adduce any evidence to support these assertions, or consider that the United States probably would want to take the offensive in order to recover lost ground. The upshot of his arguments is to leave the strong impression that, unless we can use nuclear weapons unilaterally, their employment will give us no advantage that we could not otherwise obtain, and that in many cases their bilateral employment will put our side at a serious disadvantage relative to the enemy. Assumptions which at this juncture do not seem realistic have to be made in order to support the alternative hypothesis advanced by Kissinger.

There remains the argument that against an enemy with a nuclear capability, we must deploy atomically; and, having done so, that we must use atomic weapons in order to avoid defeat. On the surface this is an impressive argument, but closer examination causes difficulties. Every nation allied to the Soviet Union may be regarded as having a nuclear capability potentially at its disposal. Does it follow, therefore, that because the Russians might suddenly decide to support Ho Chi Minh with atomic weapons, we must deploy atomically in a war against the Viet Minh? Because the Russians could turn their long-range missiles upon elements of our forces in the field, must we also try to eliminate them before they get us? Clearly there is no end to the trouble we get into with this argument. In fact, to follow its logic is to lead us right back to the doctrine of massive retaliation which Kissinger so sensibly condemns.

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Surely it is the essence of this tangled military situation that we have to take our chances somewhere along the spectrum of weapons systems and warheads when we intervene in local conflicts. And in doing so, surely we must choose the point on grounds other than that the enemy can hurt us badly by shifting the level and scope of violence, especially since we possess the means of reducing the likelihood that he will do so. Indeed, one of the many arguments favoring a conventional strategy is that it still leaves us with sanctions against unacceptable behavior by the enemy which we will feel free to use. Ironically enough, despite our fervent adherence to a nuclear military policy, the principal function of these weapons, in a world of several nuclear powers, may yet be to deter their employment against us.

To say all this is not to argue against a continuing effort to discover ways and means of fighting local conflicts effectively in a nuclear environment. The need is real and much serious work remains to be done. But we should not delude ourselves as to the state of our progress. If we reject Kissinger's intriguing but unrealistic scheme of action, we must acknowledge that we do not yet know how to conduct a bilateral nuclear battle which would not very rapidly do the most grievous material damage to the theater of war, cause heavy civilian and military casualties, and produce a state of utter chaos and confusion. Kissinger says that we must not fight a limited nuclear war as though it were a small all-out conflict, which may be good advice. But by fleeing into the fantasy of self-sufficient mobile units, by ignoring the air battle, and by minimizing the effects of nuclear weapons, he has avoided coming to grips with all the problems inherent in his advice. Indeed, one of the many paradoxes of *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* is that it berates us for having depended too much on technology and not enough on doctrine for the solution of our problems; yet when it comes to limited war, we find Kissinger himself relying to an unbelievable extent precisely on technology to rescue him from all the dilemmas created by nuclear weapons. The result is that his discussion of limited war leaves the impression of special pleading rather than of systematic analysis.

V

Kissinger is nothing if not fashionable. Having made a case for limited nuclear war, he proceeds to argue in favor of distributing strategic and tactical nuclear weapons systems to our European allies. Yet this is not a recommendation to which he can have given any serious consideration. Otherwise he would almost certainly have had doubts

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about reconciling it with his advocacy of limited nuclear war. His motives for supporting a policy of sharing are the familiar ones. If we provide the countries of Western Europe with a strategic and tactical nuclear capability, they will be able to deter strategic attacks from the Soviet Union on their own, and, together with the United States, frustrate lesser provocations by means of limited nuclear war. The United States, in turn, will gain from this arrangement by being relieved of the necessity to threaten the suicidal strategy of massive retaliation for the defense of Western Europe.

The case for sharing, stated in these terms, looks impressive. But once the frame of reference is somewhat widened, its merits become less clear. What, for example, are we to do about the countries of the Middle East and Asia? They are just as vulnerable as Europe to the Soviet strategic threat. Does this mean that we must give them a similar capability; are we prepared to commit suicide for them; or do we simply let them enter the Soviet bloc by default? Leaving aside the difficult matter of whom to include and whom to exclude, what are the systems that we are to share, in what quantities, and at what cost? Can they be designed so as to have a reasonable chance of surviving a first strike? If so, in what time period and under what conditions? Kissinger does not inquire into these important matters. Nor does he ask how these countries will behave militarily once they have acquired these capabilities. Will they really regard a strategy of limited nuclear war as a serious alternative to surrender or all-out retaliation? Will the United States, for its part, wish to maintain garrisons overseas or become enmeshed in limited nuclear wars, given the ease with which they might mushroom into all-out conflicts?

Will the United States even require much of a limited war capability under such conditions? Not only does Kissinger neglect to raise these questions. He also fails to investigate the impact of nuclear weapons sharing upon the foreign policies of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the recipient nations. Instead he appears to assume that, despite this revolutionary act, all other conditions will remain constant, and that international affairs will proceed pretty much as before. Yet surely, if we begin to distribute power in such a way as to create a wholly new equilibrium, something will happen to national attitudes and to the system of relations and commitments that has grown up since World War II. What might be the outcome of nuclear sharing—what might be the fate of such old-fashioned institutions as alliances, guarantees, and limited wars—all this is most difficult to foresee. But Kissinger's discussion would have gained immeasurably in its seriousness had he

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explored the ramifications of nuclear sharing, the alternatives to it, and how this course of action might be reconciled with his advocacy of limited nuclear war.

VI

Kissinger's approach to disarmament would also have benefited from some second thoughts. Much that he has to say on this difficult subject makes eminent good sense. But his suggestion that we would do far better to strive for an agreement on rules of limited nuclear war than continue with the current efforts to control the arms race provokes a whole host of questions. Would it be desirable or even feasible to follow this course? Is an effort to prescribe rules of limited nuclear war any more realistic than the quest for disarmament—or, for that matter, significantly different? Indeed, does the set of rules proposed by Kissinger promise to contribute very much to the limitation of wars?

There are no particularly easy or obvious answers to these questions. Admittedly, negotiations for disarmament have rarely resulted in any useful product and have been accompanied by a great deal of nonsense and hypocrisy. But there remain very powerful reasons for going on with them under present conditions. The current arms race is leading its participants to adopt increasingly difficult and dangerous expedients. It is absorbing resources at an accelerating rate; it is generating serious insecurities of its own; and, on our side at least, it is becoming more and more difficult to reconcile with the other goals of Western policy. In addition, there are large and influential groups within most of the countries of the world who sincerely believe not only that some kind of disarmament is desirable, but also that the effort to reach an agreement in this realm should be an obligation of the first priority upon all governments.

These circumstances surely make it desirable for the United States to continue negotiating seriously and imaginatively for disarmament. They also militate against an announcement that disarmament is really a waste of time and that we intend to work for rules of limited nuclear war instead. In the present state of the world, few actions would be likely to evoke a less enthusiastic domestic and international response than a formal proclamation to the effect that we accepted not merely war, but nuclear war along Kissinger's lines, as a regular part of interstate relations, and that our principal interest lay in limiting it to areas other than the United States.

Kissinger argues that the chances of a Soviet-American agreement on a worthwhile system of disarmament and inspection are terribly small;

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consequently that we ought to aim at more realizable objectives such as the limitation of wars.[8] But the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premise. Both sides may yet become convinced that an uncontrolled race for military superiority, or security, is hopeless and that it is leading them to catastrophe. Thus, however minute the probability of a reliable agreement, it still appears large enough to warrant a sustained endeavor on our part, especially since the effort costs us so little. But apparently Kissinger refuses to see it that way. In fact, he goes further and says that, even in our effort to reduce the danger of a surprise attack, we have been striving for a type of agreement which, if reached, would prove worthless. Perhaps this is so; but it is not at all clear that he understands the problem of defending SAC well enough to say what might or might not contribute to its protection against surprise. And, in any event, he has hardly asked whether the open skies proposal would not bring us important benefits quite independent of its utility in reducing the danger of a sneak attack.

To argue for a continuation of the disarmament effort is not to reject the attempt to establish controls and limits upon the institution of war. The two endeavors are so much opposite faces of the same coin that they cannot be regarded as mutually exclusive. Although the great powers may believe that there is some profit in a continuation of the arms race, they may find it advantageous to negotiate about how they will use their strength in the event of conflict. Consequently it may be feasible now, as it has been in the past, to agree upon how force should be applied, even if there can be no agreement on controlling the arms race. There may also be some point in a unilateral announcement by the United States of the rules to which it would adhere in the event of a war. Such an announcement, if skillfully formulated, might have real utility in the cold war and conceivably might influence the behavior of prospective belligerents in the desired direction. But what can actually be achieved in this realm would seem to depend rather critically on the nature of the rules that are promulgated.

Kissinger sees some point in a code which would involve ceilings on yields and bursts of nuclear weapons, declarations about open cities, delineations of combat zones, and a system of inspection to ensure conformity with the rules. Why it would be any more realistic to work for the acceptance of such a code than to strive for an agreement on disarmament had better be left unexplored. It may also be well not to ask why these rules would be required at all, given Kissinger's earlier as-

[8] For a different estimate of the possibilities of disarmament, see Richard S. Leghorn, "How the Arms Race Can Be Checked," *The Reporter*, March 6, 1958, pp. 16-20.

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surances about the discriminating character of nuclear war. What needs questioning here is whether these particular rules will produce greater benefits than some other set.

Certainly Kissinger cannot believe that the Russians are likely to accept them. And surely he does not intend to argue that they would give us some striking cold war victory. Therefore, he must believe both that the belligerents will find it possible to comply with these regulations and that the United States will be better off militarily fighting at this rather than at some other level of violence. But both assumptions are questionable. Numbers of men as well as bombs and delivery vehicles would still count in such a war. So would the advantages of the initiative, surprise, and saturation. Moreover, there must be very real doubts as to whether serious military operations could be made compatible with Kissinger's rules, even given the best will in the world on both sides. What is far more likely is that they would be violated in quite unpremeditated fashion and thus would precipitate precisely the consequences that they had been designed to avoid. Surely we are entitled to expect that if elaborate rules of war are to be the order of the future, they will be more ingeniously and realistically designed, and that they will consider more seriously than this set where American military strengths and weaknesses really lie.

One approach to the problem of limitations which promises adequately to meet the criteria set forth by Kissinger and others is that which accepts the distinction between nuclear and high explosive weapons. There may be others as well. But we should not delude ourselves. Any attempt to formulate rigid rules of conduct for wars whose origins and environment we cannot foresee may create as many problems as it pretends to solve. And the search for elaborate rules of war, determined in advance, may simply prove to be a way of avoiding the difficult question of how to keep a conflict limited. If we make the equally plausible assumption that the United States and the Soviet Union will fail to agree in advance on a set of rules, what then? Presumably, if they are both interested in limitations, they will feel obliged to grope toward some kind of tacit understanding during the actual course of battle. Hence a task of the first magnitude for the statesmen and soldiers of both sides will be to determine what system of actions, diplomatic as well as military, will best contribute to a favorable outcome of the conflict—and to its control.

How much we can actually do to foresee these actions in advance of specific contingencies whose dimensions we cannot define certainly is hard to say. Perhaps, at best, objectives of a rather abstract character

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and fairly general rules of prudence are about all that we can formulate. Of only one prospect can we be reasonably confident: that the enemy, for the reasons so well enumerated by Kissinger in his analysis of Soviet strategy, will strive, not to play the game according to any predetermined set of rules, but to surprise and embarrass us, and fight on terms most advantageous to himself. To assume otherwise, to hope for neat and tidy wars from which all serious danger of defeat and expansion has been removed, to develop plans and preparations on such premises—all this smacks of a rigidity and a simplicity that are hardly appropriate to a complex and rapidly changing international situation.

VII

There are many reasons for being troubled as well by Kissinger's proposals for reorganizing the defense establishment; they seem so tenuously related to the causes of its inefficiencies. But enough has already been said, without becoming lost in the wasteland of organizational charts, to warrant a brief and tentative assessment of what he has wrought.

Certainly he has ably synthesized the gathering criticism of American military policy. He has also recognized and skillfully defined many of the problems that the statesmen and soldiers must resolve if they are to surmount the current crisis in military affairs. For reasons which should be readily apparent, he has been far less successful in his effort to answer the great questions raised by the growth of Soviet power. But if skepticism and even grave concern must greet many of his conclusions, there can be no doubt that he has provided a major incentive to further study in this most vital and intriguing field. Kissinger maintains that much of the literature on military policy has been purely polemical; unfortunately, he himself has adhered to that tradition. The time for more sober, cautious studies, supported by detailed and sophisticated analysis, now is at hand.

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NUCLEAR POWER AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By GEORGE B. BALDWIN

J. Guéron, J. A. Lane, I. R. Maxwell, and J. R. Menke, eds., *The Economics of Nuclear Power, Including Administration and Law* (Progress in Nuclear Energy, Series VIII), New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1957, 513 pp. $17.00.

B. C. Netschert and S. H. Schurr, *Atomic Energy Applications with Reference to Underdeveloped Countries*, Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins Press, for Resources for the Future, Inc., 1957, 129 pp. $2.00.

National Planning Association Studies on the Productive Uses of Nuclear Energy, a series of twelve reports, published by (and available from) the National Planning Association, 1606 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington 9, D.C.*

WHEN the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was held in Geneva in August 1955, there was much hope that nuclear power would be cheap and that cheap power would mean faster economic development. What have three years taught us about this assumed relationship? They have taught us what many of the participants at Geneva already knew: that there is really no significant connection between economic development and atomic energy. Yet it is with this non-existent, or very tenuous, relationship that this article is concerned.

Our primary emphasis will be on the nature of the demand for elec-

* Edward S. Mason and the NPA Project Staff, *Energy Requirements and Economic Growth*, August 1955, 51 pp. $1.00.

Stefan H. Robock, *Nuclear Power and Economic Development in Brazil*, April 1957, 126 pp. $2.75.

Norman L. Gold, *Regional Economic Development and Nuclear Power in India*, with an introduction by Harrison Brown, September 1957, 132 pp. $2.75.

H. H. Landsberg and G. Perazich, *Nuclear Power and Economic Development in Israel*, July 1957, 92 pp. $1.25.

I. M. D. Little and P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, *Nuclear Power and Italy's Energy Position*, December 1957, 79 pp. $1.25.

Michael Sapir and Sam J. Van Hyning, *The Outlook for Nuclear Power in Japan*, June 1956, 175 pp. $3.00.

Maurice Kilbridge, *The Prospect for Nuclear Power in Pakistan*, May 1958, 60 pp. $1.00.

NPA Special Policy Committee on the Productive Uses of Nuclear Energy, *Summary of Findings: Policy Suggestions for the Future*, September 1957, 61 pp. $1.50.

FORTHCOMING:

Alvin Mayne, *The Prospects for Nuclear Energy in Puerto Rico.*

Perry D. Teitelbaum, *Nuclear Energy and the U.S. Fuel Economy.*

Cornelius Dwyer, *Nuclear Energy and World Fuel Prices.*

George N. Perazich, *Nuclear Energy: Its Possible Uses for Process Heat.*

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tricity, for it is primarily the lack of any such strong demand that explains why the unlocking of the atom will continue to be an event of minor importance to most underdeveloped countries over the next quarter-century. I say this in full knowledge that anyone who returns from a tour of the underdeveloped countries today is likely to report that power shortages are everywhere and are "obviously" holding back growth. But this paradox is easily explained once we understand who uses electricity, how much they need, and how fast demand is likely to grow.

I

Electricity is one of the several "commercial" forms of inanimate energy. Commercial energy is distinguished from "non-commercial" forms, which consumers usually need not pay for (since they gather it themselves) and whose use is not statistically recorded. Wood and cow-dung are probably the two most important sources of non-commercial energy in the world today. Dung is not just a quaint and marginal energy source: in India, for example, the government has estimated that 224 million tons of dry cow-dung were used as fuel in 1951, mainly for household cooking, as compared with a total coal consumption of 32 million tons. An estimate of 1947 calculated that upward of three-quarters of India's total energy consumption was derived from burning dung. In countries where the cattle population is lower (India has more cattle per capita than almost any country in the world), dung is, of course, not so important. But wherever people are poor, they rely on whatever non-commercial fuels are available to them. In Brazil, wood and charcoal provided about half the country's total energy supply in 1945.

The large role played by non-commercial energy in underdeveloped countries reflects the basic fact that such societies do not use much energy. Economic development is unthinkable without massive, long-run increases in the use of inanimate energy; and this means that the consumption of commercial energy will inevitably overtake the traditional non-commercial forms, although the absolute quantities of the latter may not decline for a long time. In the industrial era, the main sources of commercial energy have of course been running water, coal, and petroleum. To these we can now add the atom, through fission today and perhaps fusion tomorrow (none of the studies under review says anything about fusion).

Electricity is not a source of energy but a form of it, and part of our interest lies in whether or not nuclear fuels are likely to make electricity

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available at a cost lower than that at which it can be produced from coal, petroleum, or water power—and, if so, where and when. Most of the early hopes aroused by atomic energy in the underdeveloped countries were based on the implicit assumption that atomic electricity would be significantly cheaper than other kinds. In the main, this assumption is both untrue and irrelevant. For the next two decades at any rate, the underdeveloped countries do not promise to offer much of a market for nuclear power, nor does the advent of nuclear power promise to offer much of an "assist" to economic development. The basis for these twin conclusions lies in five simple propositions.

(1) The world is beginning to run out of conventional fuels (coal, petroleum, and hydroelectric sites) at a time when its energy requirements are rising rapidly, so that within a generation or two we shall need one or more major new sources of energy. But this progressive exhaustion of our natural fuel capital is proceeding very unevenly among countries and regionally within countries. Hence the time when new sources will be needed will vary considerably throughout the world.

(2) The places that are most rapidly approaching the margin of their conventional energy sources are those that use energy in large quantities today and have done so for a long time. They are the minority of the world's well-developed countries—the industrialized nations of Europe, plus Japan. Because of varying resource endowments, the coming energy shortage will be much greater in Europe and Japan than in North America.

(3) A country's need for commercial energy depends chiefly on the degree of its industrialization and urbanization. The dominant characteristic of underdeveloped countries is that they are agricultural and rural. Their energy demand is not likely to rise rapidly, because their prospects for rapid industrialization are not great. This fact underlies the present relatively low demand for commercial energy in such countries.[1] A shortage of cheap power is not an important reason why economic development does not proceed rapidly; there are other reasons of far greater importance. This means that even cheap power would

[1] The prevalence of power shortages in underdeveloped countries is a misleading index of the degree of such countries' true need for additional power. Once supply has been brought even with demand—a heroic task in many countries—demand will expand only slowly (unless industrialization is proceeding rapidly, as in Brazil or Mexico). Also, high percentage rates of electricity growth often reflect the present smallness of the industry rather than the addition of large amounts of new capacity expressed in absolute terms.

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often go begging for lack of any use for it; to install it could only be wasteful.

(4) Given the probable rate of growth of demand for energy in most underdeveloped countries, the majority of them are likely to find that, for the next two or three decades they will have energy sources that can provide power at costs well below the probable cost of nuclear power. However, there are important exceptions, both for entire countries and for particular regions within others.

(5) The above facts yield a conclusion now generally accepted by informed people but at variance with that to which many people jumped when atomic energy first made its appearance: nuclear energy will be of much greater significance to the already well-developed countries of Western Europe and to Japan than it will be to the underdeveloped two-thirds of the world. This conclusion is valid for the next twenty-five or thirty years; beyond that, predictions mean little.

Notwithstanding our conclusion, there is a possibility that within the next quarter-century nuclear power may occasionally play important specialized roles within the underdeveloped countries. Such roles all stem from atomic energy's major economic advantage: the cost of transporting atomic fuels is practically zero, while the cost of transporting coal and oil is very high, particularly on land. If atomic reactors can be developed whose costs are below those of thousands of small-scale diesel generating units scattered around the world, that specialized market could attain a modest importance. Unfortunately, the technical work on small-scale reactors is lagging far behind that on large central-station plants; and, even if low-cost small reactors are developed, their usefulness will depend on finding answers to such related questions as safety, convenience, and the degree of labor skills required.

II

To turn now to the publications under review: *The Economics of Nuclear Power*, published by McGraw-Hill, is somewhat puzzling. It contains 41 articles (nearly all by different authors) organized into five parts: (1) Needs and Resources; (2) Nuclear Power Economics; (3) Nuclear Fuel Cycles; (4) Reactor Programmes and Reactor Economic Data; and (5) Administration and Law. Another reviewer more qualified than I has come down rather hard on this volume as a publishing venture, pointing out that by buying Volume I of the United Nations series on the Geneva Conference one can acquire at lower

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cost (about $10.00) more complete versions of most of the McGraw-Hill articles of interest to economists.[2] The editors have included several articles (especially in Parts 3, 4, and 5) that do not belong in a book on the economics of nuclear power. Moreover, although it constitutes the first volume in a series with the same title, no indication is given of how frequently succeeding volumes may appear. Yet despite these shortcomings, the book contains much interesting material and will probably be a commercial success, if only because McGraw-Hill has an American distribution system superior to that of the United Nations.

The Netschert-Schurr volume surveys the outlook for the whole range of atomic applications (e.g., electricity, heat, propulsion of various kinds, radiation for industrial and medical isotope production, and food sterilization) that might conceivably be significant for underdeveloped countries. The book is particularly useful for its clean, uncluttered descriptions of the various uses to which atomic energy might be put. The authors are careful to warn that much more study of specific applications in specific environments, and much more technical development, will be required before any significant number of atomic applications are likely to be identified, and there is a sobering note in an appendix on "The Possibilities and Significance of Radiation Deinfestation of Grain in Asian Countries." Over a third of this well-written book is concerned with a review of "International Co-operation in Nuclear Energy Research and Development."

The series of reports published by the National Planning Association constitutes a milestone in nuclear power research. They do for atomic power precisely what Messrs. Netschert and Schurr tell us must be done for each possible use to which the atom can be put: they study specific uses in specific countries. The series has been planned with obvious care and wisdom, and the countries selected for study were chosen not only for their own sake but because some represent groups of countries with similar energy problems and resource endowments. Although there is some minor unevenness among the country studies, most of them have been carried out with great thoroughness and imagination. The director of the project, Philip Mullenbach, and his authors deserve high marks indeed. We need not expect all of NPA's main conclusions to turn out to be correct, but the series' contribution to the method of studying the application of nuclear power to particular countries will be of lasting value. Not that there is anything very new about

[2] See the crisp review by Harold J. Barnett in the *American Economic Review*, XLVII, No. 5 (September 1957), pp. 760-61. Barnett calls the United Nations' Volume I "an economic analysis performance significantly superior to the McGraw-Hill volume."

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the NPA approach: it is simply that of sensible men working within a well-conceived framework.

III

A realistic view of the contribution which nuclear power can make to economic development does not depend on a comparison of electrical generating costs among coal, oil, hydro, and atomic plants. Even if the cost calculations showed nuclear power to be markedly cheaper than any other kind (which they do not over the foreseeable future), this should not give much hope and comfort to those who want to see development move forward. For "cheap power" is not the key to economic development, as the four NPA studies on underdeveloped countries make clear. Furthermore, "cheap power"—entirely apart from its inability to generate economic development—is relatively powerless even to increase the demand for electricity in underdeveloped countries. Demand depends not on the price of electricity but on the level of income of those who want to buy it. This applies both to individuals and to nations.

Thus Dean Mason's paper reminds us that estimates of future energy requirements depend on "a consideration of the prospects for economic growth." If the price of energy were important in explaining growth, "we would expect to find some association between the price of energy and the state of economic development." But the figures show no significant correlation: "There are some underdeveloped countries with low and some with high fuel costs. There are also some highly industrialized countries with low and some with high fuel costs" (p. 22). Until a society develops the end-uses for electricity (or any other commercial energy), consumption of power will remain low regardless of its price. We would not, after all, expect rickshaw drivers to buy much gasoline just because it was cheap; they will not be interested in gas at any price until they have enough money to buy taxis.

The development of these end-uses means primarily the development of industry and transport, for the household and commercial sectors of less-developed economies use relatively small quantities of electricity—and then only among the upper-income groups in urban centers. Philip Sporn, president of the American Gas and Electric Co., makes the further important but often neglected point in *The Economics of Nuclear Power* that "the cost of energy-consuming equipment far exceeds the cost of the energy and the capital cost of the energy-producing facilities" (p. 161). This is why the consumption of electricity goes up not

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as its price goes down but as the incomes of the consumers rise.[3] The association which some people make between the low price of TVA power and the rapid growth of electricity consumption in that region is misleading: TVA's *main* contribution has been in making electricity *available* to consumers who had never had access to it before; the low price is an important but secondary benefit.

The conclusion that the demand for power in poor countries is income-elastic rather than price-elastic does not carry anyone far if he has to make responsible demand estimates over some future period. And such estimates are, after all, the heart of any country's power programming. What is the sensible way to make such estimates? In answering, we may cite three approaches that are sometimes used in underdeveloped countries but that hold great danger of being misleading.

(1) The first is simply to assume that the demand for electricity will grow at the same rate as the national income. But this neglects entirely the different growth rates among various sectors of an economy, and these sectoral differences are all-important for the demand for power.

(2) The second method is to assume that the need for power will grow in the future at about the same rate as it has grown in the past—a simple extrapolation. This again neglects changes in the structure of the economy.

(3) A third method that is sometimes used is to assume that the demand for power in underdeveloped countries will grow at roughly the rate experienced in the United States and Western Europe when those countries were first electrified in the nineteenth century. The trouble with this approach is its neglect of the huge differences between the income levels and industrial structures of these advanced countries at the time when electricity was made available to them and the present situation in the less-developed nations. One could scarcely forecast the demand for power from a poor Georgia hill-farmer from a study of how much John D. Rockefeller had bought when they first ran a line in to his house.

Each of the above methods has the great virtue of comparative simplicity of data and methodology; but this is outweighed by the danger of wrong results. It is a major contribution of the NPA studies that they demonstrate methods of estimating future requirements that are both relatively simple and sound. Nowhere in the studies is the approach ex-

[3] In high-income countries, the consumption of electricity becomes much more sensitive to its price, since a low price can persuade people to invest in new appliances for the first time or to shift from other forms of energy to electricity. Sophomore economics teaches us that the shape of any demand curve depends, among other things, on how much income people have: it is true!

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plicitly described in detail, although it is laid out generally in Dean Mason's paper and is easily visible in all the country studies. (The most careful and systematic work in this field that has come to my attention is an unpublished study by Kenneth A. Bohr and Robert Sadove of the Economic Staff of the World Bank.) The broad factors that stand out from the NPA studies and the work of Bohr and Sadove as being of crucial importance in forecasting electricity needs in underdeveloped countries are these:

(1) The expected rate of growth of industry, mining, and transport. These sectors are often very small in underdeveloped countries, but development sometimes means that they will grow rapidly—much more rapidly than national income.

(2) There are certain industries (e.g., cement, aluminum, mining, ferro-manganese, and other electroprocess industries) which consume *much* greater quantities of electricity than most others. If these "high leverage" industries are scheduled to grow, then electricity consumption is bound to grow at a much faster rate than "industry."

(3) Non-industrial consumption of electricity is usually less than industrial. Within the non-industrial category, household use is more important than commercial. But the ability of households to "afford" electricity is determined not by its price but by the cost of the appliances that use it. Until people pass a certain minimum income-level (an "income threshold"), they cannot be considered part of the potential market for electricity. Thus the size of an urban population tells relatively little about the market for electricity; what counts is the number of people above the critical income-level. True, nearly everyone could pay for one or two electric lights; but the revenue from such light-bulb use would not be great enough to make it worthwhile to carry lines to such customers and wire their houses: the marginal cost would exceed the marginal revenue.

None of the NPA studies neglects these factors. Indeed, one of the chief impressions they leave with the reader is how little space they devote to "nuclear energy." Most of their attention is quite properly given to an analysis of the growth prospects of the country under consideration and to detailed estimates of various sectoral demands for electricity. (The estimates are made for 1965 and 1975, with little attention to the "very long run," save in Harrison Brown's bold projections beyond Norman Gold's cut-off date for his India study.) Once the growth in electricity demand for the next twenty to twenty-five years has been estimated, each study reviews the country's program for expanding its electricity supply, with special emphasis on the probable methods of

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generation to be used and their costs. It is only at this point—at the very end, as it were—that attention is given to nuclear power, to see how much of the future supply it would be likely to take over, given certain cost assumptions.

IV

Apart from the crucial estimate of total costs per kilowatt-hour, there are two structural dimensions to power costs of special importance in arriving at a final judgment on the role that nuclear power ought to be assigned in any country. These involve the effect of different generating methods on (1) the amount of investment required and (2) the balance of payments. At present the capital costs of a nuclear plant are higher per KW of generating capacity than those of a thermal plant; this reflects both the present high costs of custom-made nuclear "hardware" and the fact that the costly initial supply of uranium is considered part of the plant's capital cost (that is, part of its necessary "working capital"). But the annual fuel costs of nuclear power are markedly lower than for coal- or oil-fired plants. Thus, if the capital cost of nuclear reactors can be reduced per KW produced, there is good reason to believe that total generating costs can be brought below those of modern thermal stations in many regions.

There is no way of predicting with much confidence what nuclear generating costs are likely to be by 1965 or 1975 (NPA's target dates); the rate and results of technological change and the accumulation of operating "know-how" are too uncertain.[4] To get around this difficulty, the NPA studies simply use some arbitrary but reasonable cost *assumptions*: they estimate how much of the additional electricity load atomic power is likely to take over in 1965 *if* it is available at 11 mills in large-scale plants operating at 50 per cent of capacity; for 1975-1980 a figure of 5-6 mills is used.

Even if the KW costs of nuclear power were judged somewhat higher than those from alternative sources, it might still pay a country to make an investment in nuclear power, for two reasons. First, the "weightlessness" of nuclear fuels eliminates any additional burden on a country's transport. By contrast, the expansion of coal- and oil-carrying and

[4] The importance of operating "know-how" was publicly demonstrated when the Argonne National Laboratory in Chicago announced in December 1957 that it had achieved a 40 per cent reduction in the cost of power from its small reactor. This resulted from a relatively simple adjustment in the operating positions of the fuel rod elements. (See the report in the *New York Times*, December 31, 1957.) In April 1958 the Laboratory announced a further increase in efficiency, so that the reactor could in effect be made to yield three times more electricity than its designers had predicted, implying a great reduction in unit costs. (*New York Times*, April 5, 1958.)

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storage capacity involves very costly additions to a country's total investment program. So even though the direct capital costs of nuclear stations may be higher than those of conventional plants, the net social investment may be lower. Secondly, countries which rely heavily on imported fuels (as must the Western European nations, Israel, Japan, and Brazil at present) are likely to find that their foreign-exchange requirements for imported fuel will rise alarmingly over the next quarter-century. For such countries, nuclear power may provide substantial relief, since the annual cost of imported nuclear fuels is generally less than half that for an equivalent amount of coal or oil. This advantage has less significance for underdeveloped countries than for Europe or Japan, as they are less likely to be able to avoid (by domestic manufacture) the greater use of foreign exchange for the initial investment that nuclear plants require.

Space limitations preclude any discussion of NPA's policy suggestions beyond the bare report that there are four major areas of United States atomic policy in which the NPA Policy Committee feels improvement is needed. Enough has been said to indicate the respect which this series deserves. The country studies in particular are almost as useful for people interested in economic development or in area studies as for those directly concerned with the prospects for nuclear power. And they should prove equally useful to technical people, bankers and economists, government officials, teachers, and university students.

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PERSISTENT THEMES IN ATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN UNITY

By ERNST B. HAAS

Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichtermann, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, Richard W. Van Wagenen, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957, 228 pp. $4.75.

C. Grove Haines, ed., *European Integration*, Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957, 310 pp. $5.00.

H. Field Haviland, Jr., ed., *The United States and the Western Community*, Haverford, Pa., Haverford College Press, 1957, 161 pp. $2.00.

Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, eds., *France Defeats EDC*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957, 225 pp. $5.00.

Henry L. Mason, *The European Coal and Steel Community: Experiment in Supranationalism*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1955, 153 pp. $4.00.

I

A DECADE of unprecedented political and economic activity among the governments of what is loosely described as the "Western" or "Atlantic Community" is at last being reflected in a steady trickle of books concerned with the integrative aspects of this activity. No doubt this is a good thing, if for no other reason than that so much of the total governmental effort of the Western European countries is invested in these regional movements. It is time that the significance of this regionalism in the pattern of international relations be examined, that vital but frequently obscure factual points be thrown into relief, that judgments be made.

But what, specifically, is it that should be studied? Questions of national foreign policy provide one range of inquiry. Why should the United States support or oppose European integration? Should pressure be put on Britain to identify herself more closely with the budding union of the Six on the Continent? Is the Common Market a good policy approach, or Euratom, or the principle of integration sector by sector? And for what and from whose viewpoint? These are leading policy questions by no means clearly answered in the past and well worth some attention.

More important questions, however, are found in the realm of ideology. The focus on Atlantic regionalism may provide a framework within which to examine attitudes and thought patterns that favor ex-

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tensive and interesting alternatives to the system of sovereign nation-states. What considerations prompt people to call for Atlantic Union or European Federation? Are these considerations rationally defensible or are they chiliastic in tone and nihilistic in sentiment? More important still, what traditional strands of political theory can we isolate in these patterns of ideological advocacy and what relation do they bear to a general assessment of contemporary Western society and culture?

But, after all, policy and ideology can be studied without focusing specifically on regional integration. Any sufficiently rigorous decision-making focus, concentrating on a series of decisions relating to Western defense or economic reconstruction, would provide very interesting answers to questions in these two realms. The only *unique* value of studies concerning Atlantic or European regionalism, it seems to me, is the insight they may afford into processes of forming political communities at the international level. This requires a rigorous set of tools, a determination to eschew vague formulas of political consent and cohesion, and a decision to think operationally. It involves, finally, the use of models, or at least ideal types, and a willingness to force the examination of reams of empirical data into the mold thus furnished—and then to revise it.

II

A good many of the authors in the books under review stress the policy focus. In the Haviland volume, most of the contributors—participants in a Haverford College conference in 1956—merely justify the American policy of supporting Atlantic and European unity as a logical anti-Soviet measure. Only the economists contribute another line of argumentation. Raymond Vernon and Lincoln Gordon, considering the global commitments of American policy, question the wisdom of complete American identification with an Atlantic confederation of the NATO type. Further, they have severe economic reservations regarding the alleged virtues of a European common market, general or by sector. Expecting European dependence on overseas markets to continue, and fearing the creation of a permanent high-cost manufacturing area in a protected continental bloc, they feel that the "trade-diverting" aspects of a common market, pointed up in Jacob Viner's analysis, may carry the day and undermine European prosperity, American strategic expectations, and the optimum world trade network. And on structural-functional grounds, both economists doubt the efficacy of supranationality as a principle of organization. For purposes of merely reintroducing a multilateral trading pattern free from obstructions, inter-

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governmental co-operation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) type is held to be quite adequate; and this, they argue, is all that wise policy should demand.

The study of the European Defense Community (EDC) prepared by Lerner and Aron offers some highly sensitive discussions of policy. Aron contributes a beautiful examination of French policy arguments for and against EDC, and correlates them with the over-all political setting. Jacques Vernant and André Philip do much the same in the realm of French economic arguments as related to lobbying patterns, thus lifting a policy discussion to the level of an analysis of process. Alfred Grosser's two essays, in the Haines volume and in the EDC study, concentrate on the Franco-German relationship; but they, too, link an examination of government policy with a study of its perception by political parties and interest groups, and they end up with ideological and structural assessments of factors working for and against harmony. Grosser achieves an admirable balance of policy description and ideological analysis, essentially concluding that for the sake of Franco-German understanding it was a good thing that EDC was defeated and that European integration did not proceed via military federation. This judgment is based on the conclusion that EDC was opposed by the very Germans (Socialists, trade unionists, and the young generation disillusioned with German military traditions) with whom the future of German democracy rests. More important, parallel French groups in the ranks of the moderate Center and Left also reasoned that a Germany rearmed against its will, and revisionist toward the East to boot, would make a poor partner in a supranational union. Given the impossibility of a meeting of the minds of two crucial sectors of the political spectrum on whom the democratic future of a united Europe may depend, the vote of August 30, 1954, could be considered a service to the growing unity of Europe. Given my own conviction that the basis of the contemporary European consensus is a common dedication to the realization of a regional welfare state, in conjunction with a considerable measure of political neutralism, I agree that the defeat of the military scheme was, in retrospect, desirable. The advent of Euratom and the Common Market in 1958, now supported overwhelmingly by Socialist opinion in France and Germany, is the most convincing item of proof among the expressions of doubts about the value of EDC.[1]

[1] A. Grosser, "France and Germany: A Confrontation," in Lerner and Aron, *op.cit.*, pp. 54-70; "France and Germany," in Haines, *op.cit.*, pp. 177-95. Since the groups identified with de Gaulle's rise to power in 1958 have always consistently opposed any European and Atlantic integration which would seriously reduce French independence, no new attitudes or aims are introduced by the demise of the Fourth Republic and our findings remain unchanged.

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The most severe reservations on policy grounds concerning the wisdom of exclusive Atlantic or European unity—specifically, in a federal form—are voiced by the British contributors. Distrust of a federal connection with the continental nations is obvious and a nostalgic desire for continued British self-sufficiency results in a fervent plea for constant inter-allied consultations at the intergovernmental level, based on the informality of the "club atmosphere" said to prevail in the Commonwealth.[2] This policy preference is justified by claiming an incompatibility of Britain's Commonwealth commitments with Atlantic and European supranational ties and by pointing to the "failure" of supranationalism in practice. Such opinions, however, seem dated in the light of post-Suez events. Many Commonwealth leaders have made plain that they see no incompatibility in Britain's association with continental unity; the Eden and Macmillan governments have been eager to establish ties with the supranational agencies; and the negotiations for the Free Trade Area initiated by Britain are a concession to the reality of the continental effort at economic union.

III

With the exception of the Gallic flavoring, nothing startlingly new can be gleaned from the discussions of policy in the European-Atlantic region in any of the books under review. The pasture of ideology is considerably greener. In the Lerner and Aron volume, Jacques Fauvet and Stanley Hoffmann contribute a play-by-play analysis of the arguments over EDC and Western European Union (WEU) heard in the French National Assembly and each comes up with a useful typology of supporters and opponents of various kinds of integration. Jean Stoetzel reviews the same ideological struggle through the medium of various public opinion polls, and Jean Marchand furnishes a summary of the positions taken by Parisian and provincial newspapers on the issues involved.

Novel as these treatments are, their restricted focus nevertheless prevents them from presenting a generally reliable ideological tableau from which projections can be made about future attitudes. From the discussion of EDC and WEU, one might conclude that regional integration under any formula would never gain adequate support in France, a finding obviously controverted by the facts. Had an effort been made to distinguish between elite and mass opinion, between attitudes expressed on various kinds of integration (political vs. economic, inter-

[2] C. E. Carrington, "The British Commonwealth and Western Europe," in Haines, *op.cit.*, pp. 279-92; Denis Healy, "Britain's Attitude Towards European Integration," in Haviland, *op.cit.*, pp. 31-52.

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governmental vs. supranational), qualified by the conditions under which proposals are debated, the final results would be more useful. As it is, some of the authors state categorical conclusions merely on the basis of examining EDC ideological material, and their typologies are confined to this single setting.

More interesting are the ideological statements in a series of contributions to the Haines volume by committed "Europeans," active advocates of a European federation. For American students at least, these chapters in the aggregate provide a startling picture of the mystique behind the European Movement, if not government policy. Altiero Spinelli presents a brutally frank history of the European Movement from its origins in the wartime Resistance in several continental countries, and develops his quasi-Sorelian notion of "spontaneous" and "popular" federalism growing up through "total" opposition to established governments, parties, parliaments, and bureaucracies.[3] This variety of federalism is "action-oriented" in the sense that it considers the dominant institutional forms of contemporary Europe and the elites active in them as hopelessly dated. Political enthusiasm for peace, democracy, and welfare cannot be expected of them; leadership cannot be forthcoming and *immobilisme* at the European level is the only conceivable result. If European industrial society is to be rejuvenated, it must be done by new and striking methods rather than by the hopelessly reactionary procedures of the old-fashioned European "doctors." Hence federalism *itself* should be the supreme creed of all European opposition groups, not the doctrines now standard in European parties. A federalist movement with a mass base would then sweep before it the entrenched interests of all other creeds and sublimely create the new society. It follows, of course, that this brand of federalism refuses to countenance the uniting of Europe through patient diplomatic negotiation, liaison among political leaders, or the gradual integration of economic sectors.

Spinelli's ideas are not those of all federalists; Hans Kohn's argument that federalism provides the moral antidote to the corrupt modern nationalism that tends toward mass totalitarianism—as demonstrated by the "federal" character of the "good" Swiss and American nationalism—comes closer to the heart of the federalist ideology.[4] Thus Henri Brugmans extracts a general social sentiment of malaise from contemporary Europe. Attachment to the nation-state is exhausted because the

[3] Altiero Spinelli, "The Growth of the European Movement Since World War II," in Haines, *op.cit.*, pp. 37-63.

[4] Hans Kohn, "Nationalism and the Integration of Europe," in *ibid.*, pp. 21-36.

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state can no longer satisfy its citizens' spiritual or physical demands and it certainly cannot inspire them to greatness. Federation, again, is the antidote, even though the specific program Brugmans suggests to inspire greatness and daring is mostly defense against the Soviet-Communist threat, a measure advocated even by non-federalists.[5] More concretely, Ugo La Malfa endorses the economic benefits of the Common Market with a restatement of the economic federalism made famous by Jean Monnet, and Hans Nord supports both Kohn and Brugmans by identifying supranationality with political decentralization and therefore with an ethical and individualistic alternative to the all-powerful—even if democratic—national state.[6]

These assertions slur over all the institutional, economic, and sociological issues raised by some commentators and the actual objections encountered in government policy. They see in federalism, whether total and immediate or economic and gradual, a panacea for whatever the diagnosis of the European disease happens to be. To Giuseppe Pella and Giovanni Demaria, the ailment is fundamentally economic. Planning, controls, tariffs, *dirigisme* are the symptoms of a failing capitalism; the Common Market and federation will compel a truly competitive and liberal economy to flourish, and will simultaneously stabilize cyclical trends by giving them more space for adjustment; yet it is granted that protection against the rest of the world will demand a common high tariff, *while also* necessitating greater exports to the presently underdeveloped countries.[7]

Let us grant that the political doctrine of federalism has its origin in disillusionment, and the economic arguments theirs in distrust of contemporary capitalist and statist practices in Europe. It remains true nevertheless that the federalists are naïve if they count on their countries to rise above "nationalism" in the abstract or themselves to strike a blow for "individualism" merely by stressing the virtues of local self-government. I suspect that the very process of "massification" deplored by Brugmans and Kohn could furnish some support for federalism. As brilliantly argued by Aldo Garosci in his discussion of European neutralism, malaise coincides with distrust of all established institutions when large numbers of people disagree with a fundamental

[5] Henri Brugmans, "The Dynamics of European Integration," in *ibid.*, pp. 161-76.

[6] Ugo La Malfa, "The Case for European Integration: Economic Considerations," in *ibid.*, pp. 64-79; Hans Nord, "In Search of a Political Framework for an Integrated Europe," in *ibid.*, pp. 215-30.

[7] Giuseppe Pella, "The Coal and Steel Community as a Case Study of Integration," in *ibid.*, pp. 137-49; Giovanni Demaria, "European Integration and the World Economy," in *ibid.*, pp. 150-59.

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step in policy—e.g., entry into a war or an alliance. Distrust then extends to diplomacy and to parliamentary government and finds its expression in a generalized exclamation of "Ohne mich!" As crises and decisions to deal with them become more complex, the feeling of distrust increases in an ascending spiral. As statesmen seek solutions through finely drafted schemes of regional integration, indifference grows.[8] While Garosci sees this neutralism as an antithesis to any kind of rational policy, I am tempted to argue that it provides the clientele to which a more demagogic European Movement might appeal, if the propositions of its ideologues, with all their connotations of Proudhon, Sorel, and Clarence Streit, are to be taken seriously.

As far as I am concerned, the West is fortunate that the dominant themes in the drive for a united Europe have been less sweeping and more consistently tied to the pre-existing historical context. Franco-German harmony, manifestation of a degree of independence toward Washington and Moscow, and the realization of welfare measures whose success is thought to depend on a large common market and a uniform economic policy—all these are rational aspirations not involving a complete repudiation of past structures and beliefs. I for one feel more at ease when the argument is tied to these issues—as raised by Monnet, Spaak, Beyen, and Adenauer—rather than to the apocalyptic visions hinted at by other participants.

It is not surprising that among this array of authors only one should raise the issue of the spiritual unity of the entire West, to speak of the cultural bonds of Western Christendom and the "necessary" political implications of these bonds. And that author is Lebanon's Charles Malik.[9] He, but none of the European or American contributors, urges the formula of Atlantic Union to safeguard this heritage. While his essay is written movingly and in perfect style, it is, I think, an accurate reflection of the numerical strength of this ideological position that it should have no other proponents in the volumes under review. The cultural unity of the West may be something we sense immanently, but it is not an ideology inspiring a political program.

IV

But if examinations of the processes of community formation constitute, for me, the uniquely valuable aspect of studies of European and Atlantic regionalism, what do the various authors have to offer in the way of new insights, techniques of analysis, and systematic findings?

[8] Aldo Garosci, "Neutralism," in *ibid.*, pp. 196-214.
[9] Charles Malik, "Asian Views of an Integrated Europe," in *ibid.*, pp. 231-49.

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What suggestions or propositions are advanced which tend to explain *why* regional cohesion in the Atlantic and European areas has developed in excess of global trends or tendencies in other regions?

Ideologues of "community" have certain impressionistic insights to offer, even though their purpose is advocacy rather than analysis. Brugmans, for example, insists that plain boredom with the tired nation-state is so pervasive an attitude among the populations of Western Europe that identification with a regional community provides an invigorating alternative for them. Whether he feels that it *ought* to provide such an alternative or actually *does* so is left unclear; but, in any event, my observations in Europe do not bear him out.

For the student who is committed to the analysis of group behavior and bureaucratic decision-making as indicators of cohesion, a number of essays by officials of international and supranational organizations are well worth examining.[10] Here we find several arresting propositions from the pens of participants in the decision-making process leading to integration. Van Kleffens confirms that governments used the device of European economic integration as a multi-purpose technique for eventually achieving political unity, for revitalizing the European industrial scene through intensified competition, for achieving strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as well as against the United States. Gordon considers the major stimulus to deliberate integration to be the perception of external tension. This he contrasts with internal strains among the integrating units and posits a theory of political integration based on a rough excess of external fear over internal division, leading to the conclusion that, under current world conditions, further institutional integration among the NATO members is unlikely.

Given this theory of integration founded on disequilibrium, the conclusion is unimpeachable. Delouvrier and Uri, however, posit a different set of institutional determinants and therefore arrive at a conclusion much closer to the pattern as I see it. Economic integration must lead to a greater measure of political unity because the devices adopted by governments to realize higher living standards through freer trade are incapable of achieving the intended results. This is so because the intergovernmental technique of general liberalization (OEEC) is unable to deal with tariff questions vigorously and incapable of compelling member governments to adopt parallel or identical

[10] E. N. Van Kleffens, "The Case for European Integration: Political Considerations," in *ibid.*, pp. 80-96; Paul Delouvrier, "Economic Integration: Problems and Possibilities," in *ibid.*, pp. 114-24; Lincoln Gordon, "Political Integration in the Free World Community," in Haviland, *op.cit.*, pp. 65-80; Pierre Uri, "A French View of the Western Community," in *ibid.*, pp. 81-92.

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policies; but it is also true because the supranational technique of integration sector by sector (the European Coal and Steel Community—ECSC—and Euratom) is incapable of dealing with general economic policy and fiscal, monetary, and labor measures. But the very limitations compel a "spill-over." Intergovernmental co-operation is intensified whenever the continental Six deliberate on further supranational integration. Britain discovers hidden virtues in OEEC and in the Council of Europe whenever the union of the Six makes progress. But, more important, the inability of both ECSC and OEEC to push integration further without a new mandate or a new organization compels the kind of integration represented by the European Economic Community. Given a commitment to economic expansion, full employment, rising welfare benefits, and political strength abroad, the long-term logic of previous fragmentary steps toward integration can take no other course. As for the rumored decline of the principle of supranationalism, the experts assure us that effective decision-making will increasingly hinge on the European Commission and not on the Council of Ministers. Since it is they who drafted the treaties in question, who is to challenge their analysis?

It might be assumed that a systematic treatment of the problems and policies of ECSC would shed further light on these propositions. Henry L. Mason's overly brief description of the institutions and policies of ECSC fails to give us such amplification, however. Mason deserves credit for seeing and stating the pioneering contribution that a systematic study of ECSC could make to our understanding of processes of community formation. But he is too preoccupied with institutions to come to grips with the integrating role of ECSC and too concerned with policies in Luxembourg to examine their impact on the behavior of the industrialists, trade unionists, politicians, and administrators in the member countries. While his book provides an excellent survey of the structure, powers, and early history of the ECSC organs, conceptualization is confined to an invocation of the requirements of successful political integration listed by Karl Deutsch in this journal,[11] without testing them empirically.

Lerner and Aron had the unenviable task of extracting from the separate contributions of their authors general propositions about the factors which militated against regional integration (EDC) in France. They claim to advocate nothing and merely to "disengage" ideologies and attitudes bearing on European unity. Yet the generalizations which

[11] "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration," *World Politics*, v, No. 2 (January 1953), pp. 194-95.

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emerge seem to me misleading. Lerner concludes that none of the traditionally accepted behavioral theories concerning the voting pattern of French deputies elucidate the EDC vote: geographical explanations explain nothing. He therefore characterizes the debate as liberating the *over-all* divisions of French society, internal tensions compounded by differing perceptions of foreign policy needs. The *melée* confirms, for him, that French society would not support any further concession to supranationality and certainly no sacrifice of national greatness symbolized by the merger of its army with a "traditionless" European force. Hence "the defeat of the Defense Community undermined the foundation of their [the *cédistes*] long-term plan for achieving by stages an integrated European community."[12] It did nothing of the kind, of course, as was proved by the parliamentary ratification in 1957 of the sovereignty-destroying treaties establishing Euratom and the Common Market. In terms of process, it is probably important to note that the coalition which approved these integrating measures was broadly identical with the one which voted ECSC into existence in 1951. The Lerner and Aron volume suffers from an overly restricted application of techniques whose introduction to the study of political integration is in itself a highly laudable step. It confines the use of ideological and behavioral data to one situation: EDC. Hence it consistently confuses opposition to German rearmament and to Cold War pressures with a rejection, on principle, of supranationalism. It confounds ideological factors let loose by the rearmament issue with general attitudinal strains which do not in fact overlap perfectly in the constituencies subject to them. It must also be noted, however, that the careful studies of the decision-making process in the French parliament contributed by Hoffmann and Fauvet constitute a unique fund of data and analytical skill exceedingly relevant to a complete understanding of how transnational integration is achieved or blocked.

The student of the integration process can derive a number of highly interesting factual and conceptual insights from the contributors to the Haines and Lerner volumes, whether they be ideologues, administrators, or scholars. However, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, a joint work by six historians and two political scientists, published under the auspices of the Princeton University Center for the Study of World Political Institutions, provides a far more solid basis for further work. The authors set out to study ten historical cases of successful and unsuccessful unions of states[13] in order to discover re-

[12] Lerner and Aron, *op.cit.*, p. xi.

[13] The cases selected for analysis include: the United States, 1789-1877; England-

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curring patterns or conditions making for the creation of a "security community"—i.e., the prevalence of the degree of integration and the common "we" feeling that make recourse to peaceful means for achieving change the standard political technique among the members. This basic concept is broken down into "amalgamated security communities" (i.e., federal or unitary states) and "pluralistic security communities" (i.e., confederations, perpetual alliances, or close permanent political co-operation among sovereigns). The "conditions" making for this happy state of affairs are divided into those which are considered "essential" (i.e., success of the union, while logically possible in their absence, was not in fact observed in the cases studied) and merely "helpful" (i.e., successful unions did occur in their absence, though not commonly). The authors are careful to note that "essential" conditions are not "necessary and sufficient" in the sense in which these terms are often used in discussions of the scientific method; they do not know *how many* such conditions may be needed to assure the success of either type of security community. The overriding and original merit of the study lies in the fact that a team of scholars worked with a common set of questions and used parallel indicators to sift through otherwise well-known historical material in order to obtain answers to a problem of process never before systematically studied on a comparative basis.

What, then, are the recurrent patterns discovered? Among the conditions found essential for both types of community, the authors stress the existence of initially compatible major value systems and the responsiveness of the elites involved in the process to each other's special needs and demands, a feature which includes both the existence of adequate physical channels of communication and the prevalence of mutual sympathy. Among the conditions found helpful in the establishment of a pluralistic security community, and essential for the amalgamated type, the authors note first and foremost the commitment to a "new way of life." By this they mean that a significant elite group, frequently composed of the rising generation, develops an attachment to values and techniques unrealized under the pre-existing government and considered attainable only by union with a larger territorial grouping. Such aspirations may include the realization of individual freedom

Scotland, until 1707; England-Ireland, until 1921; German unification, nineteenth century until 1871; Italian unification, Napoleonic Wars until 1860; Hapsburg monarchy, sixteenth century until 1918; Norway-Sweden, 1814-1907; Swiss unification, thirteenth century until 1848; England-Wales, late Middle Ages; unification of England in the Middle Ages. The guiding concepts and methods were derived from Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, 1954) and *Political Community at the International Level* (Garden City, N. Y., 1955).

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or economic welfare and the banning of violence when war is no longer considered practicable or rational; the commitment calls for "complementarity of expectations" among the actors in most parts of the area to be united. Further such unions are made possible by the existence of a "core area," a specific region combining superior economic growth with advanced techniques of political decision-making, administration, and defense. The elite governing such an area, if sufficiently responsive, will serve as a center of attraction for less developed and weaker neighboring elites. Such areas should enjoy a very wide range of interpersonal and intergroup transactions of all kinds, permit the free mobility of persons, and hold out substantial expectations of economic rewards as a result of union. Finally, the conditions must include the existence of significant links of communication among all strata of society, both vertically in each country and horizontally among the countries to be united, as well as a general broadening of the elite structure.

Lastly, the authors isolate a number of conditions found helpful but not essential to the realization of either kind of security community. The members should, but need not absolutely, be committed beforehand not to fight wars against each other. They may or may not be united by a common fear of an external threat. Strong economic ties may or may not help and ethnic compatibility is not a *sine qua non*—assimilation of ethnic groups being found in some, but by no means all, successful historical cases.

With reference to the NATO area in our own day, the authors are extremely cautious in the application of these findings. They note the prevalence of compatible value systems, of commitment to a new and distinctive way of life, the existence of the requisite core area (the United States-Canadian complex), of superior economic growth in that area, the universal broadening of elites, the unwillingness to fight wars among the members, and the existence of an external military threat. They doubt the existence of adequate mutual responsiveness—a key factor in either type—the expectation of significant joint economic rewards, the adequacy of the range of interpersonal transactions or of the communications links across national boundaries. And they note the very small degree of personal mobility among the countries in question. The book concludes with a series of fairly obvious policy recommendations on what might be done if the aim of policy-makers were the achievement of a pluralistic security community in NATO.

Certain negative findings advanced are perhaps even more important. The authors rebut as historically invalid a whole series of clichés which

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abound in discussions of regional integration. Thus increasing technical interdependence does not automatically lead to community consciousness; limited political unions do not automatically grow into more extensive and inclusive bodies; and the early centralized use of force is not necessarily a help to successful integration. Excessive military commitments, in fact, were partly responsible for the dissolution of several unions.

While some reservations might be entertained about the relevance of the notion of a "security community" in dealing with situations not involving the threat of hostilities, it is the great distinction of this work that it does advance concepts. The notion of the "take-off" in integration used by the authors seems especially useful. They argue that whenever an important elite in the area to be united adopts unification as its own aim, and thus lifts the symbols and programs associated with it from the level of literary or intellectual advocacy, integration acquires a momentum of its own, independent of the original external stimulus which produced it. When does this happen? It occurs whenever there is a claim to the achievement of a new way of life, tied to a changing pattern of demands and expectations at home, realizable only through union with the like-minded abroad. It may involve the achievement in nineteenth-century Switzerland, Germany, or Italy of free institutions and personal liberties; in the contemporary context, it could involve the attainment of military security against superpowers or the achievement of Monnet's welfare doctrine. The "take-off" depends on the preexisting complementarity of values, and profits from the deliberate deemphasis of "integration" as an end in itself in the propaganda of the unionists. It is accelerated whenever integration can be presented as a means to other, more directly desired, ends.

V

The Princeton volume is among the first systematic attempts at conceptualization and conceptual description of the integration process. It seeks to combine quantitative with qualitative techniques and indicators, make statistical analyses of such "objective" trends as the flow of mail and trade, and come to conclusions on the motives of elites on the basis of correlations. But these objectives involve the authors in some statements in which the maximum desirable crispness and precision of informing concepts are still unattained.

Thus, for my purposes at least, the notion of the "security community," especially the "pluralistic" kind, is too general. It emphasizes process largely in disregard of the institutional framework within which

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it is played out. I am convinced that the traditional structural classifications—federation, confederation, and looser types of intergovernmental systems—retain all of their relevance if their activities are submitted to behavioral rather than to formal analysis. The same is true of the study of parties at the national and international levels, for instance.[14] Contrasts of OEEC and ECSC convince me that the forms of organization can be vitally important in the study of integration and that a precise analysis need not begin with as general a concept as the pluralistic security community. We know enough about the workings of government at the international level to design our inquiries with more specific models in mind.

Further, no consistent effort is made to differentiate conditions which must exist *prior* to integration from those expected to prevail during the process. When the historical data are sifted and summarized, I gain the impression that the "conditions" thrown into focus are the same in all three stages of analysis. Thus the findings in the chapter on "background" are not much different from those in the treatment of "process," a conceptual generality which threatens to reduce some of the propositions to tautologies. Unless a different range of questions is asked at each stage of the analysis, the whole notion of integration as a process tends to be slurred over and only a more general discussion of conditions favorable or unfavorable to closer union is permitted. The vital role of social change in the process thus tends to be obscured, or at least blurred with respect to its correlation to specific environmental situations at given points in time.

When one deals with closed historical cases, it is of course exceedingly difficult to describe the motivations of elites in terms of direct information on aims and attitudes; the preference for objective indicators is natural. I am not convinced, however, that all the indicators marshaled by the authors are equally relevant and persuasive: the volume of transactions, the flow of communications, the adequacy of the network tend to prove something about the *existence* of close ties, but not necessarily about their *creation* or *development.* On the other hand, the notion of mutual responsiveness and the postulate of vertical and horizontal inter-elite links strike me as extremely relevant and valuable, even though their treatment demands non-quantitative approaches. At the same time, the lessons of the behavioral sciences must be applied more rigorously before the equally crucial notion of the compatibility

[14] For an elaboration of the fruitful marriage of institutional and behavioral analysis, see Avery Leiserson, "The Place of Parties in the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LI, No. 4 (December 1957), pp. 943-54.

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of value systems can be made more operationally specific in the context of international integration studies.

My own observations of integration among the six countries of Little Europe strongly re-enforce certain conclusions of the Princeton authors and challenge others. Mutual responsiveness and unbroken links of communication among political parties, interest groups, and civil servants across national frontiers are more a result than a cause of integration. The initial act of union—such as the adoption of the ECSC and Euratom treaties—provides the impetus, and its acceptance is usually explained by another recurrent theme unearthed by the Princeton authors, the holding-out of specific hopes for economic rewards and the advancing of very plain "bonuses" for those willing to unite. While the existence of an external threat is a far more important condition now than in the historical examples used, it is my conclusion that the notion of a "core area" of superior administrative and economic power is *not* today present as a center of attraction in Europe. In fact, West Germany has tended to serve the opposite purpose.

However, the mere fact that conclusions based on studies of integration dating from the twelfth through the nineteenth century do overlap even in part with observations made after the victory of industrialism, the mass society, the nuclear age, and two near-suicidal (for Europe) world wars testifies to the vigor and the importance of the Princeton study. Irrespective of massive changes in the total social context, certain recurrent behavior patterns are evident, even though the appeals used to achieve integration have, of course, varied directly with the preoccupation of each period. This finding should encourage us to pursue studies of this kind even though the guiding concepts will continue to undergo development. The volumes in question suggest that a coherent theory of supranational political integration is possible if we continue to try out enough indicators and test a sufficient number of historical findings in a variety of cultural, geographical, and time settings.

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SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE MOSLEM-ARAB WORLD

By MORROE BERGER

Richard N. Frye, ed., *Islam and the West*, The Hague, Mouton and Co., 1957, 215 pp. $3.25.

H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East.* Vol. I, *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century*, Part II, London, Oxford University Press, 1957, 285 pp. $5.60.

H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers, eds., *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1956, 671 pp. $12.75.

Reuben Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam*. Being the Second Edition of *The Sociology of Islam*, Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1957, 536 pp. $9.50.

Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism*, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1956, 227 pp. $4.00.

Anwar El Sadat, *Revolt on the Nile*, London, Allan Wingate, 1957, 131 pp. 12s 6d.

Doreen Warriner, *Land Reform and Development in the Middle East*, London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1957, 197 pp. 18s.

So pervasive and deep-rooted are the problems of the Moslem-Arab world that a group of disparate books such as the ones under review, which include histories, an encyclopedia, and discussions of recent political and economic changes, deals directly or implicitly with similar historical and current issues. The *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam* (which reprints the articles on religion and law from the first edition and supplement of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*) and the studies of Gibb and Bowen, and Levy, concentrate on Islamic societies in the past but tell us much about conditions, doctrines, and movements that are still relevant today. The symposium edited by Frye and the books by Nuseibeh, Sadat, and Warriner focus upon the present but they also refer to its antecedents.

Except for that of Levy and the *Shorter Encyclopaedia*, all the books discuss the "impact" of the West upon Islam (as several of their titles and subtitles show) and even these two volumes contain much that bears upon this process. Most of them also deal with political doctrines in earlier and contemporary Islamic societies. We shall discuss these two subjects in this review: the influence of the West, and certain political doctrines in Islam.

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I

Since the time of Napoleon, the West has displayed an acknowledged superiority to the Orient in science, technology, and military power. Europe has also claimed to have a politically and ethically superior social order, but this is not so uniformly conceded in the Moslem-Arab world. The Near East has borrowed from the West, both willingly and under compulsion—in frank and eager acknowledgment of superior Western modes, or in resentment at Western domination. Ideologically, the two leading responses to the European challenge have been the various attempts either to "modernize" Islamic doctrine or to reaffirm it in fundamentalist ways, and the growth of Arab nationalism and particularist nationalisms.

Western scholars and missionaries have given considerable attention to both of these ideologies, but they frequently exaggerate the degree to which Moslems themselves feel that their traditions are incompatible with modern secular thought and values. Except for a few theologians, the Moslem world is less concerned about this problem than are the Western Orientalists. And even among those Moslem theologians there are many, as Cragg points out in his contribution to the symposium *Islam and the West*, who have welcomed "in the name of Islam" precisely those values that others reject as "un-Islamic." He observes also that Islamic "modernism" has not "intended any far-reaching theological reconstruction" and that, far from seeking to revise basic doctrines, the modernists have sought only to adapt them to "new situations" and to liberate Moslems from the "incubus" of traditions that have been adhered to slavishly (pp. 150-51).

If no fundamental revision has been sought, it is because none is necessary; reinterpretation is equally effective and produces less wear and tear on the social fabric. In the same symposium, von Grunebaum reminds us of the self-protective device that many societies use when they borrow from more powerful societies for reasons of self-preservation or self-respect: they attribute the borrowed forms to their own traditions, as the Russians do now and as the Turks have done since the eighteenth century (according to Berkes and Rustow in Frye's volume). Interestingly, the most iconoclastic essay in this symposium is by a young Moslem educated in the West, Firuz Kazemzadeh, now a professor of history at Yale. To him, a favorite subject of Western Orientalists is really obsolete, for the "educated classes," in Iran at least (and, one suspects, in the Arab world as well), "have turned their backs completely on Islam. . . . In his attitude toward Islam, the present-day

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Persian intellectual is either ignorant and indifferent, or ignorant and hostile. There is a complete break between the intelligentsia and the clergy. . . . Many intellectuals have come to the conclusion that Islam itself is out of date and that the 'secret' of Western civilization lies in its secularism" (p. 195). In other words, except to the clergy itself, it is no longer a question of "accommodating" Islam to modern life; Islam is simply bypassed. This process is not unlike the one that we have known in the West; nor have we ourselves resolved the contradictions that Orientalists easily find in Islamic societies. Thomson makes this point most emphatically in Frye's volume. Has the West, he asks, "been able to resolve the conflicts between its religious beliefs and thought and its rational scientific theories, its moral and social ideals and its political and economic principles and practices" (p. 39)?

Islamic thought is thus seeking to preserve itself by accommodating to the secularism that has overtaken even the Near East. The old disputes about the "conflict" between Islamic doctrine and Arab nationalism, for example, become less and less relevant to thought and deed. This second response to the West, a nationalism that is secular, whatever use it seeks to make of religious issues and xenophobia, has clearly triumphed; and its victory is further confirmed all the time.

In *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism*, Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, a Jordanian civil servant who studied politics in this country, identifies as the two sources of this ideology the common Arab traditions and the "cultural impact of the West." The secularism of this impact is indicated in his insistence that Arab nationalism must shake off the vestiges of Islamic revivalism and follow the West in taking religion out of politics. This viewpoint, so far from the position of classical Islam, is also adopted by Anwar El Sadat, a member of the Egyptian army officers' group that took power in 1952. Although he has been attracted to Islamic revivalism in the past and is now the regime's liaison with the religious bodies, he states flatly in *Revolt on the Nile* that religion is "inherently" unfitted for political functions. "This confusion of temporal power with the spiritual," he observes, "has been the downfall of many Oriental societies" (p. 68).

An inseparable part of the Near East's modernization on the Western model has been the effort, going back to the Ottoman empire and its Arab provinces in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, to build an efficient military machine. As Berkes shows in his chapter in *Islam and the West*, eighteenth-century Ottoman military reforms ultimately failed because, being borrowed from Europe, they did not conform to the closely knit political-military system then prevailing. Since

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that time, the Near East has seen the growth of military elites or individual military leaders who have sought to change institutions in order to permit military power to develop more securely. In the twentieth century this phenomenon has been important in Turkey and Iran and is now in Syria and Egypt. As Sadat puts it with respect to Egypt up to the 1952 coup, the political parties "squabbled for power" but failed to achieve independence and strength. "The army had a right to intervene," he insists, "since both the government and the opposition parties were incapable of ending oppression" (p. 15).

Nuseibeh, however, rejects the notion that the current Arab military regimes mean that older indigenous political forms are reasserting themselves. He argues, instead, that these regimes are the consequences of Westernization. "Their roots," he says, "are to be found in the conditions, exigencies, fears, needs, and aspirations of a complex modern life" (p. 103). The foreign mandatory powers between the two world wars, he continues, introduced administrative efficiency but prevented the development by the Arabs of a political (as distinct from an administrative) capacity to govern and to be governed. Assuming political power at a time of great emphasis on social and economic goals, the native leaders have found these pressures "too great a strain upon the legal frameworks and the orderly processes of Arab governments." Hence the military regimes, he concludes.

In its classical period Islam combined the religious, political, and military elites. Today, although the political and military elites are again fusing, the religious elite remains apart and subordinate. But Islamic political doctrine has not adjusted to this situation. The theologians still speak of the "unity" of Islam as a religion, a community, and a polity. However, Gibb and Bowen, in the second part of the first volume of their valuable study of Islamic society in the eighteenth century (in preparation for future volumes on the subsequent Western impact), show that in reality this unity was shattered early in Islam's development. "No distinction was made at first," they point out, "between the secular and the religious offices of government. . . . But in practice the religion had to create the larger community. The task, already difficult in the limited area of Arabia, became infinitely more so when, as a result of the conquests of the first century [seventh century A.D.], the religion was spread from Central Asia to the Atlantic. . . . The imposing Empire of the early Caliphs, so far from forming a unity of any kind, consisted of an ill-assorted group of provinces held together by the military forces and moral prestige of the central government" (pp. 70-71).

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Such unity as the heterogeneous societies of Islam enjoyed was thus a matter of religious outlook only, although the claim of a political and religious unity has not been formally abandoned. Unlike Christian doctrine, says von Grunebaum in his chapter in *Islam and the West*, Islamic religious theory has never shunned temporal power as sinful. He cites two Moslem theologians in widely separated eras who confirm the doctrine and practice of Islam in Muhammad's own time that viewed political power as an indispensable adjunct to the religious duty to spread Islam. The full extent of the early de facto joining of religion and politics is illustrated in the article on the mosque (*masdjid*) in the *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*. "It was inherent in the character of Islam," the article states, "that religion and politics could not be separated. The same individual was ruler and chief administrator in the two fields, and the same building, the mosque, was the centre of gravity for both politics and religion" (p. 347a). In early Islam the mosque was the place where official proclamations were made. The business of government was soon moved to a special place, but even then the mosque continued to be used for some transactions requiring public meetings.

Despite this early close relationship, however, the later divergence between church and state became so marked in practice that the whole question has been a puzzling one for Western observers who seek some pattern in an unplanned patchwork. Gibb and Bowen provide a useful interpretation for the Ottoman period at least. Beginning with the fact that although the religious institutions were declared to be coterminous with the political, they actually were not in control of political life, Gibb and Bowen point out that the religious and political elites each performed their separate functions in tacit recognition of the other's sphere. Fearing anarchy more than bad government, the religious authorities taught political quietism all the while they were building up their own position outside the state. Thus developed a paradox to Western political science: a religion that claimed to be the state and a state whose main function it was (theoretically) to protect and spread the religion, but each going its separate way and, moreover, with the religion depending for its financial support upon private contributions rather than upon the state. As Gibb and Bowen put it: "Each had its own functions and rarely overstepped them. The state was concerned with military, administrative, and economic affairs; the religious institution with doctrine, law, education, intellectual life, and social relations" (pp. 79-80). Set apart from the state that it claimed to be, the religion guided its followers without relation to the state. "On the con-

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trary," Gibb and Bowen conclude, "the fundamental task of the *Ulema* [religious leaders] was to ensure that, no matter what political changes might come about, the religious institution, with all that it stood for, should remain unshaken" (p. 80).

II

There is reason to suspect (although the matter has not been systematically examined) that Moslem-Arab political thought has suffered from the smothering effect of theology's embrace. Because doctrine has been kept pure and unadulterated by practice (even, to some extent, in the case of realists like Ibn Khaldun), political thought has been weak. Nuseibeh, who deals with this subject more directly than the other authors under review, is most aware of this lack. Seeking a rationale for Arab nationalism, he comments that its literature "is noted for its dearth of political theory" and finds this feature characteristic also of the Arabs' "cultural legacy."

The present weakness of Moslem-Arab political theory is revealed in the very "negativism" of Arab nationalist writings (which Nuseibeh, incidentally, says is characteristic chiefly of the period since 1918 and which he attributes to the growth of "pessimism" resulting from Western imperialism). It is also revealed in Miss Doreen Warriner's excellent study, *Land Reform and Development in the Middle East.* She points to Egypt's as the most dynamic of the current schemes for land reform and economic development, but adds that "The present Government of Egypt has ideals but no ideology. . . ." Following an "ad hoc policy" not identifiable with any well-articulated political "ism," Egypt, she says, simply has adopted the U.N.'s "line of thinking about the economic development of underdeveloped countries." This "line" is indeed reaching the status of an "ideology" in Asia and Africa. What she says of Egypt probably applies to the whole region: "The lack of a doctrinaire ideology has been an advantage in that it has increased international bargaining power" (p. 11). This euphemism for the motives and achievements of "positive neutralism" indicates nothing of the domestic effects of raising economic development to so high a priority as to ignore democratic political values that newly independent nations have professed in their struggle against foreign control.

The "international bargaining" advantage of this undoctrinaire approach, moreover, does not conceal other domestic failures owing to the lack of political doctrine, such as the weakness of domestic reform. Miss Warriner says, for example, that the Egyptian land distribution scheme is "not apparently a revolutionary measure at all" in its effects. Far from

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being part of a consistent body of ideas, it was, she implies, little more than a move against the deposed "royal family and a small number of wealthy landowners." The largest part of the land expropriated was owned by the royal family and only fifteen or twenty others. And although the peasants who have been able to buy the land (without acquiring rights of ownership for thirty years) now have a higher income and greater security, the mode and scale of farming remain essentially unchanged. The peasants now deliver their crops to the government-controlled co-operative, which they are obligated to join, instead of to the private estate manager. Nevertheless, says Miss Warriner (who is not as disturbed as other Western observers are by positive neutralism and collective farming), "The Government has done as much as was practicable, and far more than might have been expected" (p. 48). But she does not tell us what standard of measurement she is employing.

An equally endemic weakness of political thought in Islam has been the failure to develop a stable theory of succession to rule. In his valuable survey of classical Islam, now reissued after being long out of print, Levy reviews the facts of the very first evidence of this gap at the death of Muhammad. The new religious groups made no provision "for the continuance of government in the community and no successor was appointed to the man who was the head of the State as well as the spiritual guide of the community" (p. 277). Very early, disputes as to the mode of succession and as to specific successors arose. At first elective, the office of caliph (successor to Muhammad) soon became hereditary, although in the doctrine of the theologians it was nevertheless usually said to be elective, as an article (*khalifa*) makes clear in the *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Despite the triumph of the hereditary principle, the elective principle—the mode of succession in the desert tribes before and since Islam—has exerted considerable force. In recent years, for example, the fundamentalist movement called the Moslem Brothers planned to substitute an elective monarchy for Egypt's hereditary one, according to Sadat in *Revolt on the Nile*. And just before the Egyptian plebiscite in 1956 which confirmed Nasser as president of the republic, an English-language magazine (*Egyptian Economic and Political Review*, May 1956, p. 17) remarked about the election: "In itself it will be only the normalization of a situation whose fundamental legality has never been seriously challenged. In the Moslem world the justification for leadership has been ability and capacity. The form of that leadership is secondary and relatively unimportant." This is true; leadership in Islam has been "legitimate" if it could maintain itself in power.

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Guglielmo Ferrero laid down a basic requirement for legitimacy in a hereditary monarchy: a clear, precise, and strictly observed rule of succession. Governments in Islamic societies have been unable to hold to a steady mode of hereditary succession—they have switched from the late sovereign's eldest son to any son, to the eldest survivor in the family, to election from within the family. When these governments followed the principle of election, there was never any agreement as to who elected and what were the rights and duties of majority and minority. Indeed, majority and minority in Islamic governments have not permitted each other to perform appropriate functions in a stable manner. This has been especially true since the introduction of the parliamentary system on the Western model.

For all Islam's incapacity to develop a body of autonomous political theory, Islamic governments have known political stability in the past and have been successful in accommodating a variety of ethnic, national, linguistic, and religious groups. After all, a single dynasty provided the rulers of the Ottoman empire for more than six centuries prior to the present one (although half the rulers were dethroned). And Islamic societies very early worked out a humane doctrine and practice for permitting Christians and Jews (the "people of the Book") to retain a considerable degree of self-government. Yet this doctrine has not been able to serve modern Arab nationalism, which requires organic unity of all groups in the nation, not merely accommodation through subordination and avoidance.

III

Orientalists and historians, such as several of the authors we have been discussing, are fond of telling us that knowledge of the Near Eastern past will help us to understand the present. As Western scholars, they insist on the continuity of Moslem-Arab history down to the present. The Moslems and Arabs among our authors, however, are more apt to stress the break with the past.

When the question of political instability in the Arab world is posed, the Orientalist tells us that it was always this way; weren't three of the first four caliphs murdered in office? If the social scientist asks why the state seems to be the chief agent (if any) of economic growth, the historian points to the traditional claims to omnipotence made by governments in Islam. If, as some Arabs have themselves concluded after careful study, there is a great deal of personal competitiveness in Arab society, the historian may remind us that Clot Bey, the French physician who in 1829 built the first medical school in Egypt, remarked that he

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used the Arabs' highly competitive spirit to spur them in courses and examinations.

What have these historical traits to do with their apparent counterparts in the present? The historians fail to tell us; they simply have a faith that there is some connection. The social scientist interested in the contemporary Near East too often accepts the antecedent as an "explanation" of the current phenomenon. (The problem of the relationship between history and the present is an old one, of course, which philosophers are now exploring anew.) It would help a great deal if both the historians and the social scientists examined their convenient assumption and sought to demonstrate more precisely the link between past and present. Consider the question of competitiveness. This feature of interpersonal relations must be explained in terms of influences felt now, not as a continuation of an earlier relationship. The fact that competitiveness was characteristic of a previous era is interesting but not explanatory. On the other hand, the social scientist can find in historical analyses hypotheses to be tested in the present, for it may be that the conditions making for competitiveness a hundred years ago still prevail in some way. In that case, these *present conditions*, and not the competitiveness of a century ago, explain competitiveness today.

Unfortunately, social scientists have been reluctant to bother with history. This is to some extent understandable, because much historical writing (especially on the Near East) is limited by the kinds of documents left from past eras and by the historians' and Orientalists' preoccupation with matters which many social scientists consider irrelevant to the present. The historians and Orientalists are of course entitled to study whatever they like, relevant or irrelevant as it may be to the present. But they ought not to assume so easily that what they say is indispensable to the understanding of the present.

Among the authors under review, Nuseibeh is most aware of this problem, because one of his purposes is to find in the past what is both influential and desirable for Arab nationalism today. He therefore displays a familiar ambivalence toward the past: he wants to find traditions and achievements to inspire Arabs today, but he also wants them to reject the weakness and stagnation of long centuries of Arab subordination. He must accordingly insist, against the Orientalists whom he does not name, that the "thought and the beliefs of the contemporary Arabs are substantially at variance with those of their predecessors in ages past"—but he cautiously adds, in deference to a widespread though unspecified faith, "notwithstanding that the past has thrust its characteristics upon the present in varying degrees and in manifold ways" (p.

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vii). He asks quite legitimately: ". . . why should the theories or the practices of a thousand years ago be regarded as more essential or innate . . . than those of this century" (p. 107)?

The seven volumes under review provide abundant material for analysis of the relation between past and present, although none of the authors has set himself to this task. Until both historians and social scientists begin to specify the ways in which the past helps to explain the present, Morris R. Cohen's remark about the historical introduction in studies of value will apply to current books on social institutions: "As a rule it will be found that the historical introduction is very much like the chaplain's prayer which opens a legislative session or political convention: very little of the subsequent proceedings are decided by reference to it."

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THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

By ROBERT W. TUCKER

Vernon Van Dyke, *International Politics*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957, 483 pp. $5.50.
Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1957, 637 pp. $6.25.

I

IT would be unfortunate if the recent proliferation of textbooks on international relations served only to give added stimulus to the long-standing conviction that texts are not to be regarded seriously by serious scholars. The view that texts of necessity represent little more than a low-grade distillation and simplification—usually oversimplification—of the work of scholars laboring at the frontiers of the field has always had numerous supporters. It would be pointless to deny that there are texts whose contents appear to validate that judgment. Still, there is surely no compelling reason that precludes a text from representing a distinguished and challenging work of scholarship, as the well-known text of Professor Hans Morgenthau clearly shows. Nor is there any compelling reason for accepting the assumption that the nature of a text somehow requires avoiding the critical utilization of recent research or eschewing controversial issues, let alone taking a clear position on such issues. If the authors of some texts have in fact done just this, it is less a reflection on the supposed "nature" of texts than a comment on the authors themselves and, it is only fair to add, on the nefarious pressures exerted by some publishers.

Indeed, it may reasonably be contended that texts on international relations can and should provide a useful means for furthering a number of serious purposes, quite apart from the obvious purpose of informing the student and arousing his curiosity. It is in the writing of a general text that the need clearly arises to impose a greater measure of order on the vast and amorphous materials that make up the study of international relations. Out of this effort new theoretical insights may come. On the reverse side, texts should serve as an excellent testing ground for theories developed elsewhere in highly abstract form. If a theory is incapable of meaningful verification because of its ambiguity, if it can be maintained only by ignoring much of reality, and if it proposes an elaborate and complex structure for the solution of problems

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that may be resolved by far simpler and better known methods—these and other defects may become readily apparent when the theorist is confronted with the necessity of ordering and interpreting the empirical materials that are to be included in the general text. Finally, it may be suggested that texts ought to provide a useful opportunity not only for examining a variety of controversial issues but also for critically analyzing some of the principal contributions that have been made to the solution of these issues. Significant and relevant intellectual controversies need not and should not be regarded as somehow out of place in a text, nor should the principal contributions to these controversies be pictured as disembodied spirits free from any attachment to particular persons.

Both of the texts under review represent serious efforts to bring clarity and a greater measure of order to a complex subject. Professor Van Dyke's work is consciously limited to the study of international politics, a study he conceives as being primarily concerned with the "power struggle among the governments of sovereign states" (p. 12) and particularly with that aspect of struggle which takes the form of armed conflict. With the stated objective of describing and explaining the mutual behavior of states, the author poses two principal questions: first, why do states behave as they do (a question concerning motivations and objectives) and, second, by what methods and under what limiting conditions do states pursue these objectives? Since war, potential or actual, remains the major problem of international politics, Professor Van Dyke strives throughout to turn his analysis to the purpose of illuminating the causes of war and the conditions of peace. In part, achievement of this latter purpose is sought by frequent comparison and analogy with the domestic political process and the factors making for either peace or conflict within the state.

Although the title of Professor Hartmann's volume suggests a broader field of interest than that of Professor Van Dyke's, he nevertheless comes to very nearly the same delimitation. The focus of the study of international relations, he declares, "is on the processes by which states adjust their national interests to those of other states"—national interests being defined "in terms of what states seek to protect or achieve vis-à-vis other states" (p. 5). It is Professor Hartmann's intention to present a distinct theory of international relations, a theory based in the main on the concept of "national interest." While conceding the variability of national interests from state to state, and even for the same state in different periods and circumstances, the author professes to find in this concept a tool of considerable value for theoretical analysis. It may be

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observed, however, that the distinctive part of his study is not so much concerned with a development and application of this concept as with the development of what the author has termed the "problem of power" which each nation faces and the nature of the various responses that may be made to this problem.

II

Both of these texts reflect the view that international politics should form the core of the study of international relations. Still further, both reflect the view, though Professor Van Dyke does so more explicitly, that power is the distinctive criterion of the political relationship. It follows that the study of international politics should not focus upon the sum of state relations but upon a certain type of relationship—that relationship involving the element of power. A strong case may be made for this position. How we order a vast body of data and what we select for study inevitably depend upon our interest—upon what we are looking for and what we consider significant. There are, after all, a large number of relationships carried on daily by states to which students of international politics pay little attention for the reason that these relationships are not regarded as significant. An unbiased view of the matter requires the admission that they are not considered significant because they do not involve the element of power. They may be considered an "interest" of the state (indeed, it is difficult to conceive of them otherwise if they are carried on by states) but they are not an interest related to the state's power. It is this concern with power, then, which provides a focus for the study of international politics. And while it is quite true that the concern with power is not imposed on us by the object of investigation, while it is we who do the imposing, this concern nevertheless does find a kind of objective correspondence in the materials studied. For the fundamental consideration of all nations is, as Professor Hartmann points out, that they are "involved in a power problem from which they cannot escape by an act of will, each must fear that it may be attacked, each must reckon with this power problem" (p. 251).

At the same time, it is necessary to observe that if power is defined as the ability to influence or control the behavior of others, or simply as the capacity to produce intended effects on the behavior of others, the view that makes power the distinctive criterion of the political relationship certainly casts a very wide net. Since the foreign policy of every state does intend to produce certain effects through influencing the behavior of others (if only the negative effect of being left alone), it may

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be regarded as a power policy. And Professor Van Dyke rightly insists that the power struggle also implies co-operative as well as conflicting relationships, that the very fact of intense conflict among some states in turn requires the closest collaboration among other states. Professor Hartmann makes much the same point. Nor does it follow that in making power the distinctive criterion of political relationships we are thereby committed to the acceptance of problematic theories regarding the causes of state behavior.

III

Professor Hartmann's analysis raises once again the question of the usefulness of the concept of "national interest," for it is his position that this concept provides an analytical tool which "permits us in a single phrase to deal with what is inherently varied and complex" (p. viii). Yet if national interests do "vary enormously" from state to state, and even for the same state in different periods and under different circumstances, how does the concept of national interest serve as the basis for a distinct theory of international politics? Does not the concept constitute a kind of empty vessel into which anything may be poured? Can it possess a clear meaning in view of its compatibility with any number of interpretations? The function of an analytical tool is not that of serving as a label for a mass of phenomena which are admittedly of a varied and complex character. Instead, it must serve to bring a certain order and hence a certain meaning to these phenomena that are not otherwise apparent; it must be able to make meaningful distinctions and to indicate useful similarities.

Professor Hartmann is not unaware of these objections to the concept of national interest. While stressing the variability of national interests, he nevertheless points out that there is an "irreducible core" of interests for any state at any time which consists of the state's "vital" interests. Vital interests are defined as those interests for which a state "is normally willing to go to war immediately or ultimately" and include "as a minimum, the protection and preservation of their existing territory" (p. 5). Still further, they are distinguished from "less-than-vital" or "secondary" interests which "cover all the myriad desires of individual states that they would like to obtain but for which they will not fight" (p. 5). It is the latter that presumably represent the variable element in the concept of national interest, whereas the former represent the fixed element.

Does this distinction dispose of the difficulties, particularly the ambiguities, attending the concept of national interest? If we are told that,

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although security is the sum total of the vital interests of the state, what it means for each state nevertheless varies with each state, then security itself seems to become almost as ambiguous a concept as national interest. Nor is it the case, as the author makes clear, that the variations in the meaning attached to security result only from the objective factors characterizing the position of each state in the international system. In large measure, these variations arise simply from the necessarily subjective interpretation each nation must make in determining the precise circumstances in which its security interest is satisfied. Thus, in discussing the causes of war, Professor Hartmann concludes that an analysis of the causes of particular conflicts may have little predictive value for future ones for the reason that what causes war in one instance may fail completely to have a similar effect on another occasion. It is not merely the so-called objective factors that bring on war but the attitude toward or the interpretation of those factors by the disputants. What is regarded by a nation in one period as vital to its security and worth fighting for may well be regarded in another period as no more than a peripheral interest not worth the price of war.

This is not to imply, however, that the concept of national interest, or, more accurately perhaps, the nature of the effort implicit in this concept, is of no utility to a science of international politics. It is only to suggest that the functions which this concept may serve should be clearly understood and that it not be put forward as a solution for problems which it is plainly incapable of resolving. In essence, the concept of national interest would appear to proceed largely from the assumption, which will scarcely be controverted, that the nation-state represents the institution to which the overwhelming majority of men give their supreme allegiance. In consequence, it follows that the preservation and security of the state will generally take precedence over all other concerns. It also follows that there will be a certain minimum uniformity of behavior on the part of states when these basic interests are threatened. Still further, the concept of national interest would appear to imply that in any given situation there are, in view of the specific characteristics of the international system and the power a state can bring to bear in that system, only a limited number of responses (or types of responses) which a state may make in resolving its security problem.

To be sure, the concept of national interest has been frequently criticized because it implies certain general assumptions as to the nature and relative importance of the forces that condition the behavior of states. But it is difficult to see how a theory of international politics that

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strives for a high degree of generalization can proceed without making such assumptions. Whether or not such assumptions or the inferences to be drawn from them are designated by the term "national interest" is of little importance. Thus, in Professor Van Dyke's analysis of the forces and conditions which make states behave as they do, the concept of national interest receives no emphasis. It is also true that in examining the factors which determine state behavior, the author expressly disavows the attempt either to rank the various factors in order of their influence or to discriminate between factors considered as fundamental and factors regarded as merely derivative or superficial. Nevertheless, it seems to this reviewer that the net result of Professor Van Dyke's analysis clearly reflects the very assumptions noted above. He too assumes that men give to the state a paramount place over all other institutions which compete for their loyalty. He too is forced to conclude that, for all states, self-preservation and security will be regarded as primary objectives and that a certain minimum uniformity of behavior follows from this fact.

It should be apparent that the concept of national interest finds its principal utility only on the most general level of analysis, that it suggests an analysis in which the investigator's concern is in discerning the general patterns of state behavior and the typical reactions of states to recurring kinds of situations. While recognition of this serves to underline the limitations of the concept and of the analysis that it implies, it also serves to emphasize its importance. A science of international politics must have as its first goal the formulation of valid generalizations of the nature indicated above. It is to the fulfillment of this task that the concept of national interest is addressed. The point therefore deserves emphasis that in an analysis which strives for a high level of generalization, the very simplicity of the assumptions on the basis of which the analysis proceeds represents a considerable asset which is turned into a liability only if they are used for unsuitable purposes. One of these is the nourishing of futile expectations as to the predictive value of such an analysis. The precise response that a state may make in a given situation will inevitably depend on a large number of factors, part of which are found on a low level of generality, part of which are unique to each state, and part of which are entirely contingent in character. Hence, the attempt to apply the results of a general analysis in order to "resolve" current policy controversies must always prove suspect. The interest (e.g., security) whose significance appears clear on the level of a general analysis may appear vague and uncertain on the concrete level of policy. It is an illusion to believe that the specific

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requirements of policy (and the requirements of policy are *always* specific) can somehow be deduced from the theoretical insights furnished by such a general analysis.[1]

The utility of a general analysis when applied to concrete situations therefore ought never to be exaggerated. Between the results of such an analysis and the requirements of a specific situation there is only seldom a direct and perceptible connection. Still further, the more general the level of analysis the less apparent that connection becomes. In part, it is the recognition of this point that accounts for the recent emphasis on the policy-making process within states as well as the role and relative influence of groups and elites on the determination of policy. Neither Professor Hartmann nor Professor Van Dyke has paid a great deal of attention to the process of foreign policy formation and to what current terminology labels as the "subordinate actors" in the international political process. Whether this lack of emphasis is to be regarded as an element of weakness in a text on international politics is a matter about which there are presently strong differences of opinion.

It seems clear, however, that the principal justification for the emphasis given in the texts reviewed must be found in the general character that each author has sought to give to his analysis. For such an analysis the decisive question is not the relevance as such of the decision-making process in foreign policy and the influence of particular groups and elites in that process. No one denies the relevance of such investigations for a more complete understanding of "state behavior," and especially for a more complete comprehension of a specific state's foreign policy at a particular time. However, the critical question here is not whether such investigations are relevant, but whether they are so significant as to form the basis of a *science* of international politics and the focus of the study of international politics. In other terms, how relevant are such investigations for understanding the general patterns of state behavior and the typical reactions of states to recurring types of situations? Would preoccupation with the decision-making process and with the role of groups and elites in that process have the result of overemphasizing what is essentially unique, while neglecting those uniformities that

[1] Professor Van Dyke's study clearly seems to reflect the above conclusion. On the other hand, Professor Hartmann's text leaves the reader in some doubt as to this point. In the final section of his book, which is devoted to an examination of the foreign policies of the major Powers, Professor Hartmann occasionally gives the impression that it is his purpose to apply the results of his general analysis in order to resolve current policy controversies. But this is to misconstrue the nature and purposes of such an analysis, a point which Professor Hartmann himself appears to acknowledge elsewhere in his study.

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have been illuminated by the type of inquiry exemplified by the concept of national interest?

IV

There is one problem suggested by both of these texts that deserves special attention; it concerns the importance of the international system as a factor in the explanation of state behavior. Although Professor Van Dyke's analysis by no means regards the international political process as a mere extension of domestic politics, it nevertheless proceeds on the assumption that the two have much in common and that an understanding of international politics will be facilitated by the device of frequent comparison. And yet the comparisons he draws between domestic and international politics, while valid in themselves, seem to have the net effect of emphasizing their differences. In this connection, it may also be observed that Professor Van Dyke's discussion of the methods and limiting conditions in international politics clearly illustrates how difficult it is to separate the limitations imposed on states by the environment in which they must act from the problem of state motivations and objectives. No doubt, the latter are not caused simply by this environment, by the nature and characteristics of the state system in a given period. There is no question of pure influence involved here and Professor Van Dyke makes out an impressive case to this effect in his discussions of ideological motivations and objectives as well as psychological factors in war and peace. At the same time, one might wish that the author had concentrated a greater part of his efforts on the possibilities offered by a more conscious development of this method of analysis.

Professor Hartmann, on the other hand, has placed a more deliberate emphasis on the importance of the international system in conditioning state behavior. In a major section of his text, entitled "The Problem of Power and the Power Patterns," he has based his analysis on the simple proposition that all states are confronted with a power problem which they must somehow resolve. Although the manner in which each state seeks to resolve this problem will be determined in part by the particular interests which each entertains, it remains true that only a limited number of responses are theoretically possible. Which of these responses will represent practical alternatives for statecraft must depend in turn upon the more specific characteristics of the international system in a given period and, of course, on the position of the state in this system. One may raise certain questions about the manner in which Professor Hartmann has developed his analysis, but there seems little doubt as to

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its general utility and in examining the patterns of collective security and the balance of power the author has amply demonstrated this point. Earlier, it has been suggested that this section represents the distinctive contribution of Professor Hartmann's text rather than his development of the concept of national interest. Indeed, the major criticism directed against the type of analysis implied by the concept of national interest—its extremely general character and hence the seeming ambiguity of its results—can be partially met only by supplementing this analysis with the results of an inquiry which concentrates on the specific characteristics of the international system in a given period. The latter inquiry, in delineating the possible responses or types of responses which states may make in resolving their security problems, thereby gives greater clarity and meaning to the concept of national interest itself.

In a period marked by rapid and far-reaching changes in the international system, we have only begun to examine the effects of these changes on the behavior of states. The impact of nuclear technology on the traditional functions of war, to take the most notable of these changes, remains a matter over which the most diverse judgments are expressed. Professor Van Dyke has observed that although nuclear weapons must raise grave doubt about the continued usefulness of war as an instrument of policy, the substitutes for war are also very problematic; hence, the future of international politics becomes extremely uncertain. Yet if this is true, it no longer seems altogether sufficient to continue to state, as Professors Hartmann and Van Dyke both do, that nations seek security rather than peace *per se* and that peace is a by-product of security. The interest in peace, like the interest in security, is not constant and cannot be determined in the abstract. In a nuclear age, the interest in peace may well have the effect of eventually forcing the identification of the security interest with that of self-preservation, the latter being considered in its most narrow and immediate sense. Such an identification would represent an almost revolutionary change in the international system. There is no reason why texts should not play a significant role in the task of analyzing the consequences for the international system of the many changes that we are presently witnessing.

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